Opinion
No. 04 Cr. 406 (JSR).
February 14, 2005
MEMORANDUM ORDER
Defendant Joseph Knorr is charged with robbery, conspiracy to commit robbery, and conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute marijuana. By motion dated July 22, 2004, defendant moved to suppress various statements made to law enforcement on the grounds that they were obtained in violation of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), or in the alternative to obtain an evidentiary hearing on the matter. For the reasons stated below, defendant's motion is denied.
The following facts from the defendant's sworn affidavit are taken as true for the purpose of this motion. Sometime between 9:00 and 10:00 P.M. on June 17, 2004, defendant came voluntarily to a police station in Pittsfield, Massachusetts, after speaking with police officers by telephone. Affidavit of Joseph Knorr, sworn to 7/22/04, ¶ 3. He was immediately handcuffed and arrested. Id. Earlier that evening, defendant had consumed an entire bottle of vodka and some cognac. Id. ¶ 4. After a few minutes in a cell, defendant began "acting up" because of his drunkenness. Id. In response, the police took him from the cell and strapped him into a chair for most of the night. He could not sleep in that position.Id.
Sometime between 6:00 and 7:00 the following morning, defendant was removed from the chair. He spent the next several hours in a cell, getting a couple hours of sleep. Id. ¶ 5. He was awoken around 10:00 A.M., at which point he had a "very bad hangover," compounded by sickness from heroin withdrawal. Accustomed to using four bags of heroin per day, defendant had not been able to inject any since shortly before coming to the police station the previous night. Id. ¶ 6. An agent went through his property and commented on the empty bottle of vodka. Defendant also informed the agent he was "dope-sick." Id. ¶ 7. That agent and another drove him to Springfield, where he was charged in federal court with the instant crimes. Id. ¶ 8. Along the way, they read him his Miranda rights. Id. ¶ 9. An agent told him that if he answered their questions, they would "put a letter in," which would possibly result in a more lenient sentence. Id. ¶ 10. Defendant, "feeling very sick from withdrawal, the hangover, and the lack of sleep," and "not thinking clearly," made the statements he now seeks to suppress. Id. ¶ 11.
Defendant's affidavit simply says "[t]he agents (two)" drove him, without specifying whether the agent with actual knowledge of his condition was one of them. At oral argument, the Government asserted that, in fact, neither of the two agents in the car had participated in the earlier proceedings. Because it does not affect the outcome, the Court assumes for purposes of this motion that one of the agents in the car was the one with knowledge of his condition.
For the Government to use a defendant's post-arrest statement at trial, it must prove that he (1) "voluntarily" relinquished his Miranda rights, and (2) fully understood the right being waived and the consequences of waiver. See, e.g., United States v. Jaswal, 47 F.3d 539, 542 (2d Cir. 1995) (per curiam). Because the Miranda doctrine is meant to discourage police misconduct, "voluntary" is a term of art, an inquiry into which explores the actions of Government agents as much as the defendant's subjective experience. A court is to examine "all the circumstances surrounding the law enforcement officials' conduct to ascertain whether it overcame the accused's will to resist and brought about a confession that was not freely self-determined."Campaneria v. Reid, 891 F.2d 1014, 1019-20 (2d Cir. 1989). Conversely, even if the defendant's condition is such that he has no free will to resist confession, "coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to the finding that a confession is not `voluntary.'" Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986).
Defendant's allegation that he was too hung over, sick and tired to fully understand the proceedings is thus insufficient, absent police misconduct, to make out a Miranda violation.See United States v. Feola, 651 F. Supp. 1068, 1119 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (finding that "confession offered under the pangs of heroin withdrawal, in the absence of coercive police activity, is not involuntary for Miranda purposes"). Here, the Government agents did not exploit defendant's condition inappropriately to obtain his confession. To the contrary, they allowed him to recover overnight, albeit not under the most comfortable circumstances, before talking to him. There is no indication that the reason the defendant was strapped to a chair was to occasion his sleep deprivation; rather, it was occasioned by his outbursts and was calculated, if anything, to get him (as well as any other prisoners in the vicinity) some rest by mitigating such outbursts. Without reaching the question of whether such forbearance until the next day was required, it is clear that no police misconduct was involved.
As for defendant's fall-back claim that false promises were made to him, "vague promises of leniency for cooperation" can be "one factor to be weighed in the overall calculus" of voluntariness but "generally will not, without more, warrant a finding of coercion." United States v. Gaines, 295 F.3d 293, 299 (2d Cir. 2002). Defendant was promised a "letter" that could get him "less time," a statement his counsel asserts, rather extravagantly, was a promise to make a motion for downward departure pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1. Even if such a promise were made and broken, defendant's remedy would be enforcement of the promise rather than exclusion of the confession. But in fact all the officers said, on defendant's own submission, was that they would write a letter noting his cooperation, which could result in a reduced sentence — a plainly proper promise, not rendered otherwise by any knowledge that one of them arguably had that the defendant had recently been in some physical distress. The defendant has made no allegation that, when he gave his statement to the officers, his speech was impaired or that they were in any other way on notice that he had not recovered sufficiently to freely choose to talk. To exclude his statement without such an indication would be to preclude police officers from interrogating anyone until they are certain the suspect is at his mental peak. There is neither precedent nor justification for such a ruling.
Since he has not moved to enforce the terms of the supposed agreement, the Court need not consider whether the agent's statements somehow could be interpreted as promising a motion for downward departure.
Because the plaintiff's allegations do not make out a Miranda violation as a matter of law, the Court need not hold an evidentiary hearing. Accordingly, defendant's motion is denied.
SO ORDERED.