Hence, a conspiracy generally is proved by circumstantial evidence and the context in which the circumstantial evidence is adduced. See Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 777 n. 10 (1975); United States v. Dozie, 27 F.3d 95, 97 (4th Cir. 1994) (per curiam); United States v. Andrews, 953 F.2d 1312, 1318 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1210 (1992). Indeed, a conspiracy may be proved wholly by circumstantial evidence.

The jury was permitted to compare authentic handwriting (i.e., on Rice's personal checks) to contested handwriting (i.e., on checks supporting Counts 8-14) and conclude that they match. See United States v. Dozie, 27 F.3d 95, 98 (4th Cir. 1994) (explaining that under Federal Rule of Evidence 901(b)(3), expert opinion on handwriting is not necessary). Therefore, there was substantial evidence to support the jury's conclusion that Rice personally effected the transfers that supported Counts 8-14.

The government maintains that the issue is not preserved because Chinasa did not object to the jury instructions in the district court and did not challenge the indictment before trial. Chinasa cites United States v. Hedgepeth, 418 F.3d 411 (4th Cir. 2005), and United States v. Dozie, 27 F.3d 95 (4th Cir. 1994) (per curiam), for the proposition that commission of an overt act is an element of conspiracy to commit mail or wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349. However, the statements in Hedgepeth and Dozie indicating that proof of an overt act is an element of conspiracy under § 1349 are merely non-binding dicta.

In order to sustain their convictions on that charge, the evidence must be sufficient for a rational juror to find beyond a reasonable doubt the following: (1) that there was an agreement to commit wire or mail fraud; (2) that the defendants knew of such an agreement and willingly participated in it; and (3) that there was an overt act in furtherance of the agreement. United States v. Edwards, 188 F.3d 230, 234 (4th Cir. 1999) (citing United States v. Dozie, 27 F.3d 95, 97 (4th Cir. 1994)); United States v. Falcone, 311 U.S. 205, 210 (1940) ("Those having no knowledge of the conspiracy are not conspirators."). Finally, conspiracy to commit mail or wire fraud also requires that the government show that the defendants acted with a specific intent to defraud.

For instance, the jury could compare the handwriting in both letters. See United States v. Dozie , 27 F.3d 95, 98 (4th Cir. 1994) (per curiam). The jury could also compare the similar words and phrases used in and the similar content of both letters.

As we have previously recognized, "expert opinion on handwriting is not necessary." See United States v. Dozie, 27 F.3d 95, 98 (4th Cir. 1994). Furthermore, "[a]n original is not required and other evidence of the content of a writing . . . is admissible if all the originals are lost."

Contrary to Cornell's suggestion otherwise, this type of evidence is sufficient to support a finding that Yates was the author. See Fed.R.Evid. 901(b)(2); United States v. Dozie, 27 F.3d 95, 98 (4th Cir.1994) (“[E]xpert opinion on handwriting is not necessary.”). The Government presented similar evidence to verify Cornell as the recipient.

Contrary to Cornell's suggestion otherwise, this type of evidence is sufficient to support a finding that Yates was the author. See Fed.R.Evid. 901(b)(2); United States v. Dozie, 27 F.3d 95, 98 (4th Cir.1994) (“[E]xpert opinion on handwriting is not necessary.”). The Government presented similar evidence to verify Cornell as the recipient.

Because the flight incidents and statement were "part of [the] single criminal episode" that constituted the conspiracy, they are intrinsic to the conspiracy charge and fall outside Rule 404(b)'s ambit. See Lighty, 616 F.3d at 352; see also United States v. Dozie, 27 F.3d 95, 97 (4th Cir. 1994) (per curiam) (holding that Rule 404(b) did not apply to allegations of insurance fraud that occurred within the same time frame as the charged conspiracy to commit mail fraud). Consequently, the district court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the government to introduce this evidence.

This is not a case, as Cone suggests, where an innocent spouse is implicated solely by his marriage to a conspirator. See United States v. Dozie, 27 F.3d 95, 98 (4th Cir.1994) (vacating conspiracy conviction against co-defendant's spouse who “was never tied to the conspiracy by any of the other persons involved”). Rather, the record contains ample evidence from which the jury could have properly concluded that Cone was an active participant in the conspiracy.