We therefore turn to the overall purpose expressed in the regulations themselves to derive the government's implied intent. See, e.g., United States v. Imngren, 98 F.3d 811, 815 (4th Cir. 1996). Section 541.10(a) states that the disciplinary provisions exist "[s]o that inmates may live in a safe and orderly environment[.]"
Instead, administrative suspensions are intended to promote public safety by removing drivers who drive under the influence. United States v. Imngren , 98 F.3d 811, 816 (4th Cir. 1996). In fact, the Fourth Circuit held that prosecution for driving under the influence on a military reservation following suspension of driving privileges did not violate double jeopardy.
Although it is debatable, the defendant may be correct in his contention that the Maryland administrative penalties are more severe than those imposed under the Federal statute. See, United States v. Imngren, 98 F.3d 811, 816 (4th Cir. 1996).
The Tier Determination Hearing is not unlike any separate hearing afforded prior to imposition of a remedial restraint, sanction or burden based in whole or in part on facts that have resulted in or may lead to conviction. See Allen v. Attorney General of State of Maine, 80 F.3d 569 (1st Cir. 1996) (prosecution for driving while intoxicated not barred by prior administrative suspension of license for same conduct); United States v. Imngren, 98 F.3d 811 (4th Cir. 1996) (same); United States v. Glymph, 96 F.3d 722 (4th Cir. 1996) (applying Ursery and concluding that because four year debarment served remedial purpose it did not bar a criminal prosecution); Borjesson, 92 F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 1996) (indefinite exclusion from program served remedial purpose and did not bar imposition of a sentence). In any event, the Tier Determination Hearings are not a successive prosecution for the same offense pursuant to the Blockburger test.
Moreover, the duration of the revocation does not automatically make it a punishment. See U.S. v. Imngren , 98 F.3d 811, 816 (4th Cir. 1996) (determining that the length of a one-year suspension of driving privileges does not render it punitive, and noting that "the argument that suspending a motorist's driving privileges is punitive because some element of deterrence is involved is without merit"). Two of the Mendoza-Martinez factors do not contribute much to our analysis.
We review de novo claims that multiple punishments have been imposed for the same offense in violation of the double jeopardy clause. Fullwood v. Commonwealth, 279 Va. 531, 539, 689 S.E.2d 742, 747 (2010) (citing United States v. Imngren, 98 F.3d 811, 813 (4th Cir.1996)). We previously examined this issue in Brown and Powell I: