See United States v. Delamora, 451 F.3d 977, 978 (9th Cir.2006) (“We hold today that a defendant's term of supervised release is tolled from the time that he absconds from supervision until the time he is found by federal authorities.”); United States v. Ignacio Juarez, 601 F.3d 885, 890 (9th Cir. 2010)
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. On de novo review, United States v. Ignacio Juarez, 601 F.3d 885, 888 (9th Cir. 2010) (per curiam), we hold that Watson's fugitive status tolled the term of supervised release, and that the district court had jurisdiction to revoke the release and sentence Watson to prison. The district court's authority to revoke a term of supervised release "extends beyond the expiration of the term of supervised release for any period reasonably necessary for the adjudication of matters arising before its expiration if, before its expiration, a warrant or summons has been issued on the basis of an allegation of such a violation."
A district court's exercise of jurisdiction to revoke a term of supervised release is reviewed de novo. United States v. Ignacio Juarez, 601 F.3d 885, 888 (9th Cir. 2010) (per curiam). In the revocation proceedings below, it was the government's burden to prove the facts surrounding both periods of fugitive tolling.
Nor, as Thompson concedes, is there any other court of appeals that has adopted his position. Instead, the Ninth Circuit already has rejected a very similar argument, holding in United States v. Ignacio Juarez , 601 F.3d 885 (2010), that a defendant may be a fugitive for tolling purposes even if no warrant against him has issued. It is not the warrant, the Ninth Circuit explained, that triggers tolling; instead, "[f]ugitive tolling begins when the defendant absconds from supervision – making it impossible for the Probation Office to supervise his actions."
Whether a district court has jurisdiction to revoke a term of supervised release is reviewed de novo. United States v. Ignacio Juarez, 601 F.3d 885, 888 (9th Cir.2010). III. DISCUSSION
"Fugitive tolling begins when the defendant absconds from supervision . . ." U.S. v. Ignacio Juarez, 601 F.3d 885, 890 (9th Cir. 2010). In Grant, the defendant failed to comply with the terms of her probation when she moved, failed to inform her probation officer of her move within 72 hours, as her probation terms required, and failed to comply with other terms of her probation, such as failing to pay restitution, committing another felony, and failing to timely report her nolo contendere plea to the felony.
[Citations] We are bound by those decisions." Id. at 807; see also U.S. v. Ignacio Juarez, 601 F. 3d 885 (9th Cir. 2010) and United States v Ahmadzai , 723 F. 3d 1089 (9th Cir 2013). This Court, of course, is similarly bound by those decisions.
. .and ends when federal authorities are capable of resuming supervision." United States v. Ignacio Juarez, 601 F.3d 885, 890 (9th Cir. 2010)(per curiam). Arrest by state authorities does not impute "constructive knowledge to federal authorities" of a defendant's whereabouts, allowing the resumption of supervision.
A defendant is deemed to be a fugitive from his supervised release when he absconds from supervision. Watson, 633 F.3d at 931; accord United States v. Juarez, 601 F.3d 885, 890 (9th Cir. 2010). 3. "Tolling of a supervised release term extends the date the term is set to expire as long as the defendant remains a fugitive."
As a consequence, the running of the 33 months remaining on defendant's term of supervised release was tolled when he became a fugitive. United States v. Ignacio Juarez, 601 F.3d 885, 888 (9th Cir. 2010). Moreover, the remaining 33 months of defendant's supervised release term did not run after he was arrested, convicted and imprisoned on state drug and firearm charges.