Summary
granting a new trial when the United States suppressed impeachment evidence addressing the credibility of a key government witness
Summary of this case from United States v. RodellaOpinion
Case No. 02-20044-01-CM
December 16, 2002.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
On August 1, 2002, following the trial of this matter, the jury found the defendant guilty of possession with the intent to distribute methamphetamine. Defendant filed a Motion for New Trial (Doc. 50), which the court denied as untimely. Defendant then filed a Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. 58), wherein defendant correctly pointed out that the Motion for New Trial was timely based on defense counsel's oral request at trial for thirty days to file post trial motions. The court will therefore consider the merits of defendant's Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. 58).
I. Background
Defendant asserts that the interests of justice require a new trial be granted in this case. Specifically, defendant argues that the testimony of Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Special Agent Robert Stewart constituted improper impeachment of the testimony of defendant's daughter, Billie Blood. At trial, evidence was presented that Ms. Blood had become a confidential informant for the FBI prior to the events at issue in this case. When asked at trial, Ms. Blood denied ever advising the FBI that her mother distributed methamphetamine. To impeach Ms. Blood's testimony, the government called Agent Stewart to the stand and elicited testimony regarding his two interviews of Ms. Blood. Agent Stewart testified that Ms. Blood had told him that her mother (the defendant) was distributing methamphetamine from the defendant's residence.
Shortly after the guilty verdict was returned, counsel for defendant became aware through the defendant's and Ms. Blood's former attorney that Agent Stewart's contemporaneous report of the first interview with Ms. Blood never made mention of the defendant, nor did the report include any statement attributed to Ms. Blood that the defendant distributed methamphetamine. Counsel for defendant then requested from the government the reports of the two interviews by Agent Stewart of Ms. Blood. Defendant correctly points out that neither report makes any mention of the defendant or of any methamphetamine distribution activities conducted by the defendant.
• Standards A court may grant the defendant a new trial "if required in the interest of justice." Fed.R.Crim.P. 33. Courts view motions for new trial with disfavor and grant them only with great caution. United States v. Chatman , 994 F.2d 1510, 1518 (10th Cir. 1993). The defendant has the burden of proving the necessity of a new trial. United States v. Walters , 89 F. Supp.2d 1206, 1213 (D.Kan. 2000). The government contends that this court should employ the standard for granting a motion for a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence, specifically that the evidence would probably produce an acquittal. United States v. Sinclair , 109 F.3d 1527, 1531 (10th Cir. 1997). Defendant argues that proper standard is one applicable to claims where the government has not disclosed favorable evidence material to guilt or punishment. See Brady v. Maryland , 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (due process mandates disclosure by the prosecution of all evidence that favors the defendant and is material to guilt or punishment). The court concludes that this case falls within the purview of Brady . Even though the defendant requests a new trial based on new evidence, the sole reason these reports are newly discovered is because the government had possession of these reports and did not produce them to the defendant either before or during trial. Moreover, the government does not sufficiently explain why it did not turn over the reports. The government argues that, "[w]ell in advance of trial, defense counsel had been informed by counsel for the United States that unrelated reports of interviews were not being produced in discovery because the information contained [in the reports] pertained to persons other than the defendant." (Government's Response at 3, n. 1). The government further states that, after the trial concluded, the government complied with defense counsel's request of the reports because "production of those reports would no longer jeopardize potential investigations of the persons mentioned by Blood in her interviews." ( Id. ). If the government was concerned about compromising the investigation of other individuals, the portions of the reports referring to those individuals could have been redacted, or the reports could have been filed under seal. Moreover, the government's contention that it made defense counsel aware that there existed "unrelated reports" does not adequately put defense counsel on notice that the government possessed reports favorable to the defendant. Accordingly, the court will determine under Brady whether the defendant is entitled to a new trial.
The characterization of the reports as being "unrelated" likely came about because the reports of the interviews did not mention the defendant. Ironically, the very fact that the reports did not mention the defendant render them evidence favorable to the defendant, evidence of which the government had a duty to turn over.
• Discussion In order to establish a Brady violation, a defendant must demonstrate that (1) the prosecution suppressed evidence, (2) the evidence was favorable to the defendant, and (3) the evidence was material. United States v. Quintanilla , 193 F.3d 1139, 1149 (10th Cir. 1999); see also Brady , 373 U.S. at 87. Evidence is material under Brady if there is a "reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different." United States v. Bagley , 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985). The court already determined that the government did not turn over Agent Stewart's reports of the interviews of Ms. Blood and that those reports were favorable to the defendant. The court now turns to the issue of whether the reports were material. A key element of the offense for which the defendant was convicted is whether the defendant knowingly possessed 184 grams methamphetamine. There was no factual dispute that the methamphetamine was found in the defendant's bedroom in the morning on August 21, 2001. However, the defendant consistently maintained that she did not know the methamphetamine was there.
There was evidence presented that the defendant and her daughter, Ms. Blood, had been out of town the weekend of August 18, 2001, and did not arrive at home until late night August 20th or early morning August 21st. The defendant testified that there were people at her house when she arrived, including her roommate, Omar Barajona Sanchez, and her daughter's boyfriend, Carlos Bravo Zamora, and another young man whom she did not recognize. The defendant further testified she was so exhausted and sun burned from the weekend that, as soon as she got home, she went to her bedroom and, without undressing or unmaking the bed, went to sleep. She also testified that she thought someone, likely her roommate Barajona-Sanchez, had been staying in her room while she was out of town because there were cigarette butts in an ashtray of the kind Barajona-Sanchez smoked. Early the morning of August 21st, the police arrived at the house and conducted a search. The officers found 184 grams of methamphetamine inside a little black box. According to the defendant, the little black box belonged to Barajona-Sanchez.
