Whether a warrant is supported by probable cause to conduct a search is a separate question from whether the nighttime authorization in the warrant is supported by reasonable suspicion. See United States v. Maholy, 1 F.3d 718, 721 n.5 (8th Cir. 1993) (distinguishing between a challenge to probable cause, which defendant was not asserting, and a challenge to the search warrant's nighttime authorization). Indeed, when the state court suppressed the evidence in Miles's criminal case, the court concluded that probable cause supported the search but that the affidavit lacked the requisite reasonable suspicion to support the nighttime authorization in the warrant.

Therefore, “[i]n determining whether evidence obtained solely by state officers is admissible in federal court in the first instance, it is usually irrelevant whether a state rule of criminal procedure was violated.” United States v. Maholy, 1 F.3d 718, 721 (8th Cir.1993); see also Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 178, 128 S.Ct. 1598, 170 L.Ed.2d 559 (2008) (noting that “it is not the province of the Fourth Amendment to enforce state law”). This rule “promotes uniformity in federal prosecutions.”

“When evidence obtained by state law enforcement officers is offered in a federal prosecution, the legality of the search and seizure is not determined by reference to a state statute, but rather is resolved by [F]ourth [A]mendment analysis.” United States v. Maholy, 1 F.3d 718, 721 n. 4 (8th Cir.1993) (quotation and citations omitted); accord Howard, 532 F.3d at 760. Like Arkansas Criminal Rule 13.

In reviewing a district court's decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress, we review the district court's factual findings for clear error. United States v. Maholy, 1 F.3d 718, 720 (8th Cir. 1993). "We may reverse the district court's ultimate ruling on the suppression motion, however, if the ruling reflects an erroneous view of the applicable law."

Here, the Des Moines police acted without federal involvement, so the suppression issue is governed only by the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. Maholy, 1 F.3d 718, 722 (8th Cir. 1993). Under the Fourth Amendment, "it is generally left to the discretion of the executing officers to determine the details of how best to proceed with the performance of a search authorized by warrant — subject of course to the general Fourth Amendment protection `against unreasonable searches and seizures.'"

United States v. Appelquist, 145 F.3d 976, 978 (8th Cir. 1998). “When evidence obtained by state law enforcement officers is offered in a federal prosecution, the legality of the search and seizure is not determined by reference to a state statute, but rather is resolved by [F]ourth [A]mendment analysis.” United States v. Maholy, 1 F.3d 718, 721 n.4 (8th Cir. 1993) (quotation and citations omitted)[.

"In determining whether evidence obtained solely by state officers is admissible in federal court in the first instance, it is usually irrelevant whether a state rule of criminal procedure was violated." United States v. Maholy, 1 F.3d 718, 721 (8th Cir. 1993). The legality of such a search is governed by the Fourth Amendment, not by state law.

The Code of Iowa specifically states that state search warrants may be executed "in the day time or in the night time." Code of Iowa § 808.5. Because a federal court confronted with a suppression issue is not simply attempting to determine whether there has been compliance with state law, the legality of the search and seizure is not determined by reference to such a state statute but rather is resolved by Fourth Amendment analysis.United States v. Maholy, 1 F.3d 718, 721 (8th Cir. 1993); see also Keene, 915 F.2d at 1167. Courts have recognized that the time of execution of a warrant can be important to determining the reasonableness of a warrant under Fourth Amendment analysis.

“[S]tate law is irrelevant for determining in the first instance whether fruits of a search are admissible in federal court under the Fourth Amendment, [but] state law is relevant when the analysis proceeds to the question of admitting unconstitutionally seized evidence under [the] good faith exception to the exclusionary rule.” United States v. Maholy, 1 F.3d 718, 722 (8th Cir.1993). Stephens contends that the HIDTA investigation was federal and that Maryland law is irrelevant.

But Neil's contention "fails to recognise that `in determining whether evidence obtained solely by state officers is admissible in federal court in the first instance, it is usually irrelevant whether a state rule of criminal procedure was violated.'" United States v. Howard, 532 F.3d 755, 760 (8th Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Maholy, 1 F.3d 718, 721 (8th Cir. 1993)). The legality of the search and seizure is not determined by reference to a state statute, but by Fourth Amendment analysis.