We need not address the merits of Zuniga's Tenth Amendment argument because he does not have standing to raise this issue. United States v. Hacker, 565 F.3d 522, 525-26 (8th Cir. 2009). In Hacker, the defendant also argued that SORNA violated the Tenth Amendment by encroaching on state power.

Douglas objects to the Report and Recommendation, arguing that SORNA violates: 1) the Commerce Clause; 2) the nondelegation doctrine; 3) the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553; 4) the Ex Post Facto Clause; 5) his due process rights; and 6) the Tenth Amendment. (Filing No. 27.) Douglas filed a supporting brief. (Filing No. 33.) It should be noted that defense counsel acknowledges the following Eighth Circuit decisions and filed the motion to preserve the issues raised for appeal: United States v. May, 535 F.3d 912 (8th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2431 (2009); United States v. Howell, 552 F.3d 709 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2812 (2009); and United States v. Hacker, 565 F.3d 522 (8th Cir. 2009). The arguments are briefly discussed below.

We review de novo the denial of Waddle's motion to dismiss the indictment, as well as his constitutional and statutory challenges. See United States v. Hacker, 565 F.3d 522, 524 (8th Cir. 2009) (standard of review). A. Ex Post Facto Clause

"[A] private party does not have standing to assert that the federal government is encroaching on state sovereignty in violation of the Tenth Amendment absent the involvement of a state or its instrumentalities." United States v. Hacker, 565 F.3d 522, 526 (8th Cir. 2009). While the State of Missouri may have standing to assert the claim in Count I, it is not a party to this action and Plaintiff Kinder and the other Plaintiffs do not and cannot bring this action on behalf of Missouri. As a result, Plaintiffs do not have standing to assert a violation of the Tenth Amendment in Count I.

Commerce Clause The Eighth Circuit has determined that SORNA does not violate the Commerce Clause. United States v. Hacker, 565 F.3d 522, 525 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, No. 09-5656, 2009 WL 2494072 (U.S. Oct. 5, 2009); Howell, 552 F.3d at 713; May, 535 F.3d at 922. The objection is noted and denied.

Pattangall objects to the Report and Recommendation, arguing that SORNA violates: 1) the Commerce Clause; 2) the nondelegation doctrine; 3) the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 553; 4) the Ex Post Facto Clause; 5) his due process rights; and 6) the Tenth Amendment. (Filing No. 27.) Pattangall filed a supporting brief. (Filing No. 27.) It should be noted that defense counsel acknowledges the following Eighth Circuit decisions and filed the motion to preserve the issues raised for appeal: United States v. May, 535 F.3d 912 (8th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2431 (2009); United States v. Howell, 552 F.3d 709 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2812 (2009); and United States v. Hacker, 565 F.3d 522 (8th Cir. 2009). The arguments are briefly discussed below.

However, the Eighth Circuit has found SORNA to be a valid exercise of Congress' powers under the Commerce Clause by finding "SORNA derives its authority from each prong of Lopez — and most specifically, the ability to regulate `persons or things in interstate commerce' and `the use of the channels of interstate commerce.'" United States v. May, 535 F.3d 912, 921 (8th Cir. 2008); see also United States v. Hacker, 565 F.3d 522 (8th Cir. 2009); United States v. Howell, 552 F.3d 709 (8th Cir. 2009). The Indictment against Pattangall clearly alleges an interstate commerce nexus and survives scrutiny of Congress' powers under the Commerce Clause.

Smith appeals the denial of his motion to dismiss the indictment, which this court reviews de novo. United States v. Hacker, 565 F.3d 522, 524 (8th Cir. 2009); United States v. Betcher, 534 F.3d 820, 823 (8th Cir. 2008). Smith recognizes that this court has denied his constitutional challenges to SORNA, and that this court is bound by the previous panel decisions.

The First, Second, Third, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have held that private parties do not have standing to bring such claims. See United States v. Shenandoah, 595 F.3d 151, 161-62 (3d Cir. 2010); United States v. Hacker, 565 F.3d 522, 526 (8th Cir. 2009); Brooklyn Legal Servs. Corp. B. v. Legal Servs. Corp., 462 F.3d 219, 234-36 (2d Cir. 2006); Medeiros v. Vincent, 431 F.3d 25, 33-36 (1st Cir. 2005); United States v. Parker, 362 F.3d 1279, 1284 (10th Cir. 2004). The Seventh and Eleventh Circuits have permitted private parties to assert Tenth Amendment claims.

Moreover, even if Kennedy were able to demonstrate facts or circumstances raising the specter of an unconstitutional commandeering, it would be the State, not him, that would be aggrieved, and in presenting the State's claim, Kennedy undoubtedly would face a serious standing question, as the government has suggested in its brief. See, e.g., United States v. Hacker, 565 F.3d 522, 526-27 (8th Cir. 2009) (holding that an individual has no standing to challenge SORNA on the ground that it improperly commandeers state officials in violation of the Tenth Amendment); United States v. Shenandoah, 595 F.3d 151, 161-62 (3d Cir. 2010) (following Hacker); Brooklyn Legal Servs. Corp. B and Legal Services for New York City v. Legal Servs. Corp., 462 F.3d 219, 234-36 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that an individual does not have standing to bring a Tenth Amendment claim); Medeiros v.Vincent, 431 F.3d 25, 33-36 (1st Cir. 2005) (same); United States v. Parker, 362 F.3d 1279, 1284-85 (10th Cir. 2004) (same). But see Gillespie v. City of Indianapolis, 185 F.3d 693, 700-04 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that individuals have standing to bring a Tenth Amendment claim); Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Energy, 666 F.2d 1359, 1368 n. 16 (11th Cir. 1982) (same).