Police were alerted to the residence based on the following information: Early the morning of August 21st, officers from the Kansas City, Kansas Police Department were conducting an eviction at the defendant's neighbor's home. When they parked at that location, officers observed Barahona-Sanchez smoking a marijuana cigarette in the front of the defendant's residence. When questioned, Barahona-Sanchez admitted that he had more marijuana inside the house. Thereupon, the officers requested consent to enter the home and recover the marijuana. Barahona-Sanchez consented, and the officers recovered a small bag of marijuana. Officers found the defendant, Ms. Blood, and a minor inside the home. The officers requested that the females exit the residence and obtained a search warrant.
Because the evidence against the defendant was circumstantial, the government attempted to establish that the defendant was a methamphetamine dealer. Accordingly, if the jury believed the defendant was a methamphetamine dealer, the chance the methamphetamine was hers became more likely. On the other hand, if the jury believed that the defendant was not a dealer of methamphetamine, the defendant's explanation that the methamphetamine was not hers became more believable. On this issue, the testimony of Ms. Blood, and the subsequent impeachment testimony of Agent Stewart, becomes important.
On the witness stand, Ms. Blood admitted that her mother smoked marijuana, but Ms. Blood testified that her mother hated methamphetamine and would never deal methamphetamine because of what the drug had done to Ms. Blood. Ms. Blood explained that she (Ms. Blood) had been addicted to methamphetamine when she was fifteen years old and that the defendant put Ms. Blood into a rehabilitation facility because of her addiction. Ms. Blood testified that her mother was against methamphetamine and that she did not deal the drug. Ms. Blood further testified that Barajona-Sanchez did deal methamphetamine and that the defendant benefitted from these dealings because Barajona-Sanchez could pay half of the bills. When asked whether she ever told Agent Stewart that her mother dealt methamphetamine, Ms. Blood vehemently denied making such a statement.
To impeach the testimony of Ms. Blood, the government put Agent Stewart on the stand. Agent Stewart's testimony concerned the two interviews he had conducted with Ms. Blood. Agent Stewart testified that Ms. Blood had told him that the defendant was a methamphetamine dealer and that, if she denied telling him that on the stand, then she was lying. It is at this juncture where the court must determine whether the reports of Ms. Blood's interviews are material, such that there exists a reasonable probability that, had the contents of the reports been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.
When counsel for the defense cross-examined Agent Stewart, counsel had not seen the reports. Counsel did not know that the reports, made contemporaneously with the interviews of Ms. Blood, made no mention of the defendant or of any methamphetamine distribution activities conducted by the defendant. Had defense counsel been aware that the contemporaneous reports failed to mention the defendant in any way, defense counsel could have questioned Agent Stewart about why he neglected to include in, or how he could have omitted from, the reports any references to the defendant's distribution activities. Indeed, defense counsel could have argued that, if in fact the contemporaneous reports are accurate, Ms. Blood did not, prior to the execution of the search, tell Agent Stewart that her mother dealt methamphetamine.
Agent Stewart in essence testified that Ms. Blood lied during her testimony. Without the contemporaneous reports of the interviews, defense counsel had no evidence to counter such an attack on Ms. Blood's credibility. The jury was denied the benefit of evidence which could have rehabilitated Ms. Blood's credibility and which could have impeached the testimony of Agent Stewart.
Moreover, the subject matter on which Ms. Blood's credibility was attacked was highly relevant. The government relied in part on the theory that the defendant was a methamphetamine dealer and that, as such, the methamphetamine found in defendant's bedroom likely belonged to her. Any evidence to the contrary, such as Agent Stewart's reports, undermines the government's theory that the defendant knowingly possessed the methamphetamine. The jurors were not presented evidence which would have assisted them in assessing whether Ms. Blood was truthful when she denied telling Agent Stewart that her mother was a methamphetamine dealer. Such evidence was relevant to whether the defendant knowingly possessed the 184 grams of methamphetamine.
Additionally, because Ms. Blood's credibility was attacked on the issue of whether her mother dealt methamphetamine, the jury may have disregarded her testimony regarding other issues. For example, there was conflicting evidence as to who, if anyone, was present at the house when the defendant and Ms. Blood arrived from their weekend trip. This is important because, if there were other people present at the home when the two arrived, the chance that someone else placed the methamphetamine in the defendant's bedroom before she got home is more likely. On that issue, Ms. Blood testified that she couldn't exactly remember who was there when they arrived, but she was sure at least her boyfriend, and maybe some other individuals, were present. Having been denied the presentation of evidence relating to Ms. Blood's truthfulness, the jury may have improperly disregarded Ms. Blood's testimony.
In sum, the court finds that the government failed to disclose to the defendant evidence which was favorable to her. The court further concludes there is a reasonable probability that, had the reports been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. In other words, had the jury heard all the evidence relating to whether the defendant was a methamphetamine dealer, the jury may have determined the facts of the case do not establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant knowingly possessed methamphetamine. Recognizing that courts should proceed with great caution when setting aside a jury verdict, the court finds that the defendant has met her burden under Brady showing she is entitled to a new trial. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendant's Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. 58) is granted. The court vacates its previous order (Doc. 52) denying defendant's Motion for New Trial, and hereby orders a new trial in this matter.
Defendant also argues that she is entitled to a new trial based upon statements made by the government during closing arguments. Defendant contends that the government improperly accused defense counsel of manipulating Ms. Blood into changing her testimony. However, because the court concludes that defendant is entitled to a new trial based on a Brady violation, it need not address the merits of this argument.