These authorities, however, discuss flight in the context of establishing probable cause for an arrest. Additionally, United States v. Duffy, 796 F. Supp. 1252, 1258 (D. Minn. 1992), which does hold that flight from police officers, without more, is insufficient to support a Terry pat-down, is not binding on us. In Rundle, we noted that "deliberately furtive actions and flight at the approach of strangers or law officers are strong indicia of mens rea, and when coupled with specific knowledge on the part of the officer relating the suspect to evidence of crime, they are proper factors to be considered in the decision to make an arrest."

Just as detainees are free to walk away from consensual encounters, they are similarly free to rebuff attempts by law enforcement personnel to approach them. "The adverse inference that an officer draws about the way a person communicates his desire not to speak to an officer is nothing more than a hunch which, under Terry, cannot become the sole basis for detaining a person."United States v. Duffy, D.Minn., 796 F.Supp. 1252, 1259 (1992).See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 3150, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984) ("[During a valid investigatory stop,] the officer may ask the detainee a moderate number of questions to determine his identity and to try to obtain information confirming or dispelling the officer's suspicion. But the detainee is not obliged to respond."

To determine whether the defendant's consent was an independent act of free will, breaking the causal chain between the consent and the constitutional violation, I must consider three factors: 1) the temporal proximity of the illegal conduct and the consent; 2) the presence of intervening circumstances; and 3) the purpose and the flagrancy of the initial misconduct. United States v. Duffy, 796 F. Supp. 1252 (8th Cir. 1992) (citing Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975)).

Nevertheless, even spontaneous statements may be suppressed on Fourth Amendment grounds as the fruit of an illegal arrest or seizure if they are not sufficiently attenuated from the primary illegality to represent the independent exercise of free will. State v. Fisher, 97-1133, p. 12 (La. 9/9/98), 720 So.2d 1179, 1186 (ordering suppressed defendant's statements made in response to police questioning in patrol unit on the way to the station house, and his subsequent spontaneous admission that the victim "got what he deserved"); see also United States v. Robinson, 932 F. Supp. 1271, 1278-79 (D.N.M. 1996) (suppressing spontaneous statements made by the defendant within 10 to 15 minutes of his illegal arrest); United States v. Duffy, 796 F. Supp. 1252, 1260-61 (D. Minn. 1992) (suppressing defendant's spontaneous statements to police officers in their squad car on the way to jail immediately after an illegal arrest). That the accused "may have been properly informed of his constitutional rights and waived them, while relevant, does not alone break the causal link" [between an illegal seizure and a subsequent statement].