Opinion
Criminal File No. C3-03-42
July 10, 2003
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DENYING MOTION TO SUPPRESS
Before the Court is Defendants' Motion to Suppress (doc. ##21 26). The United States filed a brief in opposition (doc. #25). On June 16, 2003, the Court held a hearing. Following the hearing, Defendants filed briefs (doc. ##29 30), and the United States also filed a post-hearing brief (doc. #31).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Wahpeton Police Department received a National Teletype warning about the high frequency of burglaries in the homes of people who own Chinese restaurants. In response to this National Teletype bulletin, the Wahpeton Police Department warned all the Chinese restaurant owners in the area to be aware of this increased burglary risk. Binh and Mandy Truong, the owners of the Good Luck Chinese Restaurant in Breckenridge, received this warning from the Wahpeton police.
On March 27, 2003, at approximately 7:13p.m., Ms. Diane Widhalm called Wahpeton police. She explained to Dispatch that she lived in Rosewood Addition in Wahpeton and that she kind of keeps an eye on the house of the people that own the Good Luck restaurant in Breckenridge. She stated that she saw some strangers in the driveway, so she called Mandy Truong at the restaurant. Mandy asked Widhalm to call the police to have a patrol car come over and investigate.
When Dispatch asked "what's going on?", Widhalm explained that her neighbors had previously asked her to call them if she ever saw anybody around their house. Widhalm told Dispatch that she thought her neighbors worried about "break-ins and stealing." Widhalm stated that the strangers were in a red-colored car in the Truong's driveway.
During the course of the conversation, Widhalm could see the car pull out of the driveway. She went outside and related to Dispatch that she could see the car leave the Rosewood Addition and head East on 16th Avenue toward Prantes'. When Dispatch asked why Widhalm thought this car was suspicious, Widhalm explained that her neighbors had asked her to watch for any car that was in the driveway that did not belong to her neighbors.
While Dispatch was talking to Widhalm, Officer Steven Helgeson, who was near the Rosewood Addition at the time, responded to the call. As Dispatch was relaying Widhalm's observation that the red car was leaving the Rosewood Addition, Officer Helgeson saw a red car turn towards him from out of the Rosewood Addition. As Sergeant James Hartmann testified, the Rosewood Addition is a new, relatively upscale neighborhood with approximately ten houses, and there is only one road leading out of the Rosewood Addition.
Officer Helgeson noticed that the red car was a Lexus, and he started following it. When the vehicle started heading east on Highway 210, Sergeant Hartmann told Officer Helgeson to pull over the car. Officer Helgeson called in the license plate on the Lexus and activated his lights. The Lexus drove through one intersection and then pulled over. Dispatch reported that the plate was registered to a 2002 Honda wagon.
In another patrol car, Sergeant Hartmann arrived at the site of the traffic stop shortly after the Lexus pulled over. Sergeant Hartmann testified that the car was pulled over at approximately 7:17p.m. The defendants were driving the car. In the back seat, the officers noticed a safe partially covered by a jacket. They could see the black dial and handle on the front and the legs of the safe.
Meanwhile, Binh Truong had left the restaurant to go home and investigate. At approximately 7:22p.m., Binh called Dispatch and reported that his house had been broken into and a safe had been stolen.
ANALYSIS
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. United States v. Roggeman, 279 F.3d 573, 577 (8th Cir. 2002) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1967)). A search conducted without a warrant is presumptively unreasonable unless an exception to the warrant requirement applies. United States v. Kuenstler, 325 F.3d 1015, 1021 (8th Cir. 2003). When the government obtains evidence illegally, the exclusionary rule prohibits the admission of any physical or testimonial evidence gathered from that illegal search or seizure. United States v. Reinholz, 245 F.3d 765, 779 (8th Cir. 2001) (citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-88 (1963)).
I. Reasonable Suspicion
One exception to the warrant requirement is the investigatory stop. A police officer may stop a vehicle without obtaining a warrant if the officer has "reasonable suspicion to believe that criminal activity may be afoot." United States v. Ameling, 328 F.3d 443, 447 (8th Cir. 2003) (quoting United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002)). A court considers the "totality of the circumstances" to determine whether an officer had a particularized and objective basis for suspecting legal wrongdoing. Id. (quoting Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273). A court may take into account an officer's experience and specialized training when deciding whether reasonable suspicion existed. Id. In forming reasonable suspicion, an officer is also entitled to "rely on information provided by other officers and all the information known to a team of officers involved in the investigation." United States v. Robinson, 119 F.3d 663, 666-67 (8th Cir. 1997). The standard for reasonable suspicion is more than a "mere hunch," less than probable cause, and "considerably short" of the preponderance of the evidence standard. Ameling, 328 F.3d at 447 (quoting Arvizu, 524 U.S. at 274).
In this case, Widhalm had been asked to watch the Truong's house because the Wahpeton police had warned the Truongs that they were at risk for burglary. When Widhalm saw the red car in the Truong's driveway, she called Mandy to tell her about it. As the owner of the house, Mandy would have known if she was going to be having visitors that day or if the car belonged to friends or family. Mandy was sufficiently worried that the red car was there for a criminal purpose that she asked Widhalm to call the police. Based on all the information known to the police working on this case, there was reasonable suspicion to stop Defendants' vehicle.
II. Inevitable Discovery
Even if there was not reasonable suspicion based upon Mandy's knowledge and concerns, the police would have inevitably discovered the safe in the back seat of Defendants' car. Under the inevitable discovery doctrine,
[i]llegally seized evidence may be admitted if the Government proves "by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) that there was a reasonable probability that the evidence would have been discovered by lawful means in the absence of police misconduct, and (2) that the government was actively pursuing a substantial, alternative line of investigation at the time of the constitutional violation."
United States v. Boyd, 180 F.3d 967, 976 (8th Cir. 1999).
Officer Helgeson testified that his standard practice would be to wait until the license plate search had finished before he would have stopped following a vehicle. In this case, if Sergeant Hartmann had not told Officer Helgeson to pull over Defendants' car, Officer Helgeson would have continued to follow the red Lexus. When the license plate search was finished, Officer Helgeson would have learned that this red Lexus had a license plate for a Honda wagon. At that point, Officer Helgeson would have had probable cause to stop the car.
At the hearing the government explained that it turned out later that the red Lexus did have the proper temporary license plate. However, even a mistake of fact can form the basis for probable cause. See Karnes v. Skrutski, 62 F.3d 485, 499 (3d Cir. 1995) (stating that for as long as the officers thought the green leafy substance they discovered was marijuana, they had probable cause to search even though they later learned it was not marijuana).
The police were pursuing a substantial, alternative line of investigation when Officer Helgeson ran a license plate search on the Lexus. Since the search immediately came back as registered to a different vehicle, Officer Helgeson would have stopped the vehicle. Therefore, there was a reasonable probability that the police would have discovered the evidence in the back seat of Defendants' car. Even assuming this was illegally seized evidence, the inevitable discovery doctrine would allow the evidence to be admitted. Boyd, 180 F.3d at 976.
Based on the foregoing, Defendants' Motion to Suppress is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.