United States ex rel. Williams v. Martin-Baker Aircraft Co.

255 Citing cases

  1. Singletary v. Howard Univ.

    939 F.3d 287 (D.C. Cir. 2019)   Cited 51 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Concluding that "the mere notice of termination is a cognizable adverse employment action regardless of whether the employer follows through"

    That factor pertains only to Section 3730(h)(1) ’s causal inquiry, which asks whether the University was on notice of her protected activity. See United States ex rel. Williams v. Martin-Baker Aircraft Co. , 389 F.3d 1251, 1261 (D.C. Cir. 2004). In short, when looked at through the proper legal lens, the proposed complaint plausibly alleges that Singletary undertook lawful acts in furtherance of her "efforts to stop 1 or more violations" of the False Claims Act.

  2. Scollick ex rel. United States v. Narula

    Case No. 14-cv-1339 (RCL) (D.D.C. Feb. 25, 2021)   Cited 1 times

    In the context of the False Claims Act, Rule 9(b)'s heightened pleading standard requires, at minimum, that the pleader "state the time, place, and content of the false misrepresentations, the fact misrepresented[,] and what was given up as a consequence of the fraud." United States ex rel. Williams v. Martin-Baker Aircraft Co. ("Williams"), 389 F.3d 1251, 1256 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (quoting Kowal v. MCI Commc'ns Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1278 (D.C. Cir. 1974)). The pleader must also "identify individuals allegedly involved in the fraud." Id.

  3. United States ex rel. Hutchins v. Dyncorp Int'l, Inc.

    342 F. Supp. 3d 32 (D.D.C. 2018)   Cited 4 times
    Finding relators did not state a claim under the FCA when they alleged that the contractor hired unqualified employees because they did not explain how the contractor's "internal hiring decisions were material to the decisions of the Army" and no performance issues were alleged

    Taken together, Rules 8 and 9(b) require that "the pleader state the time, place and content of the false misrepresentations, the fact misrepresented and what was retained or given up as a consequence of the fraud" and "identify individuals allegedly involved in the fraud." United States ex rel. Williams v. Martin-Baker Aircraft Co. , 389 F.3d 1251, 1256 (D.C. Cir. 2004). The circumstances must be pled with sufficient particularity that a defendant can "defend against the charge and not just deny that they have done anything wrong," id. at 1259 (quoting United States ex rel. Lee v. SmithKline Beecham, Inc. , 245 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2001) ), but "[w]hat allegations are needed to invest the complaint with indicia of reliability ... depend on the nature of the fraud alleged."

  4. State ex rel. Banerjee v. Moody's Corp.

    2016 N.Y. Slip Op. 51771 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2016)

    This Court finds that the question of whether a plaintiff's internal complaints fall outside the scope of his or her normal job responsibilities is a factor more appropriately analyzed under the employer's knowledge (i.e., notice) prong, instead of the first "protected activity" element. See, e.g., U.S. ex rel. Williams v. Martin-Baker Aircraft Co., 389 F.3d 1251, 1260 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (noting that the employer's argument that plaintiff-relator failed to engage in protected activity because the actions alleged did not go beyond his normal job requirements "conflate[d] Yesudian's first two requirements — that the employee engage in 'protected activity' and that the employer have notice — we read [the employer's] brief as raising only the latter"); but see Landfield, 112 AD3d at 488 (appears to have conflated the two requirements in holding that, because plaintiff's activity was part of his typical job responsibilities, he failed to engage in protected activity). It is conceivable that a plaintiff's activity would ordinarily be protected (e.g., specifically grounded in fraud, illegality, etc.), but the claim otherwise fails, as a whole, if the speech fell within the plaintiff's job duties and therefore could not have put the employer on notice of such protected speech.

  5. State ex rel. Banerjee v. Moody's Corp.

    50 N.Y.S.3d 28 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2016)

    This Court finds that the question of whether a plaintiff's internal complaints fall outside the scope of his or her normal job responsibilities is a factor more appropriately analyzed under the employer's knowledge (i.e., notice) prong, instead of the first "protected activity" element. See, e.g., U.S. ex rel. Williams v. Martin–Baker Aircraft Co., 389 F.3d 1251, 1260 (D.C.Cir.2004) (noting that the employer's argument that plaintiff-relator failed to engage in protected activity because the actions alleged did not go beyond his normal job requirements "conflate[d] Yesudian's first two requirements—that the employee engage in ‘protected activity’ and that the employer have notice—we read [the employer's] brief as raising only the latter"); but see Landfield, 112 AD3d at 488 (appears to have conflated the two requirements in holding that, because plaintiff's activity was part of his typical job responsibilities, he failed to engage in protected activity). It is conceivable that a plaintiff's activity would ordinarily be protected (e.g., specifically grounded in fraud, illegality, etc.), but the claim otherwise fails, as a whole, if the speech fell within the plaintiff's job duties and therefore could not have put the employer on notice of such protected speech.

