JON O. NEWMAN, Circuit Judge These consolidated appeals and cross-appeal primarily concern the interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 666 (1994 Supp. II 1996) and the continued validity of this Court's decision in United States v. Foley, 73 F.3d 484 (2d Cir. 1996), in light of the Supreme Court's subsequent decision in Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 118 S.Ct. 469 (1997). Section 666(a)(1)(B), (b), set out in full in the margin, punishes receipt of corrupt payments by any person who "corruptly solicits or demands" money "intending to be influenced or rewarded in connection with any . . . transaction" of an "organization, government, or agency involving anything of value of $5,000 or more" if the "organization, government, or agency receives, in any one year period, benefits in excess of $10,000 under a Federal program. . . ."

The final indictment implicated Richard Foley, who had been the Republican State Party Chairman. The recent overturning of Foley's conviction, United States v. Foley, 73 F.3d 484 (2d Cir. 1996), gave rise to the three petitions currently under consideration by this Court. The defendants in the Santopietro case were on trial for five weeks during March and April of 1992 before the late Honorable T.F. Gilroy Daly.

This Court has previously recognized that an indictment's failure to charge an offense constitutes a jurisdictional defect subject to appellate review under the plain-error doctrine when the defendant did not preserve the issue for appeal. United States v. Foley, 73 F.3d 484, 488 (2d Cir. 1996), rev'd on other grounds Salinas v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 118 S.Ct. 469, 139 L.Ed.2d 352 (1997).

However, some decisions, including a very recent Second Circuit decision, have perhaps addressed Apple's argument from a different perspective. See United States v. Foley, 73 F.3d 484 (2d Cir. 1996); United States v. Vona, 842 F. Supp. 1534 (W.D.N.Y. 1994); Mongelli, 794 F. Supp. at 530. As noted, the statute requires that the agency "business" that was "connect[ed]" to the bribe "involved anything of value of $5,000 or more."

Accordingly, we conclude that Marmolejo and Salinas were properly prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B). Compare Westmoreland, 841 F.2d at 576-78 (stating that the unambiguous language of § 666(a)(1)(B) does not require the government to establish any relation between the transaction involving a "thing of value of $5,000" and the federal funds the agency receives) with United States v. Foley, 73 F.3d 484, 490 (2d Cir. 1996) (stating that 666(a)(1)(B) was enacted to permit prosecution for bribery in connection with federal program funds, therefore, in determining whether a transaction involves "anything of value of $5,000 or more," the "value must be connected, even if only indirectly, to the integrity of federal program funds"). The dissent claims that Foley holds that "the proper method to value a transaction is from the perspective of the protected entity."

Compare Westmoreland, 841 F.2d at 576-78 (stating that the unambiguous language of Section(s) 666(a)(1)(B) does not require the government to establish any relation between the transaction involving a "thing of value of $5,000" and the federal funds the agency receives) with United States v. Foley, 73 F.3d 484, 490 (2d Cir. 1996) (stating that Section(s) 666(a)(1)(B) was enacted to permit prosecution for bribery in connection with federal program funds, therefore, in determining whether a transaction involves "anything of value of $5,000 or more," the "value must be connected, even if only indirectly, to the integrity of federal program funds"). The dissent claims that Foley holds that "the proper method to value a transaction is from the perspective of the protected entity."

Where, as here, the language of the statute is ambiguous, I am obliged to look to the legislative history to determine whether the statute was meant to apply to the situation at bar. See United States v. Foley, 73 F.3d 484, 489 (2nd Cir. 1996) (citing Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207, 213, 105 S.Ct. 3127, 87 L.Ed.2d 152 (1985)); Frega, 933 F. Supp. at 1541. The legislative history on the issue of value only suggests that what Congress wished to do is to criminalize "significant act of . . . bribery involving federal monies.

( Id. ¶¶ 7, 9, 11.) In United States v. Foley, 73 F.3d 484 (2d Cir. 1996), Judge Kearse, writing for the panel, explained that an indictment which simply tracks the statutory language of Section 666 does not properly allege a violation, given the implicit element of the crime, viz., that the $5,000 or more in value must affect either "the financial interests of the [Town or] federal funds directly." Foley, 73 F.3d at 493.

When asked to uphold convictions or find defendants guilty with no proof of a federal interest in the corrupt act, however, some courts were reluctant to do so. See United States v. Foley, 73 F.3d 484, 488-493 (2d Cir. 1996) (reversing Foley's conviction after government did not prove that corruption in some way touched on federal funds); United States v. Frega, 933 F. Supp. 1536, 1540-1541 (S.D. Cal. 1996) (dismissing indictment for failure to allege that "federal funds were corruptly administered, were in danger of being corruptly administered, or even could have been corruptly administered."). Courts in this camp expressed concern that interpreting § 666 to have no federal interest requirement would make a federal offense out of routine local bribery, dramatically changing the state-federal balance without an express Congressional directive that it intended to do so.

"[A] `failure of the indictment to charge an offense may be treated as [a] jurisdictional' defect, . . . and an appellate court must notice such a flaw even if the issue was raised neither in the district court nor on appeal." United States v. Foley, 73 F.3d 484, 488 (2d Cir. 1996) (quoting United States v. Doyle, 348 F.2d 715, 718 (2d Cir. 1965)), abrogated on other grounds by Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 118 S.Ct. 469, 139 L.Ed.2d 352 (1997); see also Fed.R.Crim.P. 12(b)(2) (objection that an indictment "fails to show jurisdiction in the court or to charge an offense . . . shall be noticed by the court at any time during the pendency of the proceedings") (emphasis added). The notion that an indictment is a prerequisite to jurisdiction over a criminal case in the federal courts is long established.