The Court further held that the defendant's waiver was voluntary because he "was fully appraised of his rights, he had previously exercised his right to remain silent absent his counsel ... , and there is no evidence of coercion or compulsion on the part of the officers." Id.; see also United States v. De La Luz Gallegos, 738 F.2d 378, 381 (10th Cir. 1984) ("Simply because a suspect has requested an attorney is not itself sufficient to prohibit the use of spontaneous declarations not brought about by the prompting of law enforcement officials."); United States v. Kean, 2005 WL 8163668 (D.N.M. 2005) (finding defendant "waived a previously invoked right to counsel by voluntarily initiating further communication with officers"); cf. United States v. Pagan, 2007 WL 593649, at *3 (D. Kan. 2007) (finding defendant did not waive previously invoked right to counsel because the officer, not defendant, reinitiated the communication). Accordingly, this Court concludes Defendant effectively waived his previously invoked right to remain silent by reinitiating communication with Detective Pillow after invoking his right to remain silent.