  6. United States ex rel. Head v. Kane Co.

    798 F. Supp. 2d 186 (D.D.C. 2011)   Cited 69 times
    Holding that "the plain language of" section 3730(h) "applies only to the employment context and, therefore, cannot extend to claims for retaliatory action occurring solely after a Plaintiff has been terminated from his job"

    Claims brought under the FCA state an action in fraud, and therefore are subject to Rule 9(b)'s pleading requirements. U.S. ex rel. Williams v. Martin–Baker Aircraft Co., 389 F.3d 1251, 1256 (D.C.Cir.2004).

  7. Si v. Foundation

    71 F. Supp. 3d 73 (D.D.C. 2014)   Cited 91 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Holding that plaintiff stated a claim for retaliation where he first reported possible fraud in 2005 and was fired in 2008

    In an FCA fraud action, Rule 9(b) requires, at a minimum, that the pleader “state the time, place and content of the false misrepresentations, the fact misrepresented and what was retained or given up as a consequence of the fraud” and “individuals allegedly involved in the fraud.” United States ex rel. Williams v. Martin–Baker Aircraft Co., Ltd., 389 F.3d 1251, 1256 (D.C.Cir.2004) (internal quotations marks and citation omitted). “In sum, although Rule 9(b) does not require plaintiffs to allege every fact pertaining to every instance of fraud when a scheme spans several years, defendants must be able to ‘defend against the charge and not just deny that they have done anything wrong.’

  8. Orellana v. Croplife International

    711 F. Supp. 2d 81 (D.D.C. 2010)   Cited 57 times
    Finding a failure to plead an agreement sufficient to state a conspiracy claim where the plaintiffs merely alleged that certain defendants "acted in concert" and were "conspiring" to engage in unlawful acts

    In this Circuit, "the circumstances that the claimant must plead with particularity include matters such as the time, place, and content of the false misrepresentations, the misrepresented fact, and what the opponent retained or the claimant lost as a consequence of the alleged fraud." Chelsea Condo. Unit Owners Ass'n v. 1815 A. St., Condo. Group, LLC, 468 F. Supp. 2d 136, 146 (D.D.C. 2007); see United States ex rel. Williams v. Martin-Baker Aircraft Co., 389 F.3d 1251, 1256 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (noting that Rule 9(b) requires a complaint to set forth the "time, place and content of the false misrepresentations, the fact misrepresented and what was retained or given up as a consequence of the fraud" as well as to "identify[ing the] individuals allegedly involved in the fraud" (citations omitted)). "Unless . . . a complaint . . . pleads with particularity [a] defendant's alleged fraudulent representations . . .

  9. United States ex rel. Schweizer v. Océ N.V.

    No. 11-7030 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 10, 2012)   Cited 17 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Concluding that "the McDonnell Douglas framework applies to § 3730(h) retaliation claims"

    The court based this conclusion on precedent indicating that employees whose job responsibilities include fraud prevention "must 'overcome the presumption that they are merely acting in accordance with their employment obligations' to put their employers on notice." United States ex rel. Williams v. Martin-Baker Aircraft Co., 389 F.3d 1251, 1261 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (quoting Yuhasz v. Brush Wellman, Inc., 341 F.3d 559, 568 (6th Cir. 2003)). According to the district court, Schweizer did not rebut this presumption - and thus did not put Océ on notice - because "every step she took in furtherance of her 'fraud investigation' was an act that fell within her job description or was undertaken at senior management's express instruction."

  10. Petway v. Santander Consumer U.S.

    Civil Action 22-3100 (RBW) (D.D.C. Jul. 17, 2024)

    . “The rule serves to ‘discourage[] the initiation of suits brought solely for their nuisance value, and safeguards potential defendants from frivolous accusations of moral turpitude.'” United States ex rel. Heath v. AT&T, Inc., 791 F.3d 112, 123 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (alteration in original) (quoting United States ex rel. Williams v. Martin-Baker Aircraft Co., 389 F.3d 1251, 1256 (D.C. Cir. 2004)). Further, “the complaint must be particular enough