Opinion
Case No. 2:01-CR-537TC
May 27, 2003
ORDER
Defendants Robin Mark Hart and Patricia Gail Hart have moved to suppress evidence seized before and during the execution of a search warrant on October 30, 2000. Mr. and Ms. Hart filed a joint memorandum in support of their separate motions to suppress, arguing (1) that the officer did not have probable cause to search the vehicle in Defendants' driveway; (2) that even if the officer did have probable cause to search the vehicle, he went beyond the scope of the permissible search; and (3) that there was not probable cause to justify the search warrant of Defendants' residence. For the reasons set forth below, Defendants' motions are DENIED.
FINDINGS OF FACT
On the day of October 30th, 2000, Animal Services Officer Swales received a call that there was a pit bull running at large in a neighborhood. (Suppression Hearing Transcript ("Tr.") at 6.) According to the caller, the dog lived at a residence at 5855 So. 4453 West ("the residence"). (Tr. at 8, 11, 30.) Officer Swales went to that address, accompanied by Deputy Darrell Magee, a patrol officer with the Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office. (Tr. at 5-6.) Animal Services Officers sometimes request such assistance when they receive a call concerning a pit bull. (Tr. at 7.) Officer Swales knocked on the front door of the residence, (Tr. at 9.) She received no response and heard no barking or other sounds indicating a dog was present in the house. (Tr. at 9-10.)
Although this date, cited at the hearing, differed from the one named in the warrant and affidavit, this discrepancy is immaterial to the analysis here, and the court uses the date given at the hearing.
Deputy Magee then walked to the back yard to check to see if the dog was there. (Tr. at 10.) On his way to the back yard, Deputy Magee walked past a blue sport utility vehicle ("the vehicle") parked in the driveway. (Tr. at 12, 19.) Glancing at the vehicle as he walked by, he saw through the passenger side window that there was a screwdriver in the ignition. (Tr. at 12.) When he reached the back yard, he found that there was no dog there. (Tr. at 12.) At that point, his attention turned back to the vehicle with the screwdriver in the ignition. (Tr. at 13.) Because in his roughly seven years of experience with the Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office (Tr. at 8, 34), Deputy Magee had encountered at least two stolen vehicles with screwdrivers in the ignition, the screwdriver raised a suspicion that the vehicle was stolen. (Tr. at 14, 33-34.) He went back to the vehicle, got the license plate number and the V.I.N. number (observed through the front windshield) from the vehicle and gave it to Dispatch. (Tr. at 12, 14, 15.) However, Dispatch told him that the computer system was down. (Tr. at 14-15.) He was told by Dispatch that the vehicle was not on the "daily sheet," a list of stolen vehicles. (Tr. at 15-16, 38.) Even after receiving this information, Deputy Magee was concerned that the vehicle might be stolen but had not yet been reported. (Tr. at 16.)
From the outside of the vehicle, Deputy Magee observed that inside the vehicle there were fresh groceries (such as lunch foods, snack packs, crackers, and cheese) and a cell phone that appeared to be on. (Tr. at 16.) When he saw these items, he was concerned that the occupants or homeowners might have been in danger and left the items in the vehicle. (Tr. at 17.) At this point, he had been at the residence for approximately twenty minutes. (Tr. at 17.) He walked to the side door of the residence, knocked loudly on the door, but again received no response. (Tr. at 18.) Deputy Magee then placed a call to his sergeant to report "what he had." (Tr. at 18.) Then he opened the vehicle on the passenger side. His purpose in entering the vehicle was to look for documents that would indicate who owned the vehicle, such as a vehicle registration or proof of insurance. (Tr. at 18-19, 39.) He searched the vehicle's glove compartment, its center console, and above the sun visor, but found no documents. (Tr. at 19-21.)
Because Deputy Magee did not testify to any particular mariner in which he entered the vehicle, and because this was not raised as an issue at the hearing, the court concludes that the vehicle was unlocked, and that he simply opened the passenger side door.
