Opinion
No. 97-CR-81373.
June 3, 2002.
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendant Catchings's Motion for Severance pursuant to FED.R.CRIM.P. 14. The Government has responded. The Court finds that the facts and legal arguments are adequately presented in the parties' briefs and the decisional process would not be significantly aided by oral argument. Therefore, pursuant to E.D. MICH. LR 7.1(e)(2), it is hereby ORDERED that the motion be resolved on the briefs submitted. For the reasons set forth below, Defendant Catching's Motion for Severance is DENIED.
Defendant Catchings is charged in the following three counts of a five-count seventh superseding indictment: Conspiracy to Obstruct Justice (Count II), Obstruction of Justice, Aiding and Abetting (Count III), and Criminal Contempt, Aiding and Abetting (Count IV). Co-Defendant Dorsey is also charged in Counts II, III, and IV, as well as in Count I (Conspiracy to Launder Monetary Instruments) and Count V (Tampering with a Witness). The offenses in Counts I through V were charged in the same indictment pursuant to FED. R. CRIM. P. 8(a), and Defendants Catchings and Dorsey were joined in the same indictment pursuant to FED. R. CRIM. P. 8(b). Defendant Catchings moves "for a severance of Defendant and/or counts." Although Defendant Catchings's brief contains boilerplate language regarding the legal standards for severance pursuant to Rule 14, it fails to set forth a detailed application of those legal standards to the facts of this case.
Essentially, Defendant Catchings argues that joining Counts I and V, counts in which he is not charged, with Counts II, III, and IV was improper under Rule 8(a) "because there is no factual relationship between Counts One and Counts Two, Three, and Four." However, as the Government details on pages two and three of its response brief, Counts I through IV constitute part of a "common scheme or plan" as required by Rule 8(a) because Count I addresses the unlawful acquisition of real estate by Co-Defendants Dorsey and John Bryant, and Counts II through IV address the unlawful retention of that real estate. Further, Count V, which charges Co-Defendant Dorsey of tampering with a witness, is also properly joined with the other offenses. See e.g., United States v. Mendez-Ortiz, 810 F.2d 76, 79 (6th Cir. 1986).
Further, joining Co-Defendants Catchings and Dorsey was proper under Rule 8(b) because both Defendants are alleged to have conspired together in Count II and to have aided and abetted each other in Counts III and IV. Therefore, joinder of Co-Defendants Catchings and Dorsey is proper. See e.g., United States v. Hessling, 845 F.2d 617, 619 (6th Cir. 1988) ("The general rule in conspiracy cases is that persons jointly indicted should be tried together and that this is particularly true where the offenses charged may be established against all of the defendants by the same evidence. . . ."); United States v. Gimelstob, 475 F.2d 157, 160 (3d Cir. 1973).
As noted by the Government, once it is determined that joining criminal defendants is proper, a heavy burden is placed on Defendant to make a "strong showing" that joinder would result in substantial prejudice and that Defendants should be severed pursuant to Rule 14. See United States v. Davis, 707 F.2d 880, 883 (6th Cir. 1983). As stated earlier, there is a dearth of facts in Defendant Catchings's brief that support his heavy burden of showing substantial prejudice. Further, the jury is "presumed capable of sorting out the evidence and considering the case of each defendant separately." The presentation of evidence applicable to more than one defendant is simply a fact of life in multiple defendant cases. United States v. Moore, 917 F.2d 215, 220 (6th Cir. 1990) (internal citations omitted). Finally, Defendant Catchings has failed to address the extreme burden that two trials would impose on the Court.
Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant Catchings's Motion for Severance is DENIED.