U.S. v. Darden

3 Citing cases

  1. U.S. v. McGhee

    627 F.3d 454 (1st Cir. 2010)   Cited 12 times
    Noting that the Melendez–Diaz Court was “sharply divided” and that the Court's “new slant on the Confrontation Clause is likely to be contested territory for some years”

    E.g., United States v. Turner, 591 F.3d 928, 931-33 (7th Cir. 2010); United States v. Williams, Criminal No. 09-0026(PLF), F.Supp.2d ___, ___, 2010 WL 4071538, at *4-*5 (D.D.C. Oct. 18, 2010); United States v. Mirabal, No. CR 09-3207 JB, 2010 WL 3834072, at *4-*8 (D.N.M. Aug. 7, 2010); see also United States v. Winston, 372 Fed.Appx. 17, 19-20 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam); United States v. Johnson, 587 F.3d 625, 634-36 (4th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 2128, 176 L.Ed.2d 749 (2010); United States v. Darden, 656 F.Supp.2d 560 (D.Md. 2009); Larkin v. Yates, No. CV 09-2034-DSF (CT), 2009 WL 2049991, at *1 (C.D.Cal. July 9, 2009). On the other hand, Tatro's conclusion as to the substance of the sample did depend in part on Knowles' work.

  2. U.S. v. Boyd

    686 F. Supp. 2d 382 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)   Cited 17 times
    Finding no constitutional violation when only the DNA analyst who wrote the report, and not the intervening-testing analysts, testified because “the testifying expert was himself familiar with the intervening procedures and could be fully cross-examined as to their efficacy, accuracy, etc.”

    Other courts have acknowledged this potential issue left open by Melendez-Diaz but have not yet addressed it directly. See, e.g., United States v. Rose, No. 08-10813, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 24473 (5th Cir. Nov. 6, 2009) (affirming defendant's conviction where the lab supervisor, who had reviewed the drug analysis report but did not perform the test, testified in court);Pendergrass v. State, 913 N.E.2d 703 (Ind. 2009) (rejecting Sixth Amendment challenge where laboratory supervisor who had knowledge of processing testified but technician did not); see also United States v. Darden, No. 09-602M, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94982 (D. Md. Sept. 24, 2009) (upholding admission of toxicology report where supervising toxicologist who reviewed data and reported conclusion testified at trial); Rector v. State, 681 S.E.2d 157 (Ga. 2009) (affirming conviction where trial court allowed toxicologist to testify about report prepared by another doctor as harmless because it did not contribute to verdict).

  3. State v. Rehmann

    419 N.J. Super. 451 (App. Div. 2011)   Cited 20 times
    Stating that "new difficulties, not previously experienced by our courts, have followed in Melendez-Diaz's wake [o]ur courts have yet to consider this surrogate-witness problem" and concluding that "[a]fter careful consideration [t]he State must provide a witness who has made an independent determination as to the results offered [by laboratory tests or other scientific results]"

    The right of cross-examination must be meaningful and is not satisfied when the State calls a witness whose knowledge is limited to the four corners of the laboratory certification produced and executed by another.See United States v. Darden, 656 F.Supp.2d 560, 561 (D.Md. 2009) (holding the right of confrontation was not violated by the testimony of a supervising toxicologist instead of the testimony of the lab technicians who actually conducted the tests on the blood); Vann v. State, 229 P.3d 197, 199-200 (Alaska App. 2010) (finding no violation where the lab technician testified as to all five samples but only tested three because she interpreted the data from other samples, and the conclusions were her own); Smith v. State, 28 So.3d 838, 853, 855 (Fla. 2009) (finding no violation even though the State failed to present the biologists who performed the DNA tests because the testifying supervisor "formulated her own conclusions from the raw data"); Reddick v. State, 298 Ga.App. 155, 679 S.E.2d 380, 382 (2009) (finding no violation despite the fact that the testifying expert performed only one of two tests because she reviewed both tests, came to her own independent conclusion, and was entitled to base her opinion on data collected by others); People v. John