The principal case on border searches in the Fourth Circuit is United States v. Ickes, 393 F.3d 501 (4th Cir.2005), which, like this case, dealt with a computer search—although not a forensic examination of an identical image of the entire contents of the computer's hardware. In Ickes, the defendant was selected for secondary inspection at the U.S.—Canadian border because the large amount of property he had in his van seemed inconsistent with his claim that he was returning from a vacation.

He argues that a laptop is like the "human mind" because of its ability to record ideas, e-mail, internet chats and web-surfing habits. Lastly, Arnold argues that application of First Amendment principles requires us to rule contrary to the Fourth Circuit in United States v. Ickes, 393 F.3d 501, 506-08 (4th Cir. 2005) (rejecting the argument based on the First Amendment that a higher level of suspicion is needed for searches of "expressive material"), and to promulgate a reasonable suspicion requirement for border searches where the risk is high that expressive material will be exposed. III A

In United States v. Arnold, 533 F.3d 1003, 1008–10 (9th Cir.2008), cert. denied,555 U.S. 1176, 129 S.Ct. 1312, 173 L.Ed.2d 595 (2009), we held that laptops are like other property, relying on the reasoning and language in Flores–Montano, Chaudhry, and Cortez–Rocha discussed above (among other cases). Similarly, in United States v. Ickes, 393 F.3d 501, 503–07 (4th Cir.2005), the Fourth Circuit upheld an extensive border search of the defendant's laptop that revealed child pornography. Notably, the court held that the border agents had reasonable suspicion to search the defendant's laptop, but explained why that did not matter:

That Kolsuz had been arrested, the district court explained, did not transform the forensic examination into a search incident to arrest or render the border exception inapplicable; both the Fourth Circuit and other courts have held that a border search may be conducted after a traveler is arrested and no longer in a position to cross the border. Id. at 851 (citing United States v. Ickes , 393 F.3d 501, 507 (4th Cir. 2005) ). Similarly, the court found, it is well established that a search initiated at the border may fall under the border exception even if it ultimately is conducted off-site and over a long period of time.

See United Statesv. Caballero, 178 F. Supp. 3d 1008, 1018 (S.D. Cal. 2016) (explaining that "[a]lthough Riley could be applied to a cell phone search at the border, this Court is bound by Cotterman"); Lopez, 2016 WL 7370030, at * 5. Likewise, district courts in the Fourth Circuit are bound by preRiley precedent in United States v. Ickes, in which the Fourth Circuit held that a manual digital search of an electronic device is a routine border search, requiring no individualized suspicion, Ickes, 393 F.3d 501, 505-06 (4th Cir. 2005). See Kolsuz, 185 F. Supp. 3d at 854-55; United States v. Saboonchi, 990 F. Supp. 2d 536, 560 (D. Md. 2014).

523 F.3d at 944. We found this unpersuasive and adopted the Fourth Circuit's position in United States v. Ickes, 393 F.3d 501 (4th Cir. 2005). See Arnold 523 F.3d at 948 (stating that the court would "follow the reasoning of Ickes "). Rejecting the creation of a First Amendment exception to the border search doctrine, the Fourth Circuit in Ickes reasoned, "[p]articularly in today's world, national security interests may require uncovering terrorist communications, which are inherently 'expressive.'

Even if both U.S. citizens and aliens are counted, there is about a 10 in a million chance that such a search will take place. See United States v. Ickes, 393 F.3d 501, 506–07 (4th Cir.2005) (rejecting as “far-fetched” the suggestion that “any person carrying a laptop computer ... on an international flight would be subject to a search of the files on the computer hard drive[,]” because “[c]ustoms agents have neither the time nor the resources to search the contents of every computer”). A judge can take judicial notice, on his own, of a fact that “can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.”

And the agencies must process the entry of over one million travelers per day, further restricting the practical limits of a basic search. We thus agree with the holdings of the Ninth and Eleventh circuits that basic border searches are routine searches and need not be supported by reasonable suspicion. Cano, 934 F.3d at 1016 ; Touset, 890 F.3d at 1233 ; see also United States v. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d 133, 146 n.5 (4th Cir. 2018) (stating that United States v. Ickes, 393 F.3d 501 (4th Cir. 2005) "treated a [basic] search of a computer as a routine border search, requiring no individualized suspicion for the search"). B. The Scope of Searches Permitted under the Border Search Exception

The Fourth Circuit and other circuits have consistently held that the government may conduct a border search after arresting an individual. SeeUnited States v. Ickes , 393 F.3d 501, 507 (4th Cir.2005) (holding that a post-arrest search of defendant's laptop was a border search).

Although our court had not addressed border searches of an electronic device at the time of this search, a number of circuits had and none had required a warrant. See, e.g. , United States v. Stewart , 729 F.3d 517, 525–26 (6th Cir. 2013) ; United States v. Cotterman , 709 F.3d 952, 962 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc); United States v. Ickes , 393 F.3d 501, 504 (4th Cir. 2005) ; United States v. Linarez–Delgado , 259 Fed.Appx. 506, 508 (3d Cir. 2007).Molina argues that Riley changes all that.