Opinion
No. 88 Civ. 4486 (LAP).
July 8, 2005
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
By Application 113, the Independent Review Board ("IRB") submitted a compromise agreement reached between the IRB and International Brotherhood of Teamsters ("IBT") member Carlow Scalf, then serving as Executive Assistant to General President Hoffa of the IBT. Application 113 disclosed that after various records had been required from Scalf concerning housing and car allowances for IBT employees and after the IRB learned that Scalf from about March 2001 through January 2004 caused the IBT to pay over $65,000 in housing expenses on his behalf when he did not have a principal place of residence out of state as the General Executive Board approval for his housing expenses required, Scalf reimbursed $69,500 to the IBT. It also disclosed that after the IRB informed Scalf that it planned to recommend a charge against him for providing inaccurate or incomplete information on residence forms he submitted to the IBT, Scalf signed the compromise agreement resolving the matter principally by the repayment and a 60-day suspension from the IBT.
By letter dated January 14, 2005, Teamsters for a Democratic Union ("TDU") objected to the compromise agreement, raising various procedural issues and arguing on the merits that a more severe sanction was required. By letter dated March 11, 2005, the IBT informed the IRB that General President Hoffa had rescinded Scalf's appointment as his Executive Assistant, and, accordingly, Mr. Scalf's employment with the IBT terminated effective March 12, 2005. Mr. Scalf, the IBT and the Government have also submitted letter briefs with respect to Application 113.
First, the TDU lacks standing to object to Application 113. TDU is "a caucus of rank-and-file IBT members concerned about corruption, lack of leadership, accountability to the membership, undemocratic procedures, unfair, ineffective and even ill-intentional bargaining and grievance adjustment strategies within the Union." United States v. IBT (TDU/TRF), 968 F.2d 1506, 1508 (2d Cir. 1992) (internal quotations omitted). As a nonparty to the Consent Decree and nonparty to the IRB's disciplinary proceeding against Scalf, TDU lacks standing to object to a disciplinary application of the IRB. See, e.g., United States v. IBT, 138 F.2d 50, 51 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
Second, even if TDU had standing to object to Application 113, there is no procedural impediment to the Application. Nothing in the IRB Rules precludes the IRB from entering into compromise agreements before an investigation is completed or requires the IRB to recommend formal charges to the IRB before submitting a compromise agreement to the Court for approval. Indeed, under the IRB Rules, the IRB is obligated to prepare an Investigative Report only "[u]pon completion of an investigation." IRB Rules ¶ I(1). If, as TDU argues, a report were required whenever the IRB had merely commenced an investigation, the IRB would be required to prepare a full report, regardless of whether or not an investigation uncovered any misconduct — a grossly inefficient waste of resources. There is nothing in the IRB Rules that precludes presentation of a compromise agreement at this stage of the proceedings.
Finally, there is no merit to TDU's argument that Application 113 should be rejected because the sanction is too lenient. "[I]t is well established that sanctions given in other cases are not relevant to the Court's inquiry as to whether a particular sanction is unwarranted or without justification." United States v. IBT (Bane), 2002 WL 654128, at *16 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 18, 2002),aff'd, (2d Cir. Mar. 13, 2003); accord United States v. IBT ("Giacumbo"), 170 F.3d 136, 144 (2d Cir. 1999) ("Uneven application of sanctions does not normally render the sanction imposed in a particular case arbitrary or capricious."); United States v. IBT (Sansone), 981 F.2d 1362, 1371-72 (2d Cir. 1992) ("The apparent discrepancy between the penalty imposed here and those imposed in other cases does not inexorably compel the conclusion that the Independent Administrator acted arbitrarily or capriciously."). Similarly, that 1) Scalf was, at the time the compromise agreement was entered into, a high-ranking official of the IBT, 2) the sanction agreed to was a relatively lenient one, and 3) the IRB did not expressly articulate that it took Scalf's position into account in fashioning a sanction does not cast doubt on the agreement. As the Court recognized in a related context, "the IRB's failure expressly to discuss a particular factor in its decision does not necessarily mean that the IRB failed to consider that factor. See Transcript of Proceedings, United States v. IBT (Crawley), 88 Civ. 4486, at 7 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 2005) ("In sum, I disagree with Mr. Crawley's legal argument that evidence not discussed by the IRB must be found not to have been considered by the IRB.") In this case, the IRB's application, on its face, plainly identifies Scalf as "the Executive Assistant to the IBT General President in Washington, DC." It may well be that, in the IRB's view, its decision to impose any sanction at all — rather than simply close its investigation without charges — reflected a desire to hold Scalf accountable precisely because he is a high-level official of the Union. For present purposes, it is sufficient that TDU has not established that the IRB failed to take Scalf's high-level position into account when considering its choice of sanction.
Moving to the merits, the Court recognizes its obligation to consider the application in a "careful, thorough and probing" manner. 170 F.3d 143 (citing Ward v. Brown, 22 F.3d 516, 521 (2d Cir. 1994)). In reviewing whether the sanction imposed here serves the remedial purposes of the Consent Decree, the Court nevertheless applies a deferential standard of review: "The IRB has `wide discretion' in imposing sanctions." United States v. IBT (O'Donnell), 29 Fed. Appx. 685, 688 (2d Cir. Feb. 12, 2002) (quoting Giacumbo, 170 F.3d at 144). In reviewing IRB sanctions, the Court asks only whether a sanction imposed represents an "allowable judgment" in the choice of a remedy.United States v. IBT (Wilson, Dickens, Weber), 978 F.2d 68, 73 (2d Cir. 1992) (citation omitted). "[T]he reviewing court should not overturn the . . . choice of sanctions unless it finds the penalty unwarranted in law or without justification in fact."Simpson, 120 F.3d at 348 (citing Wilson, Dickens, Weber, 978 F.2d at 73).
Applying these recognized standards, the sanction reflected in Application 113 serves the remedial purposes of the Consent Decree. The Court also notes that, as set forth above, since the compromise agreement reflected in Application 113 was reached, Mr. Scalf's employment at the IRB has also been terminated. Accordingly, he has suffered an additional punishment on account of the conduct reflected in Application 113.
CONCLUSION
Application 113 is granted.
SO ORDERED.