The government, understandably, has consistently argued that Glover lived in the home and argues that if Glover did not live there, then he lacks standing to bring a Fourth Amendment claim. See United States v. Kaylor, 877 F.2d 658, 663 (8th Cir.1989) (“[T]he police could have entered [the defendant's] own home without a search warrant to execute a warrant for his arrest if they had reason to believe he was inside.... [The defendant] cannot claim any greater Fourth Amendment protection in the [third party's] home than he possessed in his own home.”). Ultimately, whether or not Glover actually resided at the Enright Avenue home is not material because based on the totality of the circumstances, enough evidence existed at the time the decision was made to enter to support the officers' reasonable belief that Glover resided at the home and was present in the home. See Risse, 83 F.3d at 216 (“[T]he officers' assessment need not in fact be correct; rather, they need only ‘reasonably believe’ that the suspect resides at the dwelling to be searched and is currently present at the dwelling.”).

And the fourth line teaches that law enforcement's awareness of an outstanding warrant is enough to justify entrance into the person's residence to arrest the person.United States v. Glover, 746 F.3d 369, 373 (2014) (quoting United States v. Kaylor, 877 F.2d 658, 663 (8th Cir. 1989)); see also United States v. Clifford, 664 F.2d 1090, 1092-93 (8th Cir. 1981).

In now answering that question, we begin by noting that eight of our sister circuits have concluded that the subject of an arrest warrant, apprehended in a third party's residence, may not invoke Steagald to claim that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated because entry into the residence was not authorized by a search warrant. See United States v. Hollis , 780 F.3d 1064, 1068–69 (11th Cir. 2015) ; United States v. Jackson , 576 F.3d 465, 468 (7th Cir. 2009) ; United States v. Kern , 336 Fed.Appx. 296, 297–98 (4th Cir. 2009) ; United States v. McCarson , 527 F.3d 170, 172–73 (D.C. Cir. 2008) ; United States v. Pruitt , 458 F.3d 477, 482 (6th Cir. 2006) ; United States v. Agnew , 407 F.3d 193, 197 (3d Cir. 2005) ; United States v. Kaylor , 877 F.2d 658, 663 & n. 5 (8th Cir. 1989) ; United States v. Underwood , 717 F.2d 482, 484 (9th Cir. 1983) (en banc ). The rationale for this conclusion, as we recognized in Snype , is that “(a) Fourth Amendment rights are personal and cannot be asserted vicariously, and (b) requiring police who already hold an arrest warrant for a suspect to obtain a search warrant before they can pursue that suspect in a third party's home would grant the suspect broader rights in the third party's home than he would have in his own home under Payton .” 441 F.3d at 133 (collecting cases to date); see United States v. Hollis , 780 F.3d at 1068 (stating that “ ‘person has no greater right of privacy in another's home than in his own,’ ” and, therefore, “ ‘[i]f an arrest warrant and reason to believe the person named in the warrant is present are sufficient to protect that person's [F]ourth [A]mendment privacy rights in his own home, they necessarily suffice to protect his privacy rights in the home of another’ ” (brackets in original) (quotin

The government, understandably, has consistently argued that Glover lived in the home and argues that if Glover did not live there, then he lacks standing to bring a Fourth Amendment claim. See United States v. Kaylor, 877 F.2d 658, 663 (8th Cir. 1989) ("[T]he police could have entered [the defendant's] own home without a search warrant to execute a warrant for his arrest if they had reason to believe he was inside. . . . [The defendant] cannot claim any greater Fourth Amendment protection in the [third party's] home than he possessed in his own home."). Ultimately, whether or not Glover actually resided at the Enright Avenue home is not material because based on the totality of the circumstances, enough evidence existed at the time the decision was made to enter to support the officers' reasonable belief that Glover resided at the home and was present in the home.

Further, nearly every court of appeals to consider the issue has held that law enforcement officers do not need a search warrant in addition to an arrest warrant to enter a third party's residence in order to effect an arrest. See United States v. Agnew, 407 F.3d 193, 197 (3d Cir. 2005); United States v. Kaylor, 877 F.2d 658, 663 (8th Cir. 1989); Underwood, 717 F.2d at 483-84 (9th Cir. 1983); United States v. Buckner, 717 F.2d 297, 299-300 (6th Cir. 1983). Because a suspect has no reasonable expectation of privacy once an arrest warrant is issued, it is at least arguable that Jackson would not have standing to challenge an illegal entry into Joseph's home. See, e.g., United States v. Kaylor, 877 F.2d 658, 663 n. 4 (8th Cir. 1989); United States v. Buckner, 717 F.2d 297, 299-300 (6th Cir. 1983).

