Schiller contends that the one-year suspension of her military driving privileges constitutes a punishment within the meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause and therefore precludes a subsequent criminal prosecution. The Fourth Circuit addressed precisely this issue in United States v. Imngren, 98 F.3d 811 (4th Cir. 1996), and concluded that the Double Jeopardy Clause did not apply to prohibit a subsequent criminal prosecution. Id. at 817.

The statute is to be evaluated on its face, see id., and "whether a sanction constitutes punishment is not determined from the defendant's perspective." Department of Revenue of Mont. v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 777 n. 14 (1994); see United States v. Imngren, 98 F.3d 811, 817 n. 4 (4th Cir. 1996) (that appellants suffered as a result of the suspension of their driver's licenses is of no import in a double jeopardy analysis, citing Kurth Ranch). Second, license revocation has not been historically regarded as punishment. All the federal courts of appeal addressing the nature of driver's license revocation, including this court, have declared that it is remedial.

We therefore turn to the overall purpose expressed in the regulations themselves to derive the government's implied intent. See, e.g., United States v. Imngren, 98 F.3d 811, 815 (4th Cir. 1996). Section 541.10(a) states that the disciplinary provisions exist "[s]o that inmates may live in a safe and orderly environment[.]"

Instead, administrative suspensions are intended to promote public safety by removing drivers who drive under the influence. United States v. Imngren , 98 F.3d 811, 816 (4th Cir. 1996). In fact, the Fourth Circuit held that prosecution for driving under the influence on a military reservation following suspension of driving privileges did not violate double jeopardy.

Similarly, the Fourth Circuit has stated that "if a civil sanction serves a remedial purpose, the duration of the sanction does not necessarily make it punishment." United States v. Imngren, 98 F.3d 811, 816 (4th Cir. 1996). Both the First and Fourth Circuits determined that the administrative license suspensions at issue were remedial, not punitive, in nature.

The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recently applied similar reasoning in upholding the prosecution for drunken driving of a civilian Air Force employee after he had been suspended from his job for three days as a result of the same conduct. See United States v. Reyes, 87 F.3d 676, 680-81 (5th Cir. 1996); see also United States v. Imngren, 98 F.3d 811, 815-16 (4th Cir. 1996) (one-year suspension of on-base driving privileges of civilian army employee was "remedial" and therefore was not "punishment" barring subsequent prosecution for driving while intoxicated); United States v. Payne, 2 F.3d 706, 710-711 (6th Cir. 1993) (discharge of postal worker for "obstruction and desertion of mail" did not bar subsequent prosecution for the same incidents); United States v. Reed, 937 F.2d 575, 577-78 (11th Cir. 1991) (disciplinary suspension of postal employee for embezzlement was not punishment barring subsequent prosecution for same acts). We hold that, where the government, acting as employer of members of the armed forces, disciplines a member by using measures that are available to private employers, and are not uniquely within government's power to punish for criminal wrongdoing, such discipline ordinarily will not constitute "punishment" within the meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause.

In fact, the only cases located by the Court that have treated violations of § 3118 as criminal appear within the Eastern District of Virginia and, correspondingly, the Fourth Circuit, which heard several appeals from defendants who were charged with violating § 3118 among other offenses; the question whether § 3118 defined a crime, however, never came directly before the Fourth Circuit. See United States v. Crawford, 1998 WL 879036 (4th Cir. July 31, 1998) (per curiam); United States v. Imngren, 914 F. Supp. 1326 (E.D. Va. 1995), rev'd, 98 F.3d 811 (4th Cir. 1996); see also United States v. Van Hazel, 468 F. Supp. 2d 792, 798 (E.D.N.C. 2006) (discussing a violation of § 3118, which was not charged as a separate crime); United States v. Iglesia, 1999 WL 1095483 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 1999) (same). Accordingly, the Court will dismiss Count I of the Criminal Information without prejudice and vacate the judgment of conviction.

Accordingly, issues of law are reviewed de novo. United States v. Bursey, 416 F.3d 301, 305-06 (4th Cir. 2005);United States v. Imngren, 98 F.3d 811, 813 (4th Cir. 1996). The Double Jeopardy Clause provides that no person shall "be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb."

In order to give Defendant notice of the criminal penalties available under federal law for the violation of § 291C-102, the citation should have referred to both § 291C-102 and, for example, § 634.25(f). See, e.g., United States v. Imngren, 98 F.3d 811, 813 (4th Cir. 1996) (defendant charged with failing to drive in a single lane in violation of 32 C.F.R. § 634.25(f) and Va. Code Ann. § 46.2-804); United States v. Spencer, 422 F. Supp. 2d 589, 590 (E.D. Vir. 2005) (defendant charged with operating a motor vehicle without a valid license in violation of § 634.25(f) (adopting Va. Code Ann. § 46.2-300)). Section 634.32(d)(3) states that: "The assimilation of State traffic laws as Federal offenses should be identified by a specific State code reference in the CODE SECTION block of the DD Form 1805. . . ." 32 C.F.R. § 634.32(d)(3).

Thus, the double jeopardy clause only applies to governmental acts that are punitive. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 369, 117 S.Ct. 2072, 138 L.Ed.2d 501 (1997); United States v. Imngren, 98 F.3d 811, 817 (4th Cir. 1996); United States v. Glymph, 96 F.3d 722, 725 (4th Cir. 1996). As discussed above, supra section 1.b., the forced extraction of DNA from Stegman is not penal or punitive in nature.