(n.d). Based on this definition, there is no question that a piece of firewood qualifies as a dangerous weapon when it is used to inflict serious bodily injury, as it was in this case. See United States v. Dayea, 32 F.3d 1377, 1379 (9th Cir. 1994) ("[C]ourts have found that, in the proper circumstances, almost anything can count as a dangerous weapon, including walking sticks, leather straps, rakes, tennis shoes, rubber boots, dogs, rings, concrete curbs, clothes irons, and stink bombs."). Next, defendant argues that even if the firewood qualifies as a dangerous weapon, the district court impermissibly double counted the weapon by relying upon it both to categorize the assault as an aggravated assault and to increase the base offense level.

The only question is whether Swallow used an "instrument" capable of inflicting such injury with the intent to injure his victim. United States v. Dayea , 32 F.3d 1377, 1380 (9th Cir. 1994). The district court concluded that he did. That is a guideline-application determination we review for abuse of discretion.

Quiver and other Tenth Circuit cases have, however, cited with approval the dangerous-weapon analysis of the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Dayea, 32 F.3d 1377 (9th Cir. 1994). See, e.g., Quiver, 805 F.3d at 1273 (noting the defendant's citation to Dayea and fully agreeing that an ordinary object can become a dangerous weapon depending on the manner of its use).

The court imposed a seven-level enhancement by applying § 2A2.2(b)(3)(C). We have held that “an upward adjustment under § 2A2.2(b)(2)(B) is authorized only when a defendant used an instrument capable of causing serious bodily injury with the intent to injure his victim,” United States v. Dayea, 32 F.3d 1377, 1380 (9th Cir.1994), and that a belt can be such an instrument. Specifically, in United States v. Riggins, 40 F.3d 1055, 1057 (9th Cir.1994), we expressly held, in considering a sufficiency of the evidence argument, that “as a matter of law, a ... belt can be [a] dangerous weapon [ ],” and stated that the “determination whether an object constitutes a ‘dangerous weapon’ turns not on the object's latent capability alone, but also on the manner in which the object was used.”

We review de novo the district court's interpretation of the sentencing guidelines, and we review for clear error the factual basis for the court's decision. United States v. Dayea, 32 F.3d 1377, 1379 (9th Cir.1994). We affirm in part, and dismiss in part.

Further, the district court concluded that Jones' offense level should be increased at least two levels, based on the presence of the other two factors; we agree, and find that a three-level increase would have remained within the boundaries of "reasonableness." Although Jones argues that he did not intend to "use" his truck as a weapon, cf. United States v. Dayea, 32 F.3d 1377, 1380 (9th Cir. 1994), the district court concluded that "[Jones'] conduct was excessively reckless and so disrespectful of human life that [it] approache[d][a] deliberate or intentional act," and we agree. Although Jones' conduct may not fall within the Guidelines' definition of "brandished," insofar as Jones did not use his vehicle "in order to intimidate," see U.S.S.G. § 1B1.

Regueiro's primary argument on appeal is that the caselaw concerning U.S.S.G. § 5K2.7 does not support the district court's decision to depart upward. See Gunby, 112 F.3d 1493; United States v. Baird, 109 F.3d 856 (3d Cir. 1997); United States v. Horton, 98 F.3d 313 (7th Cir. 1996); United States v. Dayea, 32 F.3d 1377 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Murillo, 902 F.2d 1169 (5th Cir. 1990); United States v. Kikumura, 918 F.2d 1084 (3d Cir. 1990). To the contrary, the cases Regueiro relies on suggest that the fraud in this case is precisely the type that supports a § 5K2.7 departure because of interference with the day-to-day functioning of government. See, e.g., Gunby, 112 F.3d at 1503 (affirming § 5K2.7 departure in case of embezzlement of court filing fees); Baird, 109 F.3d at 871-72 (affirming § 5K2.7 departure in case of widespread police misconduct); Murillo, 902 F.2d at 1174 (affirming § 5K2.7 departure in case of selling false immigration documents).

Next, Petitioner argues that "almost anything" could qualify as a "dangerous weapon" underlying the offense of assault with a dangerous weapon, including objects such as "walking sticks, leather straps, rakes, tennis shoes, rubber boots, dogs, rings, concrete curbs, cloth[ing] irons, and stink bombs." Doc. 12 at 2 (quoting United States v. Tissnolthtos, 115 F.3d 759, 763 (10th Cir. 1997) and United States v. Dayea, 32 F.3d 1377, 1379 (9th Cir. 1994)). Petitioner further explains that a conviction under § 113(a)(3) could be upheld where such a "dangerous weapon" is merely possessed or displayed during the assault, and where the offender has the intent to cause bodily harm.

Def. Mem., Apr. 15, 1998, at 4. 32 F.3d 1377 (9th Cir. 1994). Spiegelman's argument is unpersuasive. He doubtless is correct that rules of grammar suggest that the phrase "property damage or loss" means "property damage or property loss."

See United States v. Lavender, 224 F.3d 939, 941 (9th Cir. 2000). The car, hammer, box cutter, and rope are all self-evidently instruments capable of inflicting death or serious bodily injury, so the district court did not err in concluding that they constituted dangerous weapons within the meaning of § 2B1.1(b)(16)(B). See, e.g., United States v. Dayea, 32 F.3d 1377, 1379 (9th Cir. 1994) (car); cf. United States v. Siler, 734 F.3d 1290, 1292 (11th Cir. 2013) (rope).