The sole issue on appeal is whether North Carolina's thirty-day ALR period amounts to criminal punishment, triggering the protections of the Double Jeopardy Clause. U.S. Const. Amend. V. We review the district court's grant of summary judgment denying a double jeopardy claim de novo. United States v. Imngren, 98 F.3d 811, 813 (4th Cir. 1996). N.C. Gen.Stat. § 20-16.5 (1999), entitled "Immediate civil license revocation for certain persons charged with implied-consent offenses," provides for a thirty-day revocation of the driver's license of a person charged with an implied-consent offense who either refuses a blood alcohol level (BAC) test or consents to such a test and has an alcohol concentration in excess of the applicable legal limit (.08 ordinarily).

Schiller contends that the one-year suspension of her military driving privileges constitutes a punishment within the meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause and therefore precludes a subsequent criminal prosecution. The Fourth Circuit addressed precisely this issue in United States v. Imngren, 98 F.3d 811 (4th Cir. 1996), and concluded that the Double Jeopardy Clause did not apply to prohibit a subsequent criminal prosecution. Id. at 817.

The statute is to be evaluated on its face, see id., and "whether a sanction constitutes punishment is not determined from the defendant's perspective." Department of Revenue of Mont. v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 777 n. 14 (1994); see United States v. Imngren, 98 F.3d 811, 817 n. 4 (4th Cir. 1996) (that appellants suffered as a result of the suspension of their driver's licenses is of no import in a double jeopardy analysis, citing Kurth Ranch). Second, license revocation has not been historically regarded as punishment. All the federal courts of appeal addressing the nature of driver's license revocation, including this court, have declared that it is remedial.

We therefore turn to the overall purpose expressed in the regulations themselves to derive the government's implied intent. See, e.g., United States v. Imngren, 98 F.3d 811, 815 (4th Cir. 1996). Section 541.10(a) states that the disciplinary provisions exist "[s]o that inmates may live in a safe and orderly environment[.]"

Id. This type of summary proceeding, which shifts the burden of proof to the offender, is a distinctly civil procedure. U.S. v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 116 S.Ct. 2135, 135 L.Ed.2d 549 (1996); U.S. v. Imngren, 98 F.3d 811 (4th Cir. 1996); Ex parte Avilez, 929 S.W.2d 677 (Tex. App. 1996). See, also, State v. Mantich, 249 Neb. 311, 327, 543 N.W.2d 181, 193 (1996) (stating that "this burden never shifts" in criminal case).

Instead, administrative suspensions are intended to promote public safety by removing drivers who drive under the influence. United States v. Imngren , 98 F.3d 811, 816 (4th Cir. 1996). In fact, the Fourth Circuit held that prosecution for driving under the influence on a military reservation following suspension of driving privileges did not violate double jeopardy.

Brown also challenges his CCE and drug conspiracy convictions on double jeopardy grounds, a claim that we review de novo. See United States v. McManus, 23 F.3d 878, 884 (4th Cir. 1994) (a "defendant convicted [of CCE] may not also be convicted for any predicate conspiracy charges proved as elements of the[CCE]") (internal quotations omitted); United States v. Imngren, 98 F.3d 811, 813 (4th Cir. 1996) (noting that de novo standard of review applies to double jeopardy claims). However, because we have reversed Brown's CCE conviction and sentence thereunder, Brown's double jeopardy claim is now moot.

Similarly, the Fourth Circuit has stated that "if a civil sanction serves a remedial purpose, the duration of the sanction does not necessarily make it punishment." United States v. Imngren, 98 F.3d 811, 816 (4th Cir. 1996). Both the First and Fourth Circuits determined that the administrative license suspensions at issue were remedial, not punitive, in nature.

The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recently applied similar reasoning in upholding the prosecution for drunken driving of a civilian Air Force employee after he had been suspended from his job for three days as a result of the same conduct. See United States v. Reyes, 87 F.3d 676, 680-81 (5th Cir. 1996); see also United States v. Imngren, 98 F.3d 811, 815-16 (4th Cir. 1996) (one-year suspension of on-base driving privileges of civilian army employee was "remedial" and therefore was not "punishment" barring subsequent prosecution for driving while intoxicated); United States v. Payne, 2 F.3d 706, 710-711 (6th Cir. 1993) (discharge of postal worker for "obstruction and desertion of mail" did not bar subsequent prosecution for the same incidents); United States v. Reed, 937 F.2d 575, 577-78 (11th Cir. 1991) (disciplinary suspension of postal employee for embezzlement was not punishment barring subsequent prosecution for same acts). We hold that, where the government, acting as employer of members of the armed forces, disciplines a member by using measures that are available to private employers, and are not uniquely within government's power to punish for criminal wrongdoing, such discipline ordinarily will not constitute "punishment" within the meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause.

The suspension of driving privileges focuses on the promotion of public safety, rather than punishment. United States v. Imngren, 98 F.3d 811, 816-17 (4th Cir. 1996). Therefore, the infractions Plaintiff suffered at base traffic court are not criminal punishments.