The record demonstrates the district court properly considered the § 3553(a) factors. United States v. Hull, 646 F.3d 583, 588 (8th Cir. 2011). Specifically, the court found Matthew "need[ed] to be off the street," serve time as punishment, and undergo sex-offender treatment.

The court likewise found Baker recruited Richmond into the conspiracy, citing Blaine's testimony that he originally bought fentanyl from Baker, but Baker later directed Blaine to purchase fentanyl from Richmond. See United States v. Hull, 646 F.3d 583, 587 (8th Cir. 2011) (upholding enhancement under § 3B1.1(c) where defendant instructed witness to buy cocaine from his wife while defendant was unavailable due to his incarceration).

Considering this evidence, we see no basis to reverse the 2-level enhancement. See United States v. Hull, 646 F.3d 583, 587 (8th Cir. 2011) (upholding a 2-level enhancement where, along with other evidence, the defendant's wife "chauffeured him during the drug sale"); see also United States v. Rodriguez, 741 F.3d 908, 912 (8th Cir. 2014) (upholding a 3-level enhancement where, along with other evidence, the defendant "directed his coconspirator to transport drugs and drug proceeds"); United States v. Cole, 657 F.3d 685, 687 (8th Cir. 2011) (upholding a 3-level enhancement where there was evidence the defendant directed the transportation of drugs and had an accomplice drive him to deliver drugs).

We also conclude that West's sentence is not substantively unreasonable. See United States v. Hull, 646 F.3d 583, 588 (8th Cir. 2011) (reviewing sentence under deferential abuse-of-discretion standard, and according presumption of reasonableness to sentence within advisory Guidelines range); United States v. Knox, 634 F.3d 461, 464-65 (8th Cir. 2011) (finding that district court duly addressed defendant's ability to pay fine where it considered defendant's assets and liabilities and created payment plan). After independently reviewing the record under Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75 (1988), we have found no nonfrivolous issues.

Further, the sentence was not unreasonable. See United States v. Hull, 646 F.3d 583, 588 (8th Cir. 2011) (reviewing sentence under deferential abuse-of-discretion standard, and according presumption of reasonableness to sentence within advisory Guidelines range); United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 461 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (describing procedural error). Independent review of the record under Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75 (1988), reveals no nonfrivolous issue.

"'We review the reasonableness of a sentence under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard, and we accord a presumption of reasonableness to a sentence within the advisory [G]uideline[s] range.'" United States v. Hull, 646 F.3d 583, 588 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Vinton, 631 F.3d 476, 487 (8th Cir. 2011)). "'We review a revocation sentence under the same 'reasonableness' standard that applies to initial sentencing proceedings[.]

Specifically, she asserts that (1) the obstruction-of-justice enhancement should not apply because the letters she sent to the officers were intercepted, (2) the “official victim” enhancement should not apply because her actions were based on her personal attraction/repulsion to Agent Scheidler and Officer Patterson and not based on their official status, (3) she should have received a downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility since she pleaded guilty, and (4) the court gave undue consideration to the victims' law enforcement status and not enough to her mental illness and her inability to carry out threats while incarcerated. “ ‘We review the reasonableness of a sentence under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard....’ ” United States v. Hull, 646 F.3d 583, 588 (8th Cir.2011) (quoting United States v. Vinton, 631 F.3d 476, 487 (8th Cir.2011)). We first consider procedural errors, “such as failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence—including an explanation for any deviation from the Guidelines range.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007).

Id. The sentencing court abuses its discretion if it fails to consider relevant factors or improperly weighs them. United States v. Hull, 646 F.3d 583, 588 (8th Cir.2011). When calculating a defendant's sentence in a drug conspiracy, the court may consider all drug quantities known or reasonably foreseeable to the defendant as part of the conspiracy.

On appeal, Stockman argues the district court's drug quantity finding was clearly erroneous, a procedural sentencing error that produced a substantively unreasonable sentence. See United States v. Hull, 646 F.3d 583, 586–87 (8th Cir.2011) (standard of review). We disagree.

In reviewing a sentence for procedural error, we review the district court's factual findings for clear error and its application of the Guidelines de novo. United States v. Frausto, 636 F.3d 992, 994 (8th Cir.2011); see also United States v. Hull, 646 F.3d 583, 586 (8th Cir.2011). Mabery argues that the court erred in finding that he used or possessed the firearm in connection with a controlled substance offense.