U.S. v. Garcia-Velilla

5 Citing cases

  1. U.S. v. Alegria

    3 F. Supp. 2d 151 (D.P.R. 1998)   Cited 4 times

    In general terms, the government is obliged to respect the terms of a plea agreement, United States v. Tilley, 964 F.2d 66, 70 (1st Cir. 1992), including a conditional promise to recommend a downward departure. United States v. García-Velilla, 122 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1997). However, there is a body of law respecting the prosecutor's discretion in deciding to file a motion for downward departure based upon a defendant's substantial assistance and recognizing the reasonable assumption that the government is in the best position to supply the court with an accurate report of the extent and effectiveness of the defendant's assistance.

  2. McClanahan v. Commonwealth

    308 S.W.3d 694 (Ky. 2010)   Cited 113 times
    Reversing the sentence imposed pursuant to the hammer clause in the plea agreement because the trial court failed to exercise independent discretion in setting the sentence, the sentence was imposed without giving due consideration to the presentence report, and the sentence was imposed without consideration of "the nature and circumstances of the crime and the history, character and condition of the defendant"

    Jones failed to appear for sentencing, and when he was eventually brought before the court for sentencing, the court imposed the twenty-year sentence as recommended by the Commonwealth. Guided by the decisions of federal courts in United States v. David, 58 F.3d 113 (4th Cir. 1995); United States v. Rivera, 954 F.2d 122 (2nd Cir. 1992); and United States v. Garcia-Velilla, 122 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1997), we upheld the twenty-year sentence in Jones. Critical to that decision was our recognition of the fact that the sentence of twenty years was within the range established by the legislature for Jones's crimes.

  3. Jones v. Commonwealth of Kentucky

    995 S.W.2d 363 (Ky. 1999)   Cited 8 times
    Holding that condition of plea agreement providing for a recommended sentence reduction only in the circumstance that defendant appeared for sentencing was a lawful condition

    We find Federal decisions to be persuasive. See United States v. David, 58 F.3d 113 (4th Cir. 1995); United States v. Rivera, 954 F.2d 122 (2nd Cir. 1992); United States v. Garcia-Velilla, 122 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1997). Reliance on the State of Georgia case of Chapman v. State, 206 Ga. App. 465, 426 S.E.2d 9 (1992), is misplaced because that case is neither legally nor factually applicable.

  4. Yancey v. Commonwealth

    NO. 2014-CA-001799-MR (Ky. Ct. App. Oct. 7, 2016)

    United States v. Wells, 211 F.3d 988, 995 (6th Cir.2000) (citing United States v. Skidmore, 998 F.2d 372, 375 (6th Cir. 1993)). See also United States v. Garcia-Velilla, 122 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.1997); United States v. Rivera, 954 F.2d 122 (2nd Cir.1992). "Further, if a defendant materially breaches his plea agreement, the prosecution is released from its obligations under that agreement and may bring a new indictment on previously dismissed charges."

  5. O'Neil v. Commonwealth

    114 S.W.3d 860 (Ky. Ct. App. 2003)   Cited 12 times
    Holding that plea agreements are contracts, and are interpreted according to ordinary contract principles.

    United States v. Wells, 211 F.3d 988, 995 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing United States v. Skidmore, 998 F.2d 372, 375 (6th Cir. 1993)). See also United States v. Garcia-Velilla, 122 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1997); United States v. Rivera, 954 F.2d 122 (2nd Cir. 1992). "Further, if a defendant materially breaches his plea agreement, the prosecution is released from its obligations under that agreement and may bring a new indictment on previously dismissed charges."