(ER33 (citing Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230, 67 S.Ct. 1146, 91 L.Ed. 1447 (1947))). PMSA vigorously contends that the presumption does not apply in this case, relying in particular on the Supreme Court's opinion in United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 120 S.Ct. 1135, 146 L.Ed.2d 69 (2000). The Locke Court ruled that certain components of Washington's regulatory scheme governing oil tankers in Puget Sound were preempted by the Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972 ("PWSA") and another federal statute (specifically striking down state crew training requirements, an English language proficiency mandate for tanker crew members, a navigation watch requirement, and marine casualty reporting requirements) and remanded for further consideration of the remaining state-law provisions.

See, e.g., Drake v. Laboratory Corp. of America Holdings, 458 F.3d 48, 56 (2d Cir. 2006). "[C]onflict pre-emption," which is at issue here, "occurs when compliance with both state and federal law is impossible, or when the state law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objective[s] of Congress,'" " United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 109, 120 S.Ct. 1135, 146 L.Ed.2d 69 (2000) (quoting California v. ARC America Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 100-01, 109 S.Ct. 1661, 104 L.Ed.2d 86 (1989) (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67, 61 S.Ct. 399, 85 L.Ed. 581 (1941))). State law is in "irreconcilable conflict" with federal law, and hence preempted by federal law, when compliance with the state statute would frustrate the purposes of the federal scheme.

Several states, including Massachusetts, have passed laws to protect particularly sensitive waterways. The frame-work for analyzing such conflicts derives from the several preemption analyses set forth in United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 120 S.Ct. 1135, 146 L.Ed.2d 69 (2000), and Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 98 S.Ct. 988, 55 L.Ed.2d 179 (1978). In short, depending on the nature of state and federal regulations, either field preemption, conflict preemption, or overlap analysis is used to determine whether state law impermissibly infringes on federal authority.

The Bouchard oil spill soiled approximately ninety miles of Buzzards Bay beaches and coastline, killed hundreds of birds and marine life, contaminated thousands of acres of shellfish beds, and seriously harmed the overall marine environment of the Bay.United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 94 (2000).See Interv.

PPLC points to Title II of the PWSA, 46 U.S.C. Ch. 37, and the regulations thereunder, volumes 33 and 46 of the Code of Federal Regulations. Id. at 29, PPLC also points to two Supreme Court decisions, United States v. Locke , 529 U.S. 89, 120 S.Ct. 1135, 146 L.Ed.2d 69 (2000), and Ray v. Atlantic Richfield, Co. , 435 U.S. 151, 98 S.Ct. 988, 55 L.Ed.2d 179 (1978). Id. at 30–31.

MacDonald v. Monsanto Co., 27 F.3d 1021, 1023 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Labs., Inc., 105 S.Ct. 2371, 2376 (1985)); see Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 116 S.Ct. 2240, 2250 (1996). However, in United States v. Locke, 120 S.Ct. 1135 (2000), the Supreme Court made clear that "an 'assumption' of nonpre-emption is not triggered when the State regulates in an area where there has been a history of significant federal presence." Id. at 1147 (citations omitted).

” Ex. R., 139 Cong. Rec. H396–03, *H412 (Feb. 3, 1993). This court finds instructive the reasoning of the Supreme Court in United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 105–06, 120 S.Ct. 1135, 146 L.Ed.2d 69 (2000), in which the Court addressed the scope of the saving clause found in Title I of the Oil Pollution Act, 33 U.S.C. § 2718(c), which permitted states to impose liability or requirements “relating to the discharge or substantial threat of a discharge, of oil.” The Supreme Court, id. at 107, 120 S.Ct. 1135, concluded that this saving clause did not save the state regulations from pre-emption by the Ports and Waterways Safety Act (“PWSA”).

Id. (citing Natural Resources DefenseCouncil, Inc. v. United States EPA, 824 F.2d 1258, 1283 (1st Cir. 1987)). From the outset, the Coast Guard has expressed the opinion that federal law (that is the PWSA as interpreted in Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978) andUnited States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89 (2006)) rendered MOSPA a legal nullity upon enactment, and that its intended rulemaking might also preempt MOSPA.See, e.g., Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 69 Fed. Reg. at 62430 (stating in October, 2004, that certain provisions of MOSPA were preempted in the Coast Guard's view and that "it is likely that any regulation promulgated as a result of this advance notice of proposed rulemaking would likewise touch categories of regulation reserved to the Federal Government"); Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 71 Fed. Reg. 15, 653-15, 654 (analyzing the federalism implications of the proposed rulemaking, describing various notice and consultation efforts undertaken to date in compliance with Executive Order 13132, and inviting further consultation requests). The Final Rule details the comment and consultation process as it ultimately played out with concerned local government officials, a process which clearly reflects that the Coast Guard's intention to preempt was well understood.

But this presumption is not triggered when the state regulates in an area where there has been a history of significant federal presence. (United States v. Locke (2000) 529 U.S. 89, 108 (Locke). Although appellants claims relate to health and safety matters which have traditionally been regulated through the states police powers, they also implicate maritime activity, an area traditionally within the purview of federal regulation.

But this presumption is not triggered when the state regulates in an area where there has been a history of significant federal presence. ( United States v. Locke (2000) 529 U.S. 89, 108 ( Locke). Although appellant's claims relate to health and safety matters which have traditionally been regulated through the state's police powers, they also implicate maritime activity, an area traditionally within the purview of federal regulation.