A suspect's nervous behavior is “a pertinent factor in determining reasonable suspicion” under a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis, Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124 (citations omitted), although nervous behavior alone is generally insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion in the absence of other suspicious evidence, see United States v. Hiruko, 320 F.Supp.2d 26, 32 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (finding the government's evidence of furtive gestures and nervous looks was alone deficient where the court did not credit testimony that an officer saw a bulge in the defendant's pocket or that the defendant was “fidgeting around right where the bulk was in his pants”); United States v. Parker, No. 99 Crim. 123 (JG), 1999 WL 997282, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 1999) (finding no basis for stop where the officer saw the defendant turn his view away from the officer and look back three times). Courts have generally found nervousness to be “of limited significance in determining reasonable suspicion,” particularly where not unusually severe and unaccompanied by other suspicious facts of sufficient weight. See Jackson, 2015 WL 4557401, at *10 (collecting cases) (finding that the defendant's “nervousness,” which was not unusually severe, to be of limited weight in reasonable-suspicion analysis);

A suspect's nervous behavior is “a pertinent factor in determining reasonable suspicion” under a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis, Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124 (citations omitted), although nervous behavior alone is generally insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion in the absence of other suspicious evidence, see United States v. Hiruko, 320 F.Supp.2d 26, 32 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (finding the government's evidence of furtive gestures and nervous looks was alone deficient where the court did not credit testimony that an officer saw a bulge in the defendant's pocket or that the defendant was “fidgeting around right where the bulk was in his pants”); United States v. Parker, No. 99 Crim. 123 (JG), 1999 WL 997282, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 1999) (finding no basis for stop where the officer saw the defendant turn his view away from the officer and look back three times). Courts have generally found nervousness to be “of limited significance in determining reasonable suspicion,” particularly where not unusually severe and unaccompanied by other suspicious facts of sufficient weight. See Jackson, 2015 WL 4557401, at *10 (collecting cases) (finding that the defendant's “nervousness,” which was not unusually severe, to be of limited weight in reasonable-suspicion analysis);

Determining at what point a police encounter with a suspect ripens into an investigative detention or seizure involves "'taking into account all of the circumstances surrounding the encounter,' and asking whether the 'police conduct would have communicated to a reasonable person that he was not at liberty to ignore the police presence and go about his business.'" Doughty, 2008 WL 4308123, at *3 (quoting Kaupp v. Texas, 538 U.S. 626, 629 (2003)); see United States v. Hiruko, 320 F. Supp. 2d 26, 30 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) ("A seizure occurs where a reasonable person would not feel 'free to decline the officers' requests or otherwise terminate the encounter.'") (quoting Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 439 (1991)).

Morgan cites two cases in support of this objection. In United States v. Hiruko, 320 F. Supp.2d 26 (E.D.N.Y. 2004), the Court found that an officer's testimony was not credible, but noted, "I might dismiss the foregoing inconsistencies as the byproduct of poor communication if it were not for other troubling features of Soto's testimony." Id. at 29.

517 U.S. at 813-14, 116 S.Ct. 1769; see also Dhinsa, 171 F.3d at 724-25 ("[A]n officer's use of a traffic violation as a pretext to stop a car in order to obtain evidence for some more serious crime is of no constitutional significance."). What is relevant is what objectively occurred, and the Court has no difficulty concluding that the officers testified truthfully and that they observed Mr. McKreith run through a red light on Albany Avenue. That information was then conveyed to Officer Morrison, who was entitled to pull the vehicle over on the basis of the traffic violations observed by Officer Belizzi and Detective Pillai.See, e.g., United States v. Harrell, 268 F.3d 141 (2d Cir. 2001) (affirming denial of motion to suppress drugs and weapons found during traffic stop where stop was based on violation of New York traffic law prohibiting tinted windows); United States v. Hiruko, 320 F.Supp.2d 26 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (speeding and seatbelt violations permitted traffic stop that eventually led to seizure of counterfeit money); United States v. Graham, 119 F.Supp.2d 116 (D.Conn. 2000) (speeding violation justified traffic stop as a result of which officers discovered controlled substance in plain view). "Under the collective or imputed knowledge doctrine, an arrest or search is permissible where the actual arresting or searching officer lacks the specific information to form the basis for probable cause or reasonable suspicion but sufficient information to justify the arrest or search was known by other law enforcement officials initiating or involved with the investigation."

While the Ybarra case was in the context of a search of an individual, it also applies in the context of a search of one's home as the home is afforded the utmost protection. See United States v. Hiruko, 320 F.Supp.2d 26, 33 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (stating that "[p]roximity to criminal conduct is generally insufficient to establish probable cause; rather, a search or seizure of a person must be supported by probable cause particularized with respect to that person"); Martin v. City of N. Coll. Hill, 2008 WL 4070275, at *5 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 27, 2008) (stating that "a search or seizure must be supported by individualized probable cause which cannot be established by the fact that there coincidentally exists probable cause to arrest another or to search or seize the premises"). Martin, 2008 WL 4070275, at *5.

When determining whether sufficient attenuation exists, a court must focus on three specific factors: (1) the time elapsed between the illegality and acquisition of the evidence; (2) the presence of intervening circumstances; and (3) the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct. United States v. Simpson, 439 F.3d 490 (8th Cir.2006) (citing Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975)); People v. Rodriguez, supra; see, e.g., United States v. Washington, 387 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir.2004) (the lack of a significant intervening period of time does not, in itself, require that the evidence be suppressed for want of sufficient attenuation but bears directly on the probability of taint); United States v. Mabe, 330 F.Supp.2d 1234 (D.Utah 2004) (applying attenuation analysis to statements made during and after unlawful search); United States v. Hiruko, 320 F.Supp.2d 26 (E.D.N.Y.2004) (applying attenuation analysis to statements and confessions made within one hour of unlawful search); United States v. Lewis, 760 F.Supp. 997 (E.D.N.Y.1990) (determining statements were admissible because no showing that fruits of unlawful search were impermissibly exploited during interrogation). When the connection between police misconduct and evidence of a crime is sufficiently attenuated, exclusion of the evidence neither protects the constitutional principles the rule was designed to preserve, nor advances deterrence enough to justify its costs.