Thus, the district court may consider evidence of criminal conduct that violates a defendant's supervised release regardless of whether the defendant has been separately prosecuted. See United States v. Hall, 984 F.2d 387, 391 (10th Cir. 1993) (upholding the district court's finding of sufficient evidence to support a supervised release violation based on testimony about illegal activity that was not prosecuted).
We review this factual finding for clear error. See United States v. Hall, 984 F.2d 387, 390 (10th Cir. 1993). A factual finding is clearly erroneous if it is "without factual support in the record" or if, after considering all of the evidence, we are "left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made."
Thus, the district court's factual findings will be upheld unless clearly erroneous. United States v. Hall, 984 F.2d 387, 390 (10th Cir. 1993). To support his position, Mr. Miller argues that many important activities in his son's business occurred prior to his release, and that he was merely a trusted advisor.
We review a district court's decision to revoke a term of supervised release for an abuse of discretion, and the district court's factual findings for clear error. Disney, 253 F.3d at 1212-13; United States v. Hall, 984 F.2d 387, 390 (10th Cir. 1993). In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we must also view the evidence, and all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable to the government.
De novo review means that we make an independent determination of the issue. United States v. Hall, 984 F.2d 387, 389 (10th Cir. 1993). A factual finding is clearly erroneous only "if it is without factual support in the record or if the appellate court, after reviewing all the evidence, is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made."
"The district court's factual findings are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard." United States v. Hall, 984 F.2d 387, 390 (10th Cir. 1993). "Legal questions relating to the revocation of supervised release are reviewed de novo."
We review the district court's factual findings in connection with its decision to revoke Brown's period of supervised release for clear error. See United States v. Hall, 984 F.2d 387, 390 (10th Cir. 1993). Having carefully reviewed the transcript of the revocation hearing, we discern no clear error in the district court's conclusion that Brown's state court conviction was valid.
"The district court must find by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant violated a condition of his supervised release." United States v. Hall, 984 F.2d 387, 390 (10th Cir. 1993). This court reviews a district court's decision to revoke supervised release for abuse of discretion.
Because the Cooperation Statement was only an agreement with investigators, it does not come within the scope of § 1B1.8 protection, and this court need not reach the question of whether an agreement with members of a joint local, state, and federal task force necessarily is an agreement with the federal government, which would be binding in this prosecution by federal prosecutors. See, e.g., United States v. Hall, 984 F.2d 387, 389-90 (10th Cir.1993) (holding that a cooperation agreement with state prosecutors was not binding on the United States under the facts of the case, because it concerned only state crimes and United States representatives did not know about, or agree to be bound by, the agreement).