Efforts to argue that federal jurisdiction does not encompass prosecutions for federal tax evasion have been rejected as either "silly" or "frivolous" by a myriad of courts throughout the nation. See, e.g., United States v. Dawes, 874 F.2d 746, 750 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 110 S.Ct. 284, 107 L.Ed.2d 264 (1989), overruled on other grounds, 895 F.2d 1581 (10th Cir. 1990); United States v. Tedder, 787 F.2d 540, 542 (10th Cir. 1986); United States v. Amon, 669 F.2d 1351, 1355 (10th Cir. 1981); United States v. Brown, 600 F.2d 248, 259 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 917, 100 S.Ct. 233, 62 L.Ed.2d 172 (1979); Cheek, 882 F.2d at 1270; United States v. Ward, 833 F.2d 1538, 1539 (11th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1022, 108 S.Ct. 1576, 99 L.Ed.2d 891 (1988); United States v. Koliboski, 732 F.2d 1328, 1329-30 (7th Cir. 1984); United States v. Evans, 717 F.2d 1334, 1334 (11th Cir. 1983); United States v. Drefke, 707 F.2d 978, 981 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 942, 104 S.Ct. 359, 78 L.Ed.2d 321 (1983); United States v. Spurgeon, 671 F.2d 1198, 1199 (8th Cir. 1982); O'Brien v. United States, 51 F.2d 193, 196 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 673, 52 S.Ct. 129, 76 L.Ed. 569 (1931). In the face of this uniform authority, it

We reiterate: "The Internal Revenue Code was validly enacted by Congress and is fully enforceable." United States v. Dawes, 874 F.2d 746, 750 (10th Cir. 1989), overruled in part on other grounds by United States v. Allen, 895 F.2d 1577 (10th Cir. 1990). Accordingly, the Cromars' strained argument regarding direct and indirect taxation is without merit.

This argument has been repeatedly rejected by this court and many others. See Lonsdale v. United States, 919 F.2d 1440, 1448 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding that an argument that "no statutory authority exists for imposing an income tax on individuals" is "completely lacking in legal merit and patently frivolous"); see also United States v. Dawes, 874 F.2d 746, 750-51 (10th Cir. 1989), overruled on other grounds, 895 F.2d 1581 (10th Cir. 1990); Charczuk v. Commissioner, 771 F.2d 471, 472-73 (10th Cir. 1985); United States v. Stillhammer, 706 F.2d 1072, 1077-78 (10th Cir. 1983). Mr. Boyd blatantly includes further elaboration of his legal arguments in his appendices, and he asks us to read those as a supplement to his brief.

All this is documented in no fewer than three of our published opinions. See United States v. Dawes, 951 F.2d 1189 (10th Cir. 1991); United States v. Dawes, 895 F.2d 1581 (10th Cir. 1990); United States v. Dawes, 874 F.2d 746 (10th Cir. 1989). But all this, as it turned out, was just the beginning.

Counsel does not have to take every position and make every argument that the client requests. See United States v. Dawes, 874 F.2d 746, 748 (10th Cir. 1989) (per curiam) ("There is no right to counsel who will blindly follow a defendant's instructions."). Requiring a lawyer to argue at the direction of one who may be mentally incompetent — that is, one who seems unable to comprehend the nature of the proceedings against him — serves neither the individual client nor the truth-seeking process.

Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 431, 94 S.Ct. 3042, 3047, 41 L.Ed.2d 855 (1974). See also, United States v. Dawes, 874 F.2d 746, 750 (10th Cir. 1989), United States v. Hack, 782 F.2d 862, 870 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1184, 106 S.Ct. 2921, 91 L.Ed.2d 549 (1986), United States v. O'Driscoll, 761 F.2d 589, 597 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1020, 106 S.Ct. 1207, 89 L.Ed.2d 320 (1986).

The issue in this case is whether the lack of Office of Management and Budget control numbers required by the Paperwork Reduction Act on the relevant federal tax regulations and instructions prevented the district court from convicting the appellants for their failure to file income tax returns for the years 1981 through 1983. Because we agree with the district court that such numbers are not required for these documents, we affirm. After their original convictions were affirmed by this court, United States v. Dawes, 874 F.2d 746, 751 (10th Cir. 1989), taxpayers brought motions for new trial which were denied by the district court. On appeal, this court reversed and remanded the matter with instructions to vacate the underlying convictions and sentences and to order the taxpayers' immediate release from prison pending further proceedings.

Furthermore, since this circuit has made itself clear on these and similar issues numerous times, the Lonsdales cannot by any stretch of the imagination assert that their arguments regarding the taxability of wages have any support in this circuit. See United States v. Christensen, 1990 U.S.App. LEXIS 17594 (10th Cir. 1990); United States v. Mann, 884 F.2d 532 (10th Cir. 1989); United States v. Dawes, 874 F.2d 746, 750-51 (10th Cir. 1989); Charczuk v. Commissioner, 771 F.2d 471, 472-73 (10th Cir. 1985); United States v. Stillhammer, 706 F.2d 1072, 1077-78 (10th Cir. 1983). The following quote is a representative sample of assertions repeated over and over in the complaint:

See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). In United States v. Dawes, 874 F.2d 746 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 110 S.Ct. 284, 107 L.Ed.2d 264 (1989), a case factually similar to the one at bar, this court affirmed convictions obtained after the trial court allowed defendants to proceed pro se without ensuring their knowledge and understanding of the dangers of self-representation as required by Padilla. We reasoned that, because "[o]ur examination of the record convinces us there is no reasonable possibility defendants would have been found not guilty had they been represented by counsel[,] . . . noncompliance with the requirements of Padilla was harmless error, and, based on the evidence, harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."

In defendants' direct criminal appeal we held that the failure of the district court to advise defendants of the dangers of proceeding to trial pro se was harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Dawes, 874 F.2d 746, 749 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 110 S.Ct. 284, 107 L.Ed.2d 264 (1989). Since then, we have had occasion to revisit our Dawes ruling in the context of another defendant proceeding to trial without counsel.