For example, under the totality of the circumstances test, unimpeachable veracity may offset a lack of demonstrated reliability when the police are dealing with a new informant. The Court emphasized that probable cause is a practical, nontechnical concept based on probabilities and common sense. Although Gates outlines the probable cause necessary to support a warrant, the underlying principle and the totality of the circumstances test have been applied to probable cause for a warrantless arrest as well. United States v. McCraw, 920 F.2d 224 (4th Cir. 1990). An appellate court makes an independent judgment as to the legality of the arrest, but factual findings made by the trial court will not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous.

Law enforcement officers may not circumvent the arrest warrant requirement by simply summoning a suspect to the doorway of the suspect's home in order to effect an arrest in a "public place." United States v. McCraw, 920 F.2d 224 (4th Cir. 1990); United States v. Morgan, 743 F.2d 1158 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1061, 105 S.Ct. 2126, 85 L.Ed.2d 490 (1985). In McCraw the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that when a person answers a knock at a hotel room door he "does not surrender his expectation of privacy nor consent to the officers' entry by so doing, and that his arrest inside his room under such circumstances is contrary to the fourth amendment and the United States Supreme Court's decision in Payton v. New York.

This prohibition is especially powerful when it comes to "protect[ing] the physical integrity of the home." United States v. McCraw, 920 F.2d 224, 230 (4th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted). The majority recognizes that Schoop was acting as a government agent when he entered Seidman's home.

1. Legal Standard "A combination of tips from an informant and first-hand corroborative observation of suspicious activity will provide probable cause . . . ." United States v. McCraw, 920 F.2d 224, 227 (4th Cir. 1990). In determining whether an anonymous tip gives rise to probable cause "the degree to which the report is corroborated is an important consideration."

The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has distinguished Santana on the facts that a defendant did not leave his apartment, but merely opened the door halfway to determine the identity of the person, who turned out to be a police officer, knocking on his door. See United States v. McCraw, 920 F.2d 224, 229 (4th Cir. 1990). In this instance, the defendant did not voluntarily expose his activities to the public and, therefore, did not relinquish his expectation of privacy.

The warrant requirement applies equally to searches and seizures conducted in lawfully acquired hotel rooms. Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 490, 84 S.Ct. 889, 11 L.Ed.2d 856 (1964); United States v. Kitchens, 114 F.3d 29, 31 (4th Cir. 1997); United States v. McCraw, 920 F.2d 224, 228 (4th Cir. 1990). In this case, the Barboursville Red Roof Inn's records confirm that Angel Belasquez lawfully checked into a room for two adults shortly after 3:00 p.m. on June 22, 1997.

"Probable cause exists if `at that moment the facts and circumstances within [the officers'] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the [suspect] had committed or was committing an offense.'" United States v. McCraw, 920 F.2d 224, 227 (4th Cir. 1990) (quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91, 85 S.Ct. 223, 225, 13 L.Ed.2d 142 (1964)). "Probable cause is based upon the `totality of the circumstances.'"

McClish did not completely surrender or forfeit every reasonable expectation of privacy when he opened the door, including, most notably, the right to be secure within his home from a warrantless arrest. See Hadley, 368 F.3d at 750 ("The fact that a person answers a knock at the door doesn't mean he agrees to let the person who knocked enter."); Berkowitz, 927 F.2d at 1387 ("Answering a knock at the door is not an invitation to come in the house."); United States v. McCraw, 920 F.2d 224, 228 (4th Cir.1990) ("We hold that a person does not surrender his expectation of privacy nor consent to the officers' entry by [opening the door], and that his arrest inside his room under such circumstances is contrary to the fourth amendment and . . . Payton"); Duncan v. Storie, 869 F.2d 1100, 1103 (8th Cir.1989); cf. Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 137 n. 7, 110 S.Ct. 2301, 110 L.Ed.2d 112 (1990). Simply put, the fact that an officer may view a subject in the interior of a home through an open door does not alter the basic rule that a warrantless entry into the home to effect an arrest is prohibited absent consent or exigent circumstances.

Circuit court precedent is also divided, with some decisions helpful to the police in this case and others less so. Compare, e.g., United States v. Rengifo, 858 F.2d 800, 804-05 (1st Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1023 (1989) and United States v. Carrion, 809 F.2d 1120, 1123, 1128 n. 9 (5th Cir. 1987) with United States v. McCraw, 920 F.2d 224, 229-30 (4th Cir. 1990) and United States v. Curzi, 867 F.2d 36, 40 (1st Cir. 1989). Given the unsettled state of the law, we have no hesitation in concluding that the officers in this case are protected by qualified immunity which protects public officials against section 1983 liability so long as they acted reasonably.

Under Belton, "the police may also examine the contents of any containers found within the passenger compartment." Id.; see also United States v. McCraw, 920 F.2d 224, 228 (4th Cir. 1990) ("Incident to an automobile occupant's lawful arrest, police may search the passenger compartment of the vehicle and examine the contents of any containers found within the passenger compartment."). "Containers," as defined in Belton, includes the glove compartment.