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U.S. v. Imngren

23 Citing cases

  1. Herbert v. Billy

    160 F.3d 1131 (6th Cir. 1998)   Cited 966 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that a license suspension is not a punishment for Double Jeopardy purposes

    Similarly, the Fourth Circuit has stated that "if a civil sanction serves a remedial purpose, the duration of the sanction does not necessarily make it punishment." United States v. Imngren, 98 F.3d 811, 816 (4th Cir. 1996). Both the First and Fourth Circuits determined that the administrative license suspensions at issue were remedial, not punitive, in nature.

  2. Lawlor v. Commonwealth

    285 Va. 187 (Va. 2013)   Cited 392 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that evidence of defendant drinking "on the day of the offense is insufficient to establish that he was too intoxicated to form the requisite intent" to commit capital murder

    We review de novo claims that multiple punishments have been imposed for the same offense in violation of the double jeopardy clause. Fullwood v. Commonwealth, 279 Va. 531, 539, 689 S.E.2d 742, 747 (2010) (citing United States v. Imngren, 98 F.3d 811, 813 (4th Cir.1996)). We previously examined this issue in Brown and Powell I:

  3. United States v. Mayes

    158 F.3d 1215 (11th Cir. 1998)   Cited 93 times
    Holding that "trial judges should not blindly defer to the recommendation of law enforcement officials as to the appropriateness of shackling without independently reviewing the facts and circumstances thought to warrant such a security measure and carefully considering the legal ramifications of that decision"

    We therefore turn to the overall purpose expressed in the regulations themselves to derive the government's implied intent. See, e.g., United States v. Imngren, 98 F.3d 811, 815 (4th Cir. 1996). Section 541.10(a) states that the disciplinary provisions exist "[s]o that inmates may live in a safe and orderly environment[.]"

  4. U.S. v. Brown

    202 F.3d 691 (4th Cir. 2000)   Cited 86 times
    Holding that money laundering cannot be a predicate offense under the CCE statute

    Brown also challenges his CCE and drug conspiracy convictions on double jeopardy grounds, a claim that we review de novo. See United States v. McManus, 23 F.3d 878, 884 (4th Cir. 1994) (a "defendant convicted [of CCE] may not also be convicted for any predicate conspiracy charges proved as elements of the[CCE]") (internal quotations omitted); United States v. Imngren, 98 F.3d 811, 813 (4th Cir. 1996) (noting that de novo standard of review applies to double jeopardy claims). However, because we have reversed Brown's CCE conviction and sentence thereunder, Brown's double jeopardy claim is now moot.

  5. U.S. v. Sauls

    981 F. Supp. 909 (D. Md. 1997)   Cited 27 times
    Finding no constitutional error when officer read state, not federal, driving consequences of refusal, noting that defendant could not show how he was harmed by “taking a test that the federal law required he take”

    Although it is debatable, the defendant may be correct in his contention that the Maryland administrative penalties are more severe than those imposed under the Federal statute. See, United States v. Imngren, 98 F.3d 811, 816 (4th Cir. 1996).

  6. State v. Howell

    254 Neb. 247 (Neb. 1998)   Cited 24 times
    In State v. Howell, 254 Neb. 247, 575 N.W.2d 861 (1998), we addressed the question of whether the administrative revocation of a driver's license for refusal to submit to a chemical test constituted punishment such that any subsequent prosecution put the offender twice in jeopardy.

    Id. This type of summary proceeding, which shifts the burden of proof to the offender, is a distinctly civil procedure. U.S. v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 116 S.Ct. 2135, 135 L.Ed.2d 549 (1996); U.S. v. Imngren, 98 F.3d 811 (4th Cir. 1996); Ex parte Avilez, 929 S.W.2d 677 (Tex. App. 1996). See, also, State v. Mantich, 249 Neb. 311, 327, 543 N.W.2d 181, 193 (1996) (stating that "this burden never shifts" in criminal case).

  7. Fullwood v. Commonwealth

    279 Va. 531 (Va. 2010)   Cited 15 times
    In Fullwood, the Supreme Court of Virginia upheld a circuit court's finding that the parking lot of a privately-owned apartment complex was "open to public use."

    Whether there has been a double jeopardy violation presents a question of law requiring a de novo review. SeeUnited States v. Imngren, 98 F.3d 811, 813 (4th Cir.1996). In such a review, the rule is that " [w]here consecutive sentences are imposed at a single criminal trial, the role of the constitutional guarantee is limited to assuring that the court does not exceed its legislative authorization by imposing multiple punishments for the same offense."

  8. Rivera v. Pugh

    194 F.3d 1064 (9th Cir. 1999)   Cited 14 times

    The statute is to be evaluated on its face, see id., and "whether a sanction constitutes punishment is not determined from the defendant's perspective." Department of Revenue of Mont. v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 777 n. 14 (1994); see United States v. Imngren, 98 F.3d 811, 817 n. 4 (4th Cir. 1996) (that appellants suffered as a result of the suspension of their driver's licenses is of no import in a double jeopardy analysis, citing Kurth Ranch). Second, license revocation has not been historically regarded as punishment. All the federal courts of appeal addressing the nature of driver's license revocation, including this court, have declared that it is remedial.

  9. State v. Price

    333 S.C. 267 (S.C. 1998)   Cited 11 times
    Explaining analysis under Hudson and holding that administrative suspension of driver's license for refusal to submit to breathalyser test is not so punitive in purpose or effect as to constitute a criminal penalty that would implicate double jeopardy

    Moreover, the mere fact that the conduct for which the sanction is imposed is also criminal is insufficient to render the sanction criminally punitive. Hudson, 118 S.Ct. at 496, U.S. v. Imngren, 98 F.3d 811 (4th Cir. 1996), State v. Howell, supra. Finally, we note that nearly every other court which has addressed the issue finds no double jeopardy problem is posed by the administrative suspension of a driver's license following a drunk driving arrest or refusal to submit to chemical testing.

  10. U.S. v. Stegman

    295 F. Supp. 2d 542 (D. Md. 2003)   Cited 10 times

    Thus, the double jeopardy clause only applies to governmental acts that are punitive. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 369, 117 S.Ct. 2072, 138 L.Ed.2d 501 (1997); United States v. Imngren, 98 F.3d 811, 817 (4th Cir. 1996); United States v. Glymph, 96 F.3d 722, 725 (4th Cir. 1996). As discussed above, supra section 1.b., the forced extraction of DNA from Stegman is not penal or punitive in nature.