Opinion
CRIMINAL CASE NO.: RDB-03-0368
November 6, 2003
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Currently before the Court is the Appellant's Appeal of the Magistrate Judge's Decision (Paper 5). Appellant Ricardo Martin ("Martin"), a minor, appeals from United States Magistrate Judge Thomas M. DiGirolamo's denial of his Motion to Dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. By so doing, the Appellant requests that this Court reverse the denial of his Motion to Dismiss, and vacate the subsequent judgment and conviction, which resulted from his guilty plea. For the reasons below, the Decision of the Magistrate Judge and the Judgment of Conviction are AFFIRMED.
BACKGROUND
The Background facts are those that the Appellant, at his plea and sentencing hearing, agreed could be supported had his case gone to trial.
On November 11, 2002 at about 2:15 A.M., a United States Park Police officer observed a blue Dodge Neon traveling north on the Baltimore-Washington Parkway (the "Parkway") at a very high rate of speed. Consequently, the officer followed the Neon in her marked police cruiser and paced the Neon as traveling 80 miles an hour in a 55 mile per hour zone. When the officer turned her vehicle's lights and siren on, the Neon accelerated to a speed of 110 miles per hour while maneuvering around other traffic. Next, the Neon attempted to exit the Parkway at Route 193, Greenbelt Road, but drove into a wooded median between the corresponding on and off ramps. The Neon's driver then exited the vehicle and began running, but was apprehended by another officer who had arrived on the scene. The driver of the Neon was identified as Appellant Martin, a fourteen year old minor who did not have a license to drive. Later, it was determined that the Neon had been reported stolen by its owner.
The Parkway is located within a federal territorial jurisdiction administered by the United States Park Service.
Ultimately, the Government charged Martin with the following offenses: (1) unsafe operation of a vehicle, in violation of 36 C.F.R. § 4.22; (2) reckless driving, in violation of Md. Code Ann., Transp. § 21-901.1(a); (3) speeding, in violation of 36 C.F.R. § 4.21(c); (4) fleeing to elude, in violation of Md. Code Ann., Transp. § 21-904; (5) receiving stolen property, in violation of 36 C.F.R. § 2.30(a)(5); and (6) driving without an operator's license, in violation of Md. Code Ann., Transp. § 16-101(a). Each offense carried a maximum penalty of six months incarceration and a fine of $5,000. 36 C.F.R. § 1.3, 4.2.
Shortly thereafter, Martin filed a motion to dismiss, contending that a United States Magistrate Judge ("Magistrate Judge") does not have subject matter jurisdiction to preside over the case of a juvenile without first obtaining the certification described under the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act, 18 U.S.C. § 5031 et seq. The court denied Martin's motion in a written memorandum opinion and order.
Under the applicable statutory provisions of this Appeal, a juvenile is "a person who has not attained his eighteenth birthday." 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (2003).
Subsequently, Martin pled guilty to one count of speeding and one count of possession of stolen property, and the remaining charges were dismissed. The Court sentenced Martin to two years of supervised probation, with 50 hours of community service, on the speeding count, and a concurrent two years of supervised probation, with an additional 100 hours of community service, on the receiving stolen property count. The instant Appeal followed.
ANALYSIS
The crux of the present Appeal is the proper interpretation of two statutory provisions, one governing the power of Magistrate Judges and the other federal proceedings against juveniles. Specifically at issue is whether the provisions provide Magistrate Judges with subject matter jurisdiction to preside over, without first obtaining special certification, violations of petty offenses committed by juveniles within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States. The proper interpretation of the two statutes involves solely a question of law calling for de novo review. United States v. Hall, 972 F.2d 67, 69 (4th Cir. 1992).
The Applicable Statutes The Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act
The Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act, 18 U.S.C. § 5031 et seq. ("FJDA"), governs federal proceedings against juveniles. Under section 5032 of the FJDA, a federal action against a juvenile may not proceed unless the Attorney General has certified, after investigation, that the appropriate state does not have, or refuses to assume, jurisdiction over the juvenile, the state does not have adequate services for the needs of the juvenile, or that there is a "substantial federal interest" to warrant the exercise of federal jurisdiction. 18 U.S.C. § 5032. Importantly, however, certification is not required for "a violation of law committed within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States for which the maximum authorized term of imprisonment does not exceed six months [i.e., "petty offenses"]." Id.
