U.S. v. Doss

9 Citing cases

  1. U.S. v. Marvin

    135 F.3d 1129 (7th Cir. 1998)   Cited 29 times
    Discussing violation of special condition not to obtain loans or open new bank accounts

    It was not all too long ago that the degree of judicial scrutiny we were to employ when considering § 7B1.4(a) sentencing issues remained an open question in this Circuit. See, e.g., United States v. McGee, 60 F.3d 1266 (7th Cir. 1995) (case of first impression). However, it is now well-settled that, because "the range set forth in the policy statement at § 7B1.4(a) is neither a guideline nor interpretive of a guideline," Id. at 1272 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(4)); see also United States v. Doss, 79 F.3d 76, 79 (7th Cir. 1996), we review a sentence imposed following revocation to ascertain whether it was "plainly unreasonable." Doss, 79 F.3d at 79.

  2. United States v. Hale

    107 F.3d 526 (7th Cir. 1997)   Cited 26 times
    Affirming 30-month term where policy statements advised 5-11 months

    As we have emphasized in several recent decisions, the imprisonment ranges set out in section 7B1.4(a)'s Revocation Table are advisory rather than mandatory, as they are included in a non-interpretive policy statement, rather than in a guideline. See United States v. Doss, 79 F.3d 76, 78 (7th Cir. 1996); United States v. Lee, 78 F.3d 1236, 1239 (7th Cir. 1996); United States v. McGee, 60 F.3d 1266, 1272 (7th Cir. 1995); United States v. Hill, 48 F.3d 228, 231 (7th Cir. 1995). In determining the sentence to be imposed upon the revocation of supervised release, the district court must consider the range designated in the Table, but the court is thereafter free to impose a sentence outside the designated range, subject to the maximum sentence allowable under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3).

  3. U.S. v. McClanahan

    136 F.3d 1146 (7th Cir. 1998)   Cited 27 times
    Holding that because "there is no sentencing `departure'" when a court sentences outside the advisory range "the sentencing court is not required to provide notice that the sentence it contemplates may exceed the Table's range"

    Nonetheless, numerous post-Stinson courts have concluded that the Chapter Seven provisions are merely advisory rather than mandatory, subject to the statutory maximum terms of imprisonment ("caps") provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). See, e.g., United States v. Pelensky, 129 F.3d 63, 69 (2d Cir. 1997); United States v. Doss, 79 F.3d 76, 78 (7th Cir. 1996); Hurst, 78 F.3d at 483-84 (collecting cases); United States v. Milano, 32 F.3d 1499, 1502-03 (11th Cir. 1994); United States v. Mathena, 23 F.3d 87, 93 (5th Cir. 1994). As this court explained in United States v. Hill, not all commentary interprets a guideline.

  4. Sandfrey v. U.S.

    Civil Case No. 04-cv-4264-JPG, Criminal Case No. 95-cr-40081-JPG (S.D. Ill. Dec. 21, 2006)

    A sentence imposed when revoking a term of supervised release will only be reversed if it is "plainly unreasonable." United States v. Doss, 79 F.3d 76, 79 (7th Cir. 1996). Sandfrey's sentence was unquestionably reasonable.

  5. United States v. Smith

    No. 18-3265 (7th Cir. Jul. 11, 2019)   Cited 2 times

    Chapter 7, Part B of the Sentencing Guidelines, which contains the advisory revocation sentence table, is a policy statement and "not a guideline, binding on the sentencing judge." United States v. Doss, 79 F.3d 76, 78 (7th Cir. 1996). Smith argues the 24-month sentence was unreasonable because the district court failed to treat her mental health problems as a mitigating factor.

  6. U.S. v. Flagg

    481 F.3d 946 (7th Cir. 2007)   Cited 49 times
    Affirming revocation when defendant admitted violations

    '" United States v. Salinas, 365 F.3d 582, 588 (7th Cir.2004) (citing United, States v. McClanahan, 136 F.3d 1146, 1149 (7th Cir.1998); United States v. Marvin, 135 F.3d 1129, 1136 (7th Cir.1998)). "To determine whether the sentence was plainly unreasonable, we [consider] . . . the standards set out in 18 U.S.C. § 3583." United States v. Harvey, 232 F.3d 585, 587 (7th Cir.2000) (citing United States v. Doss, 79 F.3d 76, 79 (7th Cir.1996)). The district court was also required to consider the policy statements set forth by the Sentencing Commission in U.S.S.G. Chapter Seven and the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

  7. U.S. v. Salinas

    365 F.3d 582 (7th Cir. 2004)   Cited 71 times
    Finding 24 month term of reimprisonment, 15 months higher than sentencing range, not plainly unreasonable

    Thus, the district court must at least consider the sentencing range recommended under section 7B1.4(a). United States v. Doss, 79 F.3d 76, 78 (7th Cir. 1996); Hill, 48 F.3d at 231. Nonetheless, the recommended range informs rather than cabins the exercise of the judge's discretion.

  8. U.S. v. Harvey

    232 F.3d 585 (7th Cir. 2000)   Cited 14 times
    Affirming 24-month term where policy statements advised 4-10 months

    To determine whether the sentence was plainly unreasonable, we must assess whether the district judge complied with the standards set out in 18 U.S.C. § 3583. See United States v. Doss, 79 F.3d 76, 79 (7th Cir. 1996). The district court's interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines is an issue of law; therefore our review is de novo.

  9. U.S. v. Tadeo

    222 F.3d 623 (9th Cir. 2000)   Cited 40 times
    Finding no abuse of discretion where the court found that the use of narcotics in violation of supervised release created a risk that the defendant would commit serious crimes because some of his past criminal activity occurred while under the influence

    While it is quite true that Application Note 3 states that "an upward departure may be warranted" under certain circumstances, the use of the term "upward departure" does not serve to convert the suggested sentence into a binding sentencing guideline if the Grade C violation is not associated with a high risk of new felonious conduct. See United States v. Doss, 79 F.3d 76, 78 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that § 7B1.4(a) is not binding simply because the district court used the term "depart upward" in rejecting a joint recommendation by both counsel that the suggested range of 8 to 14 months be applied). Here, the district court considered the aggravating factor set forth in Application Note 3 in rejecting the suggested range set forth in § 7B1.4(a). It found that Tadeo's use of narcotics presented the risk that Tadeo would commit serious crimes because his prior criminal activity, including sexual offenses, occurred while he abused controlled substances.