Opinion
Case No. 2:90-CR-012 (10), 2:00-CR-106.
June 5, 2009
ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendant Willie Green, Jr.'s ("Green") Motion for early termination of his period of supervised release. (Doc. No. 17.) The Government opposes Green's request. Following a 1990 trial, Green was convicted of possession with intent to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2, and conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. He was released on bail pending sentencing. Green failed to appear at sentencing, however, and remained at large for almost 10 years. In 2000, he was arrested and pled guilty to failing to appear in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 3146(a)(1) and § 3146(b)(1)(a)(i).
After a defendant has served one full year of supervised release, a court has the power to order early termination of the period of supervised release. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1). Under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1):
The court may, after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), (a)(2)(D), (a)(4), (a)(5), (a)(6), and (a)(7)
(1) terminate a term of supervised release and discharge the defendant released at any time after the expiration of one year of supervised release . . . if it is satisfied that such action is warranted by the conduct of the defendant released and the interest of justice
Green began supervised release on July 31, 2007, therefore, he has already served one year of supervised release and is potentially eligible for early termination.
Green argues that the Court should terminate his supervised release period early because he has complied with all of the terms of his supervised release and will continue to "do the right things" upon his discharge from supervised release. The Government argues that Green would benefit from additional supervision because he recently moved to Atlanta, Georgia, does not have regular employment and is not living on his own.
Having considered the relevant statutory factors set out in § 3553, the Court concludes that early termination from supervised release is not warranted in this case. The first two statutory factors that the Court is directed to consider are "the nature and circumstances of the offense" and the need "to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct." 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) and (a)(2)(B). Given the gravity of Green's offense, particularly his decision to run from justice for nearly a decade, the Court believes that early release from supervised release would not afford an adequate deterrence and would not serve the interests of justice. Therefore, Green's motion is DENIED.