Still trying to identify who owned the vehicle, Deputy Magee began to search the back parts of the vehicle, believing that the documents had fallen to the floor or behind a seat. (Tr. at 21.) Toward the back, he noticed a camp stove and hoses with tape around the ends, along with a cooler covered by a man-sized black coat (which he removed). (Tr. at 22-23, 39-41.) As a result of his drug recognition training and routine patrol experience, he suspected that these items might be the components of a mobile methamphetamine lab. (Tr. at 22, 40, 44.) He also knew that the "glassware and precursors" necessary for meth production are usually kept inside coolers. (Tr. at 23.) Furthermore, his concern about the safety of the homeowners increased because he feared that some sort of drug activity had gone bad. (Tr. at 23.) He had been at the residence for forty-five minutes to an hour at that point. (Tr. at 23.) When he opened the cooler, he saw a liquid substance that appeared to him to be a narcotic. (Tr. at 24.) Because he was not authorized by departmental policy to investigate or remove clandestine lab materials, Deputy Magee notified his sergeant, who in turn contacted their narcotics detective, Detective Scott Van Wagoner ("Detective Van Wagoner"). (Tr. at 24.)
Police obtained a search warrant for the residence. (Suppression Hearing, Ex. 2, Affidavit at 3.) The search revealed drug contraband.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
I. Did Deputy Magee Have Probable Cause to Enter the Vehicle?
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in part that "the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated." U.S. Constit. Amend. IV. There is a well-established "vehicle exception" which provides that "movable vessels may be stopped and searched on facts giving rise to probable cause that the vehicle contains contraband, without the protection afforded by a magistrate's prior evaluation of those facts." California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 393 (1985) (citing United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982)). The reasons justifying the automobile exception are (1) the mobility of vehicles, and (2) the lessened expectation of privacy deriving "from the pervasive regulation of vehicles capable of traveling on the public highways." Id. at 392 (citing Cady v. Dombroski, 413 U.S. 433, 440-41 (1973)). An officer has probable cause to search a vehicle if there is a "fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found."Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (U.S. 1983), abrogated on other grounds by, Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995). Probable cause is to be "evaluated in light of circumstances as they would have appeared to a prudent, cautious, trained police officer." United States v. Maher, 919 F.2d 1482, 1485 (10th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted). That the circumstances giving rise to an officer's suspicion could in fact be innocent is of little consequence where a prudent, cautious, and trained police officer draws an inference of criminal activity based on his or her "experience in deciding whether probable cause exists." United States v. Sparks, 291 F.3d 683, 688 (10th Cir. 2002) (citing Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 700 (1996).
In this case, the government has shown that under the circumstances known to Deputy Magee at the time he entered the vehicle, there was a fair probability that evidence of auto theft would be found in the vehicle. Deputy Magee, who was a credible witness, testified regarding the facts which caused him to be suspicious that the vehicle might be stolen. Under the totality of the circumstances as viewed through the experienced eyes of Deputy Magee, the court concludes that he had probable cause to enter the vehicle to search for registration and insurance documentation, documents which could be used to ascertain whether the vehicle was stolen.
It is also significant that, as was pointed out at argument, anyone could have opened the door, used the screwdriver in the ignition, and driven away in the vehicle. This tended to indicate that the owners had not simply left their vehicle on the driveway. In addition, a cell phone was left inside the vehicle and was also vulnerable to theft.
II. The Scope of the Search
The United States Supreme Court has held that "[i]f probable cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies the search of every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the search." California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 570 (1991) (citing United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982). In Ross, the Court held that "[t]he scope of a warrantless search of an automobile . . . is not defined by the nature of the container in which the contraband is secreted. Rather, it is defined by the object of the search and the places where there is probable cause to believe that it may be found." 456 U.S. at 824.
Under this rule, because Deputy Magee had probable cause to enter the car to search for registration and insurance documentation, he was legally justified to search the cooler for such documentation. He had found no documents in the typical places such as the the glove compartment, the center console, and the area above the sun visor for indicia of ownership, finding nothing. (Tr. at 18-21, 39.) Wondering if the documents had fallen to the floor or behind a seat, he began to search the back parts of the passenger area of the vehicle and discovered a cooler. Because a cooler is capable of containing "the object of the search," the ownership documentation, Deputy Magee could open and search the cooler under the rule articulated in Acevedo and Ross. His testimony further reveals that no matter what his suspicions were regarding possible mobile meth lab components, he still was looking for the documentation as he searched throughout the car, including in the cooler. (Tr. at 41, 44.)