The Federal Magistrates Act
The Federal Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. § 631 et seq. ("Magistrates Act"), delineates the power and authority of United States Magistrate Judges. Under the Magistrates Act, Magistrate Judges are given "the power to conduct trials under section 3401, title 18, United States Code, in conformity with and subject to the limitations of that section." 28 U.S.C. § 636(a)(3) (2003); see also Local Rule 301 (D. Md. 2001). According to section 3401(g):
[t]he magistrate judge may, in a petty offense case involving a juvenile, exercise all powers granted to the district court under chapter 403 of this title [the FJDA]. The magistrate judge may, in the case of any misdemeanor, other than a petty offense, involving a juvenile in which consent to trial before a magistrate judge has been filed under subsection (b), exercise all powers granted to the district court under chapter 403 of this title [the FJDA]. For purposes of this subsection, proceedings under chapter 403 of this title [the FJDA] may be instituted against a juvenile by a violation notice or complaint, except that no such case may proceed unless the certification referred to in section 5032 of this title has been filed in open court at the arraignment. 18 U.S.C. § 3401(g).
Discussion
Upon reading the language of the above statutory provisions in concert, it is clear that Magistrate Judges may preside over violations of petty offenses committed by juveniles within the special maritime and territorial federal jurisdiction without first obtaining certification. See Faircloth v. Lundy Packing Co., 91 F.3d 648, 653 (4th Cir. 1996) ("[w]hen confronted with a question of statutory interpretation, our inquiry begins with an examination of the language used in the statute"). First, section 3401(g) provides Magistrate Judges with subject matter jurisdiction over petty offense cases involving juveniles, subject to the "certification requirement referred to in section 5032." 18 U.S.C. § 3401(g). Second, section 5032 of the FJDA has eliminated the certification requirement for "a violation of law committed within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States for which the maximum authorized term of imprisonment does not exceed six months." 18 U.S.C. § 5032. Thus, the "certification referred to in section 5032" no longer includes certification for petty offenses involving juveniles within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States. Consequently, such petty offense cases may proceed before a Magistrate Judge without first obtaining certification.The legislative history of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, which created the exception under FJDA section 5032 for petty offenses committed within the "special" jurisdiction of the United States, compels this logical interpretation. Indeed, the United States Senate's rationale for adding the exception was as follows:
Statutory authority exists for creation of petty offenses, by means of regulations, that govern conduct in national parks and lands. In large measure, these offenses, which carry a six-month maximum term of imprisonment, cover such matters as driving regulations, littering ordinances, and the like. When a juvenile is charged with one of these offenses committed in a national park, he is usually interested in speedy disposition and, in most case, the states are reluctant to assume jurisdiction over the juvenile. The delay attendant in meeting the current certification after `investigation' requirement for a juvenile far from his home charged with a petty offense such as a driving violation, creates a sizable and an unreasonable burden for both the juvenile and the court. In these cases, summary disposition is in everyone's interest. S. Rep. No. 98-225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 1983, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3528.
The Appellant's effort to read the two statutory provisions so as to make the certification exception inapplicable to Magistrate Judges is inconsistent with the pertinent context and legislative intent underlying the FJDA, which is the timely disposition of petty offenses involving juveniles within federal jurisdictional lands. See Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118 (1994) (citation omitted) ("[t]he meaning of statutory language, plain or not, depends on context"); United States v. Hartwell, 73 U.S. 385 (1868) (stating that in construing statutes the "proper course in all cases is to adopt that sense of the words which best harmonizes with the context, and promotes in the fullest manner the policy and objects of the legislature").
Thus, since the charges against the juvenile Appellant in the instant case arose within a "special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States," the Parkway, and only carried a maximum penalty of six months imprisonment, certification under the FJDA was not required prior to an exercise of federal jurisdiction by the Magistrate Judge. Accordingly, the Decision of the Magistrate Judge and the Judgment of Conviction are AFFIRMED. A separate Order will follow.