The ACA provides that in the absence of a governing federal statute, a person who commits a state crime on a federal enclave "shall be guilty of a like offense and subject to a like punishment." 18 U.S.C.A. Section(s) 13(a); United States v. Harris, 27 F.3d 111, 115 (4th Cir. 1994). Thus, one who commits an act illegal under state law but not prohibited by federal law in an area of federal jurisdiction may be sentenced "only in the way and to the extent" that the person could have been sentenced in state court. United States v. Press Publishing Co., 219 U.S. 1, 10 (1911); United States v. Minger, 976 F.2d 185, 187-188 (4th Cir. 1992).
Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004). We recognize, of course, that federal courts are not required to assimilate "every incident of a state's sentencing policy," United States v. Harris, 27 F.3d 111, 115 (4th Cir. 1994), and that state sentencing provisions that conflict with federal sentencing policy will not be assimilated, see Pierce, 75 F.3d at 176. Contrary to the government's suggestion, however, we cannot conclude that North Carolina's method for calculating criminal history points conflicts with federal sentencing policy simply because McManus would have received a higher criminal history score under the federal guidelines.
As such, the maximum and minimum mandatory sentences, as defined by the applicable state law, are fixed guideposts for federal district courts to consider during sentencing. United States v. Harris, 27 F.3d 111, 115 (4th Cir. 1994). After adhering to the state statutory limits, however, federal sentencing policy prevails.
First, when a state sentencing law calls for a mandatory minimum sentence, this Court must impose that mandatory minimum. United States v. Harris, 27 F.3d 111, 115 (4th Cir. 1994). The maximum and minimum mandatory sentences as defined by the state law are fixed parameters for the federal courts.
This underscores Pierce's implication that a defendant being prosecuted under the ACA should not receive a prison sentence that a state court would have lacked authority to impose. Our holding today also finds support in United States v. Harris, 27 F.3d 111 (4th Cir. 1994). There, the defendant was prosecuted under the ACA for driving while impaired under N.C. Gen. Stat. ยง 20-138.1.
Additionally, Plaintiff's proposed application of Lewis ignores the fact that "Congress clearly recognized that both ยง 13(a) [the ACA] and ยง 3551(a) [as amended by the Sentencing Reform Act] are 'capable of co-existence,' [and thus] courts are obliged to regard 'each as effective.'" United States v. Harris, 27 F.3d 111, 115 (4th Cir. 1994) (quoting Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1018, 104 S.Ct. 2862, 81 L.Ed.2d 815, (1984)). Thus, the Court declines to read ยง 3551(a) (incorporating ยง 3572(a)) as demonstrative, on its own, of a congressional intent to preclude any conflicting provisions of assimilated state law.
Moreover, under Fourth Circuit precedent, state law โprovide[s] the mandatory maximum or minimum sentenceโ for assimilated crimes, and โthe federal sentencing guidelines determine the sentence within these limits.โ Pierce, 75 F.3d at 176 (quoting United States v. Harris, 27 F.3d 111, 115 (4th Cir. 1994)). Consistent with that framework, many decisions from this Court have found that the ACA requires the Court to impose mandatory minimum sentences called for under state law.
However, it is settled law in this Circuit that "the `like punishment' requirement of the [ACA] mandates that federal court sentences for assimilated crimes must fall within the minimum and maximum terms established by state law, and that within this range of discretion federal judges should apply the Sentencing Guidelines to the extent possible." United States v. Young, 75 F.2d 147, 150 (4th Cir. 1990); see also United States v. Harris, 27 F.3d 111, 115 (4th Cir. 1994) ("A federal judge, like his state counterpart, has discretion to impose a sentence within the statutory limits.");United States v. Montigue, 357 F. Supp.2d 939, 940, 2005 WL 400397, *1 (E.D. Va. Feb. 16, 2005) (Miller, USMJ) ("[W]hen a state sentencing law calls for a mandatory minimum sentence, this Court must impose that mandatory minimum.")
Thus, although a federal prisoner is convicted and sentenced in accordance with the ACA, he is still subject to federal correctional policies. See, United States v. Harris, 27 F.3d 111 (4th Cir. 1994). Initially, it is important to note that if the defendant had been convicted of a federal misdemeanor and sentenced to a maximum penalty of one year incarceration, the district court properly could have imposed an additional one year period of supervised release.
The ACA provides that "in the absence of a governing federal statute, a person who commits a state crime on a federal enclave `shall be guilty of a like offense and subject to a like punishment.'" United States v. Pierce, 75 F.3d 173, 176 (4th Cir. 1996) ( quoting 18 U.S.C. ยง 13(a) (1994)); see United States v. Harris, 27 F.3d 111, 115 (4th Cir. 1994)). It is well established in the Fourth Circuit that the ACA incorporates the entire substantive criminal law of the state, including laws relating to the definition and scope of an offense and laws governing the manner in which an offense is to be punished.