U.S. v. Hedberg

4 Citing cases

  1. U.S. v. Matthews

    226 F.3d 1075 (9th Cir. 2000)   Cited 44 times
    Explaining that a multiplicitous indictment does not lead to prejudice where “the government would have introduced exactly the same evidence had the indictment contained only one count of the charged offense” (quoting United States v. Nash, 115 F.3d 1431, 1438 (9th Cir. 1997))

    There is simply no reason in this case for deviating from our "general practice" of allowing the district court to conduct further appropriate proceedings on remand for purposes of resentencing. United States v. Washington, 172 F.3d 1116, 1118 (9th Cir. 1999); see also United States v. Parrilla, 114 F.3d 124, 128 (9th Cir. 1997) ("On remand, the district court should conduct further proceedings as may be necessary to enable it to make appropriate findings to resolve the factual dispute. . . ."); United States v. Hedberg, 902 F.2d 1427, 1429 (9th Cir. 1990) (remanding for de novo sentencing proceedings). Even assuming that the district court erred in applying the enhancement, the majority's analysis of this issue is overbroad and inconsistent with our prior precedents.

  2. U.S. v. Hayes

    53 F. App'x 454 (9th Cir. 2002)

    SeeBurns v. United States, 501 U.S. 129, 137, 111 S.Ct. 2182, 115 L.Ed.2d 123 (1991). The notice in this case was timely, as it came before the outset of the sentencing hearing. United States v. Hedberg, 902 F.2d 1427, 1428 (9th Cir.1990). There was no objection, and no clear error.

  3. U.S. v. Hernandez

    251 F.3d 1247 (9th Cir. 2001)   Cited 30 times
    Holding that the district court gave reasonable notice by stating its intention to depart upwards at the beginning of the sentencing hearing, even though "neither the [PSR] nor the government's sentencing memorandum identified factors warranting a departure"

    Consistent with Burns, we leave to the individual districts the task of fashioning rules detailing when their courts must give notice of an intent to depart. Our precedent makes clear that district courts must in any case provide notice of a potential departure not later than the outset of the sentencing hearing. See United States v. Hedberg, 902 F.2d 1427, 1428 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that defense counsel "must be accorded an opportunity to comment on the potential grounds for departure prior to the imposition of sentence"); United States v. Rafferty, 911 F.2d 227, 230 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Nuno-Para, 877 F.2d 1409, 1415 (9th Cir. 1988). Hernandez contends that United States v. Hinojosa-Gonzalez, 142 F.3d 1122, 1123 (9th Cir. 1998), establishes that a defendant is denied the right to adequate notice under Rule 32 when notice of an intended departure is given at the sentencing hearing.

  4. U.S. v. Cota-Guerrero

    907 F.2d 87 (9th Cir. 1990)   Cited 13 times
    Sentencing court could properly rely upon reversed prior state conviction under 4A1.3 if it provides reliable evidence of past criminal activity

    The district court also erred by failing to advise Guerrero in advance of imposing sentence that it thought the criminal history category inadequate and intended to depart. See United States v. Hedberg, 902 F.2d 1427, 1428, 1429 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Nuno-Para, 877 F.2d 1409, 1415 (9th Cir. 1989). The fact that Guerrero's extensive criminal history appeared in the presentence report did not alleviate the need for specific notice of the court's intention.