The operative language here is "capable of containing." It is of little significance that vehicle owners do not typically keep their registration and insurance documentation in coolers. This is particularly so given the circumstances here, where the possibility that the vehicle was stolen — and thus not being driven by its rightful owner — arguably displaced ordinary expectations about where the paperwork could be found.
Defendants correctly point out that Deputy Magee's testimony is inconsistent in this respect, where on cross examination he testified that he did not begin to suspect that there was a meth lab until he opened the cooler. (Tr. at 40.) However, even on cross examination, he testified that he "recognized [the stove and hoses] as potentially being components of a meth lab." (Tr. at 40.) Insofar as his testimony is seemingly inconsistent, Deputy Magee appears to have resisted defense counsel's suggestion that "at [the point when you recognized the stove and hoses as potential meth lab components] the focus of your search then changed from stolen vehicle to, `Hey, maybe I've got a meth lab here,' isn't that true?" (Tr. at 40.) Instead, he insisted that he was still "searching for any paperwork or anything that's going to tell me something about who may own this vehicle." (Tr. at 41.) Ultimately, his responses to the court's questions confirmed that when he looked in the cooker, he was both searching for "anything that could tell me who this vehicle belongs to" and operating on his suspicion that there might be a meth lab. (Tr. at 44.)
Because Deputy Magee had probable cause to search for ownership documentation throughout the vehicle, including the cooler, the court does not need to address whether he had an independent basis for probable cause in his suspicion that the cooler contained mobile meth lab components.
III. The Search of the Residence
(A) Probable Cause Analysis
The Fourth Amendment states that "no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation. . . ." U.S. Const. amend. IV. Fourth Amendment protection requires that probable cause determinations "be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime." Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1947).
The affidavit accompanying a warrant must, therefore, provide a magistrate with a "substantial basis" for making an independent assessment regarding probable cause. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 238-39. The standard for probable cause is a "practical, nontechnical conception."Id. at 231 (citation omitted). The test for probable cause is a "common-sense decision" whether there is "a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place."Id. at 238; see also United States v. Le, 173 F.3d 1258, 1267 (10th Cir. 1999). Courts should accord "great deference" when reviewing a magistrate's decision to issue a warrant. See United States v. Finnigin, 113 F.3d 1182, 1185 (10th Cir. 1997).
When reviewing an affidavit, a court should be cautious not to interpret the language in a "hypertechnical" manner. See United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 109 (1965). At the same time, it is imperative that an affidavit accurately reflect the facts of the particular situation at hand. See, e.g., United States v. Richardson, 861 F.2d 291 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
In this case, the affiant for the search warrant was Detective Van Wagoner, whom Deputy Magee and his sergeant called when suspected mobile meth lab components were found in the vehicle. (Tr. at 24.) Detective Van Wagoner relied on the following facts, in pertinent part, as the basis for probable cause:
• a grey camp cooler found in the vehicle, inside of which was "a Pyrex dish containing approximately one ounce of methamphetamine [field tested positive] along with items consistent with the manufacture of the drug . . . [including] bottles filled with chemicals, a propane stove, hose, and other unidentified elements."
• observation of surveillance cameras on the outside of the residence. He stated that from his investigations, he knew such cameras were "used by persons involved in illegal narcotics activity, specifically methamphetamine sales or production," where "[m]ethamphetamine users have a drug induced paranoia and often times use differing surveillance techniques to put themselves at ease and to try to defeat investigative tools used by law enforcement."
• interviews with the neighbors indicating that "the male party who lives at the residence sought to be searched has been seen driving the vehicle sought to be searched."
• possible threats, again known through his experience, of armed or drug dependent paranoid individuals, as well as a hazardous methamphetamine laboratory itself.
