U.S. v. Frakes

4 Citing cases

  1. United States v. Singo

    No. 16-4409 (4th Cir. Feb. 24, 2017)

    We further observe that other Courts of Appeals that have addressed the issue have rejected double counting objections to the application of USSG § 2G2.2(b)(3)(F) in prosecutions for child pornography distribution. See United States v. Walters, 775 F.3d 778, 784-85 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2913 (2015); United States v. Cubero, 754 F.3d 888, 893-95 (11th Cir. 2014); United States v. Reingold, 731 F.3d 204, 227-28 (2d Cir. 2013); United States v. Chiaradio, 684 F.3d 265, 282-83 (1st Cir. 2012); United States v. Frakes, 402 F. App'x 332, 335-36 (10th Cir. 2010). We therefore conclude that the district court did not err in applying the two-level enhancement under USSG § 2G2.2(b)(3)(F) in this case.

  2. United States v. McGill

    754 F.3d 452 (7th Cir. 2014)   Cited 14 times   1 Legal Analyses
    In McGill, there was substantial evidence of hesitation and resistance by McGill. Indeed, the evidence there showed that the informant, Elliott, would steer innocent conversations on unrelated subjects back to child pornography and when Elliott pestered McGill into providing him with child pornography, McGill cancelled, claiming he was sick.

    We note, however, that five circuits have rejected double-counting objections to the application § 2G2.2(b)(3)(F) in prosecutions for distribution of child pornography. See United States v. Clark, 553 Fed.Appx. 538, 539 (6th Cir.2014); United States v. Reingold, 731 F.3d 204, 227–28 (2d Cir.2013); United States v. Chiaradio, 684 F.3d 265, 282–83 (1st Cir.2012); United States v. Frakes, 402 Fed.Appx. 332, 335–36 (10th Cir.2010); United States v. Fugit, 296 Fed.Appx. 311, 312–13 (4th Cir.2008).The prosecutor insisted that it was McGill's idea to share his child pornography with Elliott, not Elliott's idea.

  3. United States v. Reingold

    731 F.3d 204 (2d Cir. 2013)   Cited 99 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that because the use of a computer enhancement "does not increase a defendant's sentence to reflect the kind of harm that has already been fully accounted for by the base offense level," the district court erred in finding that application of the enhancement resulted in impermissible double counting

    Indeed, that conclusion has been so obvious to those of our sister circuits to have considered the question that they have employed little discussion to reject double counting challenges to the application of a § 2G2.2(b)(3)(F) enhancement to defendants convicted of distribution offenses. See United States v. Chiaradio, 684 F.3d 265, 283 (1st Cir.2012) (identifying “absolutely no basis” for inferring that distribution enhancement did not apply to defendant convicted of distribution crime); United States v. Frakes, 402 Fed.Appx. 332, 335–36 (10th Cir.2010) (“Rather than forbidding double-counting, § 2G2.2 expressly allows a two-level enhancement for distribution,” such that a minimum two-point enhancement “will always apply” to defendants convicted of distribution offenses (emphasis in original)). We agree that a minimum two-level enhancement for distribution applies to the calculation of Reingold's Guidelines, and we conclude that the district court erred as a matter of law in holding that such an enhancement constituted impermissible double counting.

  4. United States v. Brasfield

    Case No. 11-CR-96 (E.D. Wis. Aug. 27, 2011)   Cited 1 times

    It essentially means that distributors always start at level 24 (at least).See United States v. Frakes, 402 Fed. Appx. 332, 335-36 (10th Cir. 2010). Moreover, the type of file-sharing seen in this case, which resulted in the distribution aspect, is found in many cases as it is a typical method by which such images are obtained.