Id. This type of summary proceeding, which shifts the burden of proof to the offender, is a distinctly civil procedure. U.S. v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 116 S.Ct. 2135, 135 L.Ed.2d 549 (1996); U.S. v. Imngren, 98 F.3d 811 (4th Cir. 1996); Ex parte Avilez, 929 S.W.2d 677 (Tex. App. 1996). See, also, State v. Mantich, 249 Neb. 311, 327, 543 N.W.2d 181, 193 (1996) (stating that "this burden never shifts" in criminal case).

Moreover, the duration of the revocation does not automatically make it a punishment. See U.S. v. Imngren , 98 F.3d 811, 816 (4th Cir. 1996) (determining that the length of a one-year suspension of driving privileges does not render it punitive, and noting that "the argument that suspending a motorist's driving privileges is punitive because some element of deterrence is involved is without merit"). Two of the Mendoza-Martinez factors do not contribute much to our analysis.

We review de novo claims that multiple punishments have been imposed for the same offense in violation of the double jeopardy clause. Fullwood v. Commonwealth, 279 Va. 531, 539, 689 S.E.2d 742, 747 (2010) (citing United States v. Imngren, 98 F.3d 811, 813 (4th Cir.1996)). We previously examined this issue in Brown and Powell I:

Whether there has been a double jeopardy violation presents a question of law requiring a de novo review. SeeUnited States v. Imngren, 98 F.3d 811, 813 (4th Cir.1996). In such a review, the rule is that " [w]here consecutive sentences are imposed at a single criminal trial, the role of the constitutional guarantee is limited to assuring that the court does not exceed its legislative authorization by imposing multiple punishments for the same offense."

This type of summary proceeding, which shifts the burden of proof to the offender, is a distinctly civil procedure. Id., citing United States v. Ursery, supra; U.S. v. Imngren, 98 F.3d 811 (4th Cir. 1996); Ex parte Avilez, 929 S.W.2d 677 (Tex.App. 1996). A criminal trial and ALR proceedings serve different purposes.

Moreover, the mere fact that the conduct for which the sanction is imposed is also criminal is insufficient to render the sanction criminally punitive. Hudson, 118 S.Ct. at 496, U.S. v. Imngren, 98 F.3d 811 (4th Cir. 1996), State v. Howell, supra. Finally, we note that nearly every other court which has addressed the issue finds no double jeopardy problem is posed by the administrative suspension of a driver's license following a drunk driving arrest or refusal to submit to chemical testing.

Because in this instance federal law provides no greater protection to the defendant, we undertake no separate federal analysis. See id. at 26, 622 A.2d at 1247; United States v. Imngren, 98 F.3d 811, 815-17 (4th Cir. 1996). In deciding whether the defendant's administrative license suspension is punishment under part I, article 16 of the State Constitution, we first inquire whether the legislature intended that this statutory penalty be considered civil or criminal.

As noted below, the prison discipline system exists to maintain institutional security and order, not to adjudicate guilt or innocence. Ten days after the Court of Appeals decision in Jones, the Fourth Circuit handed down United States v. Imngren, 98 F.3d 811 (4th Cir. 1996), which applied Ursery to uphold a drunk driving conviction that followed a license suspension. Appellant is not the first inmate to contend that criminal prosecutions following administrative sanctions violate the double jeopardy clause. Of the courts that have entertained this question, the overwhelming consensus is that such claims are without merit.