Two of our sister circuits have done the same with respect to the offense level for bribery convictions. See United States v. Martinez, 76 F.3d 1145, 1153-54 (10th Cir. 1996); United States v. Kahlon, 38 F.3d 467, 470 (9th Cir. 1994). In the present case, we therefore review for clear error the district court's factual finding that Arshad's payments "were intended for the accomplishment of more than . . . one action," and we review de novo the district court's legal conclusion that separate payments for more than one purpose constitute multiple bribes under § 2C1.1(b)(1).

Objections to the indictment raise questions of law which are reviewed de novo. United States v. Kahlon, 38 F.3d 467, 469 (9th Cir.1994). Under Fed.R.Crim.P. 12(b)(3), failure to present objections based on defects in instituting the prosecution, including defects in the grand jury proceedings, prior to the start of trial, constitutes a waiver thereof. Shotwell Mfg. Co. v. United States, 371 U.S. 341, 362, 83 S.Ct. 448, 9 L.Ed.2d 357 (1963); Kahlon, 38 F.3d at 469.

This circuit has not decided how to differentiate between related payments for a single bribe and multiple acts of bribery. However, in United States v. Kahlon, 38 F.3d 467 (9th Cir. 1994), the Ninth Circuit addressed the application of § 2C1.1(b)(1). That defendant was convicted of conspiracy and three counts of bribery.

The district court's underlying factual findings are reviewed for clear error. United States v. Kahlon, 38 F.3d 467, 469, 470 (9th Cir. 1994). Whether the district court properly applied those facts to the Sentencing Guidelines is reviewed for abuse of discretion.

We review de novo jurisdictional issues, even when they are raised for the first time on appeal. See United States v. Anderson, 472 F.3d 662, 666 (9th Cir. 2006) ("Jurisdictional issues are reviewed de novo . . . ."); United States v. Kahlon, 38 F.3d 467, 469 (9th Cir. 1994) (noting that jurisdictional claims are an exception to the rule that issues generally cannot be raised for the first time on appeal).

McReynolds argues that the district court erred in finding his illegal possession of the Bushmaster AR-15 rifle, charged in Count 12 of the indictment—which remained pending at the time of sentencing—was relevant conduct when calculating his base offense level. "A district court's factual determination that conduct is 'relevant conduct' within the meaning of section 1B1.3 of the Sentencing Guidelines is reviewed for clear error." United States v. Kahlon, 38 F.3d 467, 470 (9th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). At sentencing, the district court denied McReynolds' objections to the presentence report's references to his possession of the Bushmaster AR-15 rifle, citing U.S.S.G. § 1B1.4, 18 U.S.C. § 3661, and United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 157 (1997) (per curiam) (holding that "a jury's verdict of acquittal does not prevent the sentencing court from considering conduct underlying the acquitted charge, so long as that conduct has been proved by a preponderance of the evidence").

"Although the payments were part of a larger conspiracy, they were not installment payments for a single action." United States v. Kahlon, 38 F.3d 467, 470 (9th Cir. 1994); see U.S.S.G. § 2C1.1 cmt. n.2. The Villarreals also offer no support for their contention they cannot be subject to the more-than-one-bribe enhancement merely because they were charged with a single count of bribery.

Howard waived any challenge to the validity of the indictment by failing to raise alleged defects in the grand jury proceedings before trial. See United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630, 122 S.Ct. 1781, 152 L.Ed.2d 860 (2002) (holding that a defendant may waive his grand jury right and that defects in an indictment do not deprive a court of subject matter jurisdiction); see also United States v. Kahlon, 38 F.3d 467, 469 (9th Cir. 1994) ("Irregularities in grand jury proceedings are considered defects in the institution of prosecution. . . . Failure to raise such defects before trial results in waiver of the objections."). AFFIRMED.

Indeed, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure require a defendant to "alleg[e] a defect in instituting the prosecution" before trial, Fed.R.Crim.P. 12(b)(3)(A), or else waive the objection on appeal, Fed.R. Crim P. 12(e); we apply a similar waiver rule to untimely claims of irregularities in grand jury proceedings. See United States v. Kahlon, 38 F.3d 467, 469 (9th Cir. 1994) ("[I]rregularities in grand jury proceedings are considered to be defects in the institution of the prosecution within the meaning of Rule 12(b)[]. . . . Failure to raise such defects before trial results in waiver of the objections.

These contentions fail. See United States v. Kahlon, 38 F.3d 467, 470 (9th Cir. 1994); see also United States v. Speelman, 431 F.3d 1226, 1232 (9th Cir. 2005). AFFIRMED.