U.S. v. Imngren

3 Citing cases

  1. U.S. v. Torres

    CR. NO. 06-00477 LEK (D. Haw. Dec. 27, 2006)   Cited 2 times
    In Torres, Magistrate Judge Kobayashi dismissed the citation because (1) the citation referenced only HRS § 291C-102 and therefore did not provide sufficient notice that this violation of state law subjected Torres to criminal penalties under federal law; and (2) the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over this citation because it was not a "local magistrate" as required by 32 C.F.R. § 634.25(f).

    In order to give Defendant notice of the criminal penalties available under federal law for the violation of § 291C-102, the citation should have referred to both § 291C-102 and, for example, § 634.25(f). See, e.g., United States v. Imngren, 98 F.3d 811, 813 (4th Cir. 1996) (defendant charged with failing to drive in a single lane in violation of 32 C.F.R. § 634.25(f) and Va. Code Ann. § 46.2-804); United States v. Spencer, 422 F. Supp. 2d 589, 590 (E.D. Vir. 2005) (defendant charged with operating a motor vehicle without a valid license in violation of § 634.25(f) (adopting Va. Code Ann. § 46.2-300)). Section 634.32(d)(3) states that: "The assimilation of State traffic laws as Federal offenses should be identified by a specific State code reference in the CODE SECTION block of the DD Form 1805. . . ." 32 C.F.R. § 634.32(d)(3).

  2. U.S. v. Stegman

    295 F. Supp. 2d 542 (D. Md. 2003)   Cited 10 times

    Thus, the double jeopardy clause only applies to governmental acts that are punitive. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 369, 117 S.Ct. 2072, 138 L.Ed.2d 501 (1997); United States v. Imngren, 98 F.3d 811, 817 (4th Cir. 1996); United States v. Glymph, 96 F.3d 722, 725 (4th Cir. 1996). As discussed above, supra section 1.b., the forced extraction of DNA from Stegman is not penal or punitive in nature.

  3. Alan A. v. Verniero

    970 F. Supp. 1153 (D.N.J. 1997)   Cited 6 times
    Stating that Megan's Law was enacted to provide knowledge as measure of self-defense to help protect most vulnerable community members from sex offenders

    The Tier Determination Hearing is not unlike any separate hearing afforded prior to imposition of a remedial restraint, sanction or burden based in whole or in part on facts that have resulted in or may lead to conviction. See Allen v. Attorney General of State of Maine, 80 F.3d 569 (1st Cir. 1996) (prosecution for driving while intoxicated not barred by prior administrative suspension of license for same conduct); United States v. Imngren, 98 F.3d 811 (4th Cir. 1996) (same); United States v. Glymph, 96 F.3d 722 (4th Cir. 1996) (applying Ursery and concluding that because four year debarment served remedial purpose it did not bar a criminal prosecution); Borjesson, 92 F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 1996) (indefinite exclusion from program served remedial purpose and did not bar imposition of a sentence). In any event, the Tier Determination Hearings are not a successive prosecution for the same offense pursuant to the Blockburger test.