Id. Due process, however, does require that laws provide notice to the ordinary person as to what constitutes prohibited activity. United States v. Kaylor, 877 F.2d 658, 661 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 871, 110 S.Ct. 198, 107 L.Ed.2d 152 (1989). In assessing the vagueness of a statute, courts look to the common usage of the statutory language, judicial explanations of the language's meaning, and previous applications of the statute to the same or similar conduct.

However, the holding in Steagald would apply only if Ms. Arrington or the homeowner were the one challenging the entry. See United States v. Agnew, 407 F.3d 193, 196–97 (3d Cir.2005) (citing United States v. Underwood, 717 F.2d 482, 484 (9th Cir.1983) (en banc); United States v. Kaylor, 877 F.2d 658, 663 n. 5 (8th Cir.1989) ) (holding the right recognized in Steagald “is personal to the homeowner and cannot be asserted vicariously by the person named in the arrest warrant”). The United States responds that “there was ample evidence to support the conclusion that the defendant resided at 5131 Clairton and was present at the time of his arrest,” ECF No. 22, at 6, and cites to Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 603, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980), in contending that the entry was lawful.

Since the Supreme Court's decisions in Payton and Steagald, five courts of appeals, not including the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, have concluded that law enforcement officers do not need a search warrant to effectuate an arrest in a third-party residence where they have a valid arrest warrant coupled with a reasonable belief that the suspect is inside. See United States v. Jackson, 576 F.3d 465 (7th Cir.2009); United States v. Agnew, 407 F.3d 193 (3d Cir.2005); United States v. Kaylor, 877 F.2d 658 (8th Cir.1989); United States v. Buckner, 717 F.2d 297 (6th Cir.1983); United States v. Underwood, 717 F.2d 482 (9th Cir.1983). Notably, these decisions do not require prior judicial approval for entrance by the government; ex-post justification is sufficient if a defendant challenges the search or seizure.

But we agree with our sister circuits that the subject of an arrest warrant cannot challenge the execution of that warrant and the later discovery of evidence in a third-party's home. See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 576 F.3d 465, 468 (7th Cir.2009); United States v. McCarson, 527 F.3d 170, 172–73 (D.C.Cir.2008); Agnew, 407 F.3d at 197; United States v. Kaylor, 877 F.2d 658, 663 (8th Cir.1989); United States v. Underwood, 717 F.2d 482, 484 (9th Cir.1983); United States v. Buckner, 717 F.2d 297, 299–300 (6th Cir.1983); but see United States v. Weems, 322 F.3d 18, 23 n. 3 (1st Cir.2003) (assuming but not deciding that a suspect can challenge the search of a third-party's home incident to the suspect's arrest). The protective sweep, performed incident to Hollis's arrest, was a valid attempt to ensure that the apartment did not contain “other persons who are dangerous and who could unexpectedly launch an attack.”

We have said as much in analogous cases on at least two occasions, United States v. Taylor, 497 F.3d 673, 679 (2007); United States v. Searles, 24 F.3d 1464 (Table), 1994 WL 246130, at *1 (1994), as has every other court of appeals to have decided the issue. See United States v. Pruitt, 458 F.3d 477, 481-82 (6th Cir. 2006); United States v. Agnew, 407 F.3d 193, 196-97 (3d Cir. 2005); United States v. Kaylor, 877 F.2d 658, 663 n. 5 (8th Cir. 1989); United States v. Underwood, 717 F.2d 482, 484 (9th Cir. 1983) (en banc) ("If an arrest warrant and reason to believe the person named in the warrant is present are sufficient to protect that person's fourth amendment privacy rights in his own home, they necessarily suffice to protect his privacy rights in the home of another"); see also United States v. Snype, 441 F.3d 119, 133 (2d Cir. 2006) (leaving issue open); United States v. Weems, 322 F.3d 18, 23 n. 3 (1st Cir. 2003) (same). McCarson next challenges the admissibility at trial of four prior convictions — two for possession of a gun and two for distribution of crack cocaine — on the ground that the evidence was inadmissible under Rules 404(b) and 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Rule 404(b), which governs the admissibility of "[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts," excludes evidence submitted "to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith," whereas Rule 403 provides that otherwise