The few instances of threat to legitimate business practices mentioned in the House Report pale in seriousness when compared with the scope of legitimate statutory proscription — accepting payoffs for loan procurement. See, e.g., U.S. v. Jumper, 838 F.2d 755, 758 (5th Cir. 1988) ("The purpose of 18 U.S.C. § 215 is to protect FDIC insured bank deposits by preventing unsound and improvident lines of credit from being made from such deposits by officers and directors of the bank. In addition, there can be no doubt that Congress' intent by enacting section 215 was to remove from the path of bank officials the temptation of self-enrichment at the expense of the borrower or bank.").

The purpose of section 215 is to remove from the bank officials any temptation of self-enrichment at the expense of the borrower or the bank. ( United States v. Jumper (5th Cir. 1988), 838 F.2d 755, 758.) Numerous Federal court cases have ruled that section 215 is violated when bank officers receive commissions or fees in clear violation of the statute or conceal their interest in the transaction.

We conclude that the evidence is sufficient on this count. United States v. Jumper, 838 F.2d 755, 757 (5th Cir. 1988). In March 1986, Mann sold one of his companies, T-L Drilling, to Mirlex Corporation for a $2.5 million note payable to the parent of T-L Drilling, Trilex, in which Mann was sole shareholder, and Mirlex's assumption of $1 million of T-L Drilling debt. The note was later distributed to Mann as a dividend.

Kelly's actions were covered by section 215, and he has not shown that he could not have reasonably understood that his conduct was prohibited by the statute — this is especially so given Congress's intent in enacting section 215 to "remove from the path of bank officials the temptation of self enrichment" at the borrower's or bank's expense. United States v. Jumper, 838 F.2d 755, 758 (5th Cir. 1988) (citation omitted). See supra note 16.

First, we find Mr. Denny misperceives the purpose of 18 U.S.C. § 215. As stated in United States v. Jumper, 838 F.2d 755, 758 (5th Cir. 1988): The purpose of 18 U.S.C. § 215 is to protect FDIC insured bank deposits by preventing unsound and improvident lines of credit from being made . . . by officers . . . of the bank. . . .

"[T]he essence of the offense under section 215 is endeavoring to procure a loan from a bank for a thing of value by an officer of the bank." United States v. Schoenhut, 576 F.2d 1010, 1022 (3d Cir. 1978); see also United States v. Jumper, 838 F.2d 755, 758 (5th Cir. 1988) ("The purpose of 18 U.S.C. § 215 is to protect FDIC insured bank deposits by preventing unsound and improvident lines of credit from being made from such deposits by officers and directors of the bank. In addition, there can be no doubt that Congress' intent by enacting section 215 was to remove from the path of bank officials the temptation of self enrichment at the expense of the borrower or bank.

The purpose of 18 U.S.C. § 215 is to protect FDIC insured bank deposits by preventing unsound and improvident lines of credit from being made from such deposits by bank officers and directors. United States v. Jumper, 838 F.2d 755, 758 (5th Cir. 1988). There can be no doubt that Congress's intent in enacting Section 215 was to remove from the path of bank officials the temptation of self-enrichment at the expense of the borrower or bank.

See also United States v. Schoenhut, 576 F.2d 1010, 1012 N Cir. 1978) (no proof necessary that defendant knew of fraudulent schemes and forgeries, as long as defendant endeavors to or does secure loan in return for something of value). Indeed, in none of the cases addressing this statute is there any indication that failure to plead the illegality would be deficient. See, e.g., United States v. Jumper, 838 F.2d 755, 757 (5th Cir. 1988); Harenberg, 732 F.2d 1507; Ryan v. United States, 278 F.2d 836, 838 (9th Cir. 1960). This also supports the government's arguments on this motion.