That factor pertains only to Section 3730(h)(1) ’s causal inquiry, which asks whether the University was on notice of her protected activity. See United States ex rel. Williams v. Martin-Baker Aircraft Co. , 389 F.3d 1251, 1261 (D.C. Cir. 2004). In short, when looked at through the proper legal lens, the proposed complaint plausibly alleges that Singletary undertook lawful acts in furtherance of her "efforts to stop 1 or more violations" of the False Claims Act.
In the context of the False Claims Act, Rule 9(b)'s heightened pleading standard requires, at minimum, that the pleader "state the time, place, and content of the false misrepresentations, the fact misrepresented[,] and what was given up as a consequence of the fraud." United States ex rel. Williams v. Martin-Baker Aircraft Co. ("Williams"), 389 F.3d 1251, 1256 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (quoting Kowal v. MCI Commc'ns Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1278 (D.C. Cir. 1974)). The pleader must also "identify individuals allegedly involved in the fraud." Id.
Taken together, Rules 8 and 9(b) require that "the pleader state the time, place and content of the false misrepresentations, the fact misrepresented and what was retained or given up as a consequence of the fraud" and "identify individuals allegedly involved in the fraud." United States ex rel. Williams v. Martin-Baker Aircraft Co. , 389 F.3d 1251, 1256 (D.C. Cir. 2004). The circumstances must be pled with sufficient particularity that a defendant can "defend against the charge and not just deny that they have done anything wrong," id. at 1259 (quoting United States ex rel. Lee v. SmithKline Beecham, Inc. , 245 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2001) ), but "[w]hat allegations are needed to invest the complaint with indicia of reliability ... depend on the nature of the fraud alleged."
This Court finds that the question of whether a plaintiff's internal complaints fall outside the scope of his or her normal job responsibilities is a factor more appropriately analyzed under the employer's knowledge (i.e., notice) prong, instead of the first "protected activity" element. See, e.g., U.S. ex rel. Williams v. Martin-Baker Aircraft Co., 389 F.3d 1251, 1260 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (noting that the employer's argument that plaintiff-relator failed to engage in protected activity because the actions alleged did not go beyond his normal job requirements "conflate[d] Yesudian's first two requirements — that the employee engage in 'protected activity' and that the employer have notice — we read [the employer's] brief as raising only the latter"); but see Landfield, 112 AD3d at 488 (appears to have conflated the two requirements in holding that, because plaintiff's activity was part of his typical job responsibilities, he failed to engage in protected activity). It is conceivable that a plaintiff's activity would ordinarily be protected (e.g., specifically grounded in fraud, illegality, etc.), but the claim otherwise fails, as a whole, if the speech fell within the plaintiff's job duties and therefore could not have put the employer on notice of such protected speech.
This Court finds that the question of whether a plaintiff's internal complaints fall outside the scope of his or her normal job responsibilities is a factor more appropriately analyzed under the employer's knowledge (i.e., notice) prong, instead of the first "protected activity" element. See, e.g., U.S. ex rel. Williams v. Martin–Baker Aircraft Co., 389 F.3d 1251, 1260 (D.C.Cir.2004) (noting that the employer's argument that plaintiff-relator failed to engage in protected activity because the actions alleged did not go beyond his normal job requirements "conflate[d] Yesudian's first two requirements—that the employee engage in ‘protected activity’ and that the employer have notice—we read [the employer's] brief as raising only the latter"); but see Landfield, 112 AD3d at 488 (appears to have conflated the two requirements in holding that, because plaintiff's activity was part of his typical job responsibilities, he failed to engage in protected activity). It is conceivable that a plaintiff's activity would ordinarily be protected (e.g., specifically grounded in fraud, illegality, etc.), but the claim otherwise fails, as a whole, if the speech fell within the plaintiff's job duties and therefore could not have put the employer on notice of such protected speech.
Claims brought under the FCA state an action in fraud, and therefore are subject to Rule 9(b)'s pleading requirements. U.S. ex rel. Williams v. Martin–Baker Aircraft Co., 389 F.3d 1251, 1256 (D.C.Cir.2004).
In an FCA fraud action, Rule 9(b) requires, at a minimum, that the pleader “state the time, place and content of the false misrepresentations, the fact misrepresented and what was retained or given up as a consequence of the fraud” and “individuals allegedly involved in the fraud.” United States ex rel. Williams v. Martin–Baker Aircraft Co., Ltd., 389 F.3d 1251, 1256 (D.C.Cir.2004) (internal quotations marks and citation omitted). “In sum, although Rule 9(b) does not require plaintiffs to allege every fact pertaining to every instance of fraud when a scheme spans several years, defendants must be able to ‘defend against the charge and not just deny that they have done anything wrong.’
In this Circuit, "the circumstances that the claimant must plead with particularity include matters such as the time, place, and content of the false misrepresentations, the misrepresented fact, and what the opponent retained or the claimant lost as a consequence of the alleged fraud." Chelsea Condo. Unit Owners Ass'n v. 1815 A. St., Condo. Group, LLC, 468 F. Supp. 2d 136, 146 (D.D.C. 2007); see United States ex rel. Williams v. Martin-Baker Aircraft Co., 389 F.3d 1251, 1256 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (noting that Rule 9(b) requires a complaint to set forth the "time, place and content of the false misrepresentations, the fact misrepresented and what was retained or given up as a consequence of the fraud" as well as to "identify[ing the] individuals allegedly involved in the fraud" (citations omitted)). "Unless . . . a complaint . . . pleads with particularity [a] defendant's alleged fraudulent representations . . .
The court based this conclusion on precedent indicating that employees whose job responsibilities include fraud prevention "must 'overcome the presumption that they are merely acting in accordance with their employment obligations' to put their employers on notice." United States ex rel. Williams v. Martin-Baker Aircraft Co., 389 F.3d 1251, 1261 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (quoting Yuhasz v. Brush Wellman, Inc., 341 F.3d 559, 568 (6th Cir. 2003)). According to the district court, Schweizer did not rebut this presumption - and thus did not put Océ on notice - because "every step she took in furtherance of her 'fraud investigation' was an act that fell within her job description or was undertaken at senior management's express instruction."
. “The rule serves to ‘discourage[] the initiation of suits brought solely for their nuisance value, and safeguards potential defendants from frivolous accusations of moral turpitude.'” United States ex rel. Heath v. AT&T, Inc., 791 F.3d 112, 123 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (alteration in original) (quoting United States ex rel. Williams v. Martin-Baker Aircraft Co., 389 F.3d 1251, 1256 (D.C. Cir. 2004)). Further, “the complaint must be particular enough