(Suppression Hearing, Ex. 2, Affidavit at 3-4.) Defendants contend that "[p]ossible illegal activity in a car does not lead to the conclusion that evidence of crime will be found in a residence connected to that car" (Defs' Br. at 12.), relying on the Ninth Circuit case of United States v. Howard, 828 F.2d 552 (9th Cir. 1987). In Howard, where narcotics agents observed persons unloading boxes of methamphetamine-related chemicals and glassware into a garage detached from the house, the court held that no probable cause justified the warrant given "a complete lack of nexus between the securing of the house and the alleged drug laboratory." Id. at 555. But the present case is distinguishable from Howard. Here, officers had discovered suspected components of a "mobile" meth lab, which by its very definition was not confined to any defined area, unlike the lab set up in the detached garage in Howard. Furthermore, the presence of surveillance cameras on the exterior of the residence, given the affiant's experience of the significance of such equipment, provided further basis for probable cause that methamphetamine-related evidence contraband could be found in the house. The information provided in the affidavit was sufficient for the judge to determine that there was probable cause that drugs would be found in both the vehicle and the residence.
(B) Leon Analysis
Alternatively, even if the warrant were invalid, the Leon good faith exception applies. The "good-faith exception," as articulated by United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922-23 (1984), requires that evidence not be suppressed even if the warrant is invalid when the officer conducting the search acted in objectively reasonable, good faith reliance on a warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate that subsequently is determined to be invalid. Id.; see also United States v. Rowland, 145 F.3d 1194, 1206-07 (10th Cir. 1998).
The good-faith exception does not extend to cases where the police have no reasonable grounds for believing that the warrant was properly issued. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 922-93. The Supreme Court has identified four situations where police reliance on a warrant is not objectively reasonable, only one of which could arguably apply here. Id. Specifically, the Leon Court held that an officer's reliance is not objectively reasonable when the warrant is based on an affidavit "so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable." Id. at 923.
In determining whether this exception applies, the "good-faith inquiry is confined to the objectively ascertainable question whether a reasonably well trained officer would have known that the search was illegal despite the magistrate's authorization." Id. at 922 n. 23. In making this determination, the court considers "all of the circumstances." Id. The analysis begins with the presumption that when an officer relies upon a warrant, the officer is acting in good faith. See United States v. McKneely, 6 F.3d 1447, 1454 (10th Cir. 1993); see also Leon, 468 U.S. at 922 ("[S]earches pursuant to a warrant will rarely require any deep inquiry into reasonableness, for a warrant issued by a magistrate normally suffices to establish that a law enforcement officer has acted in good faith in conducting the search.") (internal quotations omitted).
When reviewing an officer's reliance on a warrant, a court must determine whether "the underlying documents are devoid of factual support, not merely whether the facts they contain are legally sufficient." McKneely, 6 F.3d at 1454 (citation omitted). "It is only when [an officer's] reliance was wholly unwarranted that good faith is absent." Id. (citation omitted). According to the Tenth Circuit, however, "[t]he good faith presumption is not without limits. . . . An officer who knows or should have known that a search warrant was invalid may not rely upon the good-faith exception to immunize his subsequent seizure of evidence." Id. at 1455.
The Tenth Circuit has applied Leon's good-faith exception in numerous cases. See, e.g., United States v. Cook, 854 F.2d 371 (10th Cir. 1988) (Leon applied when the affidavit included only informant's statements, police corroboration of defendant's residence, and observation of heavy foot traffic.); United States v. Nolan, 199 F.3d 1180 (10th Cir. 1999) (Leon applied when the affidavit included only information from a confidential informant that defendant was a drug dealer together with evidence that defendant did not sell drugs from his home.); but see United States v. Williamson, 1 F.3d 1134 (10th Cir. 1993) (government not entitled to good faith exception when affidavit was not attached to the warrant and the warrant listed the wrong address).
As demonstrated above, the affidavit in this case was not "bare bones," and contained more than conclusory statements without any factual support. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 926; McKneely, 6 F.3d at 1454. Therefore, the court concludes that Leon's good-faith exception applies.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Defendants' Motion to Suppress is DENIED.