United States v. Debs also falls in this category. 949 F.2d 199, 201 (6th Cir. 1991). There, the Sixth Circuit declined to extend the claim-of-right defense to intra -union threats and violence.

District courts and courts of appeal in other jurisdictions have concluded that “LMRDA rights can constitute extortable property under the Hobbs Act, notwithstanding the fact that LMRDA rights cannot be legally exercised by third parties.” United States v. Gotti, 459 F.3d 296, 325 (2d Cir.2006) (collecting cases); see also United States v. Debs, 949 F.2d 199, 201 (6th Cir.1991) (concluding that “intangible business rights, including business rights of unions” are extortable property); United States v. Local 560 of Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen, & Helpers of Am., 780 F.2d 267, 281–82 (3d Cir.1985) (concluding that the “intangible property right to democratic participation in the affairs of [a] union ... [is] extortable ‘property’ for purposes of the Hobbs Act”). In United States v. Tropiano, 418 F.2d 1069 (2d Cir.1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1021, 90 S.Ct. 1258, 1262, 25 L.Ed.2d 530 (1970), the Second Circuit affirmed the conviction of defendants who were engaged in the refuse removal business and who by means of threats, convinced a rival to cease doing business in a certain area.

W.C. McGowan, District Attorney, and Burges Burges, for appellant. — 1. Courts of equity have jurisdiction to issue writs of injunction to abate public nuisances. State v. Goodnight, 70 Tex. 682; City of Belton v. Central Hotel Co., 33 S.W. Rep., 297; Marsan v. French, 61 Tex. 173; Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 672 [Book 31, p. 214, Lawyer's ed.]; United States v. Debs, 64 Fed. Rep. 724, 740; City of Georgetown v. Alexandria Canal Co., 12 Peters, 91, 98; Coosaw Mining Co. v. State, 144 U.S. 550 (Lawyers's ed., Book 36, pp. 537, 543); In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 587; The State of Kansas v. Crawford, 28 Kansas, 518; Littleton v. Fritz, 22 N.W. Rep., 641; People v. City of St. Louis, 10 Ill. 351, 367; Hamilton v. Whiteridge, 11 Md. 128, 69 Am. Dec., 184; 2 Story's Eq. Jur., secs. 921, 923, 924; 2 Daniel's Chan. Plead. and Prac., 6 Am. Ed., 1635; 3 Pom. Eq. Jur., sec. 1349; 2 Beach on Mod. Eq. Jur., secs. 742, 743; Snell's Principles of Eq., 495; 2 Eden on Inj., 259; 2 Beach on Inj., sec. 1080; 1 Spelling on Ext. Relief, 376; Attorney General v. Forbes, 2 Mylne Craig, 123, 133. 2.

In the wake of Enmons, however, a number of courts, including our own, have questioned whether Enmons's analysis of the importance of the legitimacy of the end sought to the "wrongful" inquiry should be applicable beyond cases in which violence occurs during a lawful strike to obtain a collective bargaining agreement. SeeUnited States v. Porcaro, 648 F.2d 753, 759-60 (1st Cir. 1981) (distinguishing Enmons in part on the ground that it is "a labor case dealing with the unique problem of strike violence"); see also United States v. Debs, 949 F.2d 199, 201 (6th Cir. 1991) (noting that " Enmons has not been extended beyond its own facts" and declining to hold that "because some illegality in union activity is justifiable every illegality ... must also be within the orbit of Enmons"); United States v. Jones, 766 F.2d 994, 1002 (6th Cir. 1985) (reserving the question of whether Enmons applies "to the use of violence outside of the collective bargaining context and in pursuit of goals other than higher wages"); United States v. Cerilli, 603 F.2d 415, 419 (3d Cir. 1979) ("The Court's reasoning [in Enmons] was obviously and explicitly tied to the labor context and more specifically to the strike context. Any application of Enmons to cases outside of that context must be done with caution.").

So too have the Third and Sixth Circuits. See United States v. Debs, 949 F.2d 199, 201-02 (6th Cir. 1991); United States v. Local 560, 780 F.2d 267, 281-82 (3d Cir. 1985). Ida presents no directly contrary authority.

The possession and use of property under claim of right does not constitute a public nuisance which can be abated by injunction. ( United States v. Debs, 64 Fed. 724, 740; C. S., secs. 2911, 6420, 6421, 6427; City of Bellevue v. Daily, 14 Idaho 545, 94 P. 1036; Laws 1913, p. 156; Laws 1917, p. 231; Laws 1923, p. 18.) The grant does not prohibit a lease to a private party.

The Tropiano case's discussion of obtaining property has been cited with approval by federal courts in virtually every circuit in the country. See, e.g., United States v. Hathaway, 534 F. 2d 386, 396 (CA1 1976); United States v. Arena, 180 F. 3d 380, 392 (CA2 1999); Northeast Women's Center, Inc. v. McMonagle, 868 F. 2d 1342, 1350 (CA3 1989); United States v. Santoni, 585 F. 2d 667, 673 (CA4 1978); United States v. Nadaline, 471 F. 2d 340, 344 (CA5 1973); United States v. Debs, 949 F. 2d 199, 201 (CA6 1991); United States v. Lewis, 797 F. 2d 358, 364 (CA7 1986); United States v. Zemek, 634 F. 2d 1159, 1174 (CA9 1980). Its interpretation of the term "property" is consistent with pre-Hobbs Act decisions of this Court, see Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 74 (1917) (property "consists of the free use, enjoyment, and disposal of a person's acquisitions without control or diminution"), the New York Court of Appeals, see People v. Barondess, 133 N.Y. 649, 31 N.E. 240 (1892), the California Supreme Court, People v. Cadman, 57 Cal. 562 (1881), and with our recent decision in Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987).

It is surely surprising to conclude that when a long and persistent effort to take the federal courts out of the industrial conflict, insofar as the labor injunction put them into it, found its way to the statute books, the Act failed to meet the grievances that were most dramatic and deepest in the memory of those most concerned with the legislation. United States v. Debs, 64 F. 724; 158 U.S. 564; United States v. Hayes, unreported, D. Ind. 1919; United States v. Railway Employees' Dept. A.F.L., 283 F. 479, 286 F. 228, 290 F. 978. It is urged, however, that legislative history cuts down what might otherwise be the scope of the Act.

Id., p. 822. In the case of United States v. Debs, 64 F. 724, the United States brought suit to enjoin those engaged in a conspiracy to interfere with transportation upon several railroads, and an injunction having been issued and disobeyed, contempt proceedings were instituted. The question was whether the federal court had jurisdiction to issue the injunction.

There is no right of trial by jury in a contempt proceeding under the Constitution, because it is not the trial of a crime or a criminal prosecution, and the court can act without a jury in such matter, regardless of whether the proceeding be classified as a civil or criminal contempt. Const., Art. III, § 2, cl. 3; Sixth Amendment; Seventh Amendment; Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 738; Myers v. United States, 264 U.S. 95; In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564; United States v. Debs, 64 F. 724; McDougall v. Sheridan, 23 Idaho 191; Bowman v. Continental Oil Co., 256 U.S. 642; Gompers v. Bucks Stove Range Co., 221 U.S. 418; Merchants' Stock Grain Co. v. Board of Trade, 201 F. 20; United States v. Eaton, 144 U.S. 687. Mr. Richard L. Kennedy, with whom Mr. William T. Faricy, Mr. Lyman T. Powell and Mr. John S. Sprowls were on the brief, for respondent in No. 246.