Thus, the record conclusively establishes that trial counsel proffered evidence as to each point that Petitioner claims the additional evidence would have supported, and in general, counsel is not deficient for failing to present cumulative evidence. See United States v. Foreman, 323 F.3d 498, 504 (6th Cir. 2003); Leija v. Elo, 9 F. App'x 500, 501 (6th Cir. 2001) ("[T]rial counsel cannot be faulted for failing to call a defense witness whose testimony would have been, at best, cumulative and, in part, detrimental to the theory espoused by [the petitioner]."); Kelly v. United States, Nos. 2:11-cr-87 & 2:15-cv-62, 2017 WL 3160608, at *6 (E.D. Tenn. July 25, 2017) ("Counsel was not ineffective for not calling every possible witness, especially where the testimony, as here, is cumulative."). Also, the cumulative nature of the evidence that the investigations at issue would have presumably uncovered undermines a conclusion that trial counsel's failure to perform such investigations was objectively unreasonable.

"When a convicted defendant complains of the ineffectiveness of counsel's assistance, the defendant must show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); see also Keith v. Mitchell, 455 F.3d 662, 682 (6th Cir.2006); United States v. Foreman, 323 F.3d 498, 503 (6th Cir.2003). "The defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.

Although we generally do not address ineffective assistance claims on direct appeal, we may do so "[i]f the parties have adequately developed the record." United States v. Foreman, 323 F.3d 498, 502 (6th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). Because the district court conducted an evidentiary hearing on the issue, and because both parties ask us to consider the claim on direct appeal, see Foreman, 323 F.3d at 502, we will do so.

We have recognized an exception to this general rule where "the parties have adequately developed the record." United States v. Foreman, 323 F.3d 498, 502 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting United States v. Pierce, 62 F.3d 818, 833 (6th Cir. 1995)). This exception, however, is inapposite here.

Although it is true that “[a]s a general rule, this Court declines to rule on claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal,” United States v. Detloff , 794 F.3d 588, 594 (6th Cir. 2015), that rule only applies when “the record is ... inadequate to evaluate such a claim.” United States v. Foreman , 323 F.3d 498, 502 (6th Cir. 2003). That is not the case here since there is nothing to be gained from any further development of the record.

However, conflict-of-interest claims are generally subject to "a modified version" of the ineffective-assistance test, Moore v. Mitchell, 708 F.3d 760, 777 (6th Cir. 2013); prejudice is presumed if a defendant shows that an "actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance," Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348-50 (1980). "As a general rule, this Court declines to rule on claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal," United States v. Detloff, 794 F.3d 588, 594 (6th Cir. 2015), "because the record is generally inadequate to evaluate such a claim," United States v. Foreman, 323 F.3d 498, 502 (6th Cir. 2003), and "appellate courts are not equipped to resolve factual issues," United States v. Garner, 491 F.3d 532, 535 (6th Cir. 2007). However, we will review an ineffective-assistance claim "in rare cases where the error is apparent from the existing record."

Although we generally do not address IAC claims on direct appeal, review is appropriate here because the record was sufficiently developed in conjunction with Falcon's earlier filed Rule 33 motion for new trial. See Molina, 934 F.2d at 1446-49; United States v. Foreman, 323 F.3d 498, 502-05 (6th Cir. 2003). Based upon the record, the district court was correct in holding that "there is nothing . . . to indicate that [Falcon's] legal representation in this case was deficient, nor that any alleged deficiency in any way prejudiced his defense."

Counsel was not ineffective by not calling an alibi witness who would have discredited the alibi defense, thus leading to the presumption that counsel's decision to omit an alibi defense was trial strategy. See, e.g., United States v. Foreman, 323 F.3d 498, 503 (6th Cir. 2003).

A trial attorney's decision as to which witnesses to call, if any, is generally a matter of trial strategy that falls within the attorney's broad professional discretion. See id.; United States v. Foreman, 323 F.3d 498, 503-04 (6th Cir. 2003) (concluding that trial counsel's decision not to call various witnesses was "reasonable trial strategy"). Moreover, petitioner is not entitled to relief on his claim because he failed to provide to the Michigan courts any proffer as to the aunt's expected testimony.

There is a presumption that counsel's performance was reasonable. United States v. Foreman, 323 F.3d 498, 503 (6th Cir. 2003). "A court making the prejudice inquiry must ask if the defendant has met the burden of showing that the decision reached would reasonably likely have been different absent the errors."