In considering the appearance of justice, we must consider Judge Platt's pattern of error regarding 5K1.1 letters. See United States v. Doe, 348 F.3d 64 (2d Cir. 2003) (per curiam); Campo, 140 F.3d 415. 3.

Each of the cases that the Government cites where this Court reassigned a case to a different judge involved remands for sentencing or re-sentencing. See United States v. Doe, 348 F.3d 64 (2d Cir. 2003); Cullen v. United States, 194 F.3d 401 (2d Cir. 1999); United States v. Padilla, 186 F.3d 136 (2d Cir. 1999); United States v. Campo, 140 F.3d 415 (2d Cir. 1998) (per curiam); United States v. Londono, 100 F.3d 236 (2d Cir. 1996); United States v. Leung, 40 F.3d 577 (2d Cir. 1994); United States v. Robin, 545 F.2d 775 (2d Cir. 1976). In those cases, unlike here, on remand the judge would be the fact finder.

Since all the relevant sentencing facts necessary to trigger the mandatory minimum sentence (i.e., more than 400 grams of fentanyl) were admitted by Elston during his plea allocution, such admission is the equivalent of a jury finding. See, United States v. Doe, 66 Fed. App'x. 249, 252 (2d Cir.2003) (“[B]ecause all the relevant sentencing facts were admitted in a plea allocution, the equivalent of a jury finding, Apprendi has no relevance to this case.”); see also, United States v. Johnson, 732 F.3d 577, 584 (6th Cir.2013)

The court will do so here, with respect to Mr. Jones's Second Ground.Zarvela v. Artuz, 364 F.3d 415, 418 (2d Cir. 2004) ("Even if we assume that no procedural bar exists, we agree with the District Court that the claim cannot succeed on the merits."); United States v. Doe, 66 F. App'x 249, 252 (2d Cir. 2003) ("However, because the merits of the petition are easily resolved, we look beyond the possible procedural default and address the merits."); Salvagno v. Williams, 2019 WL 109337, at *8 (D. Conn. Jan. 4, 2019) (" '[T]he doctrine of procedural default is based on considerations of comity and finality, and not on a jurisdictional limitation on the power of a federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 to look beyond a state procedural default and consider the merits of a defaulted claim that asserts a constitutional violation.' ") (quoting Spence v. Superintendent, Great Meadow Corr. Facility, 219 F.3d 162, 170 (2d Cir. 2000)).

After Apprendi, "it was well settled under case law . . . that a defendant's admission of an element that would enhance his sentence during his guilty plea allocution was equivalent to that element having been determined by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt." United States v. Melville, No. 13-CR-205 (ARR), 2014 WL 173416, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 2014) (citing United States v. Brooker, 543 U.S. 220, 244 (2005); United States v. Doe, 66 F. App'x 249, 252 (2d Cir. 2003)). Alleyne did not "disturb[ ] this rule." Id.

The Court does not decide that issue because this matter is easily resolved on the merits. See United States v. Doe, 66 F. App'x 249, 252 (2d Cir. 2003) ("[B]ecause the merits of the petition are easily resolved, we look beyond the possible procedural default and address the merits."). II.

Given that that the doctrine of procedural default is not jurisdictional, but rather prudential, the Court will consider this claim on the merits. See United States v. Doe, 66 F. App'x 249, 252 (2d Cir. 2003) (citing Kuhali v. Reno, 266 F.3d 93, 101 (2d Cir. 2001) ("It is well-settled that the doctrine of procedural default is prudential rather than jurisdictional in nature.")). Generally, conviction by a jury renders harmless any errors in the grand jury proceeding.

Prior to Alleyne, it was well settled under case law following the ruling in Apprendi that a defendant's admission of an element that would enhance his sentence during his guilty plea allocution was equivalent to that element having been determined by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 244 (2005) (reaffirming holding in Apprendi that "[a]ny fact (other than a prior conviction) which is necessary to support a sentence exceeding the maximum authorized by the facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt") (emphasis added); United States v. Doe, 66 Fed. App'x 249, 252 (2d Cir. 2003) ("[B]ecause all the relevant sentencing facts were admitted in a plea allocution, the equivalent of a jury finding, Apprendi has no relevance to this case."). There is no reason for Alleyne to have disturbed this rule.

Accordingly, because Londono-Marin admitted in open court each factual element necessary to trigger the mandatory minimum, I did not determine any of these elements by a preponderance of the evidence and Alleyne is inapplicable. See United States v. Doe, 66 F. App'x 249, 252 (2d Cir. 2003) (unpublished) ("When a defendant is sentenced based on a plea in which he admits to the sentencing facts, Apprendi is not implicated."). Second, even if Alleyne was implicated by the facts presented here, Londono-Marin's conviction is final and Alleyne would not apply retroactively.

Because this case can be easily resolved on the merits, it is in the interests of judicial economy to dispose of the case without reaching the procedural default issues. See United States v. Doe, 66 F. App'x 249, 252 (2d Cir. 2003) ("[B]ecause the merits of the petition are easily resolved, we look beyond the possible procedural default and address the merits." (citing Kuhali v. Reno, 266 F.3d 93, 101 (2d Cir. 2001) ("It is well-settled that the doctrine of procedural default is prudential rather than jurisdictional in nature."))).