United States v. Cray

54 Citing cases

  1. U.S. v. Robinson

    498 F. Supp. 2d 328 (D.D.C. 2007)   Cited 7 times
    Stating that the defendant "`must affirmatively advance an objectively reasonable argument that he is innocent'" (quoting Cray, 47 F.3d at 1209)

    A defendant seeking to withdraw a guilty plea before sentencing "must affirmatively advance an objectively reasonable argument that he is innocent, for he has waived his right simply to try his luck before a jury." United States v. Cray, 47 F.3d 1203, 1209 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). Where the motion asserts legal innocence and the plea was not properly entered or is otherwise constitutionally infirm, presentence withdrawal should be "rather freely allowed."

  2. United States v. Shah

    263 F. Supp. 2d 10 (D.D.C. 2003)   Cited 11 times
    Denying the defendant's downward departure for alleged cooperation with the Government where during debriefing the defendant denied any knowledge of dealing with the supplier and thus was not truthful

    United States v. Ford, 993 F.2d 249, 251 (D.C. Cir. 1993). The D.C. Circuit revisited the issue of plea withdrawal in United States v. Cray, 47 F.3d 1203 (D.C. Cir. 1995). It promulgated a three-part inquiry for examining the propriety of permitting a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea:

  3. U.S. v. Curry

    344 F. Supp. 2d 22 (D.D.C. 2004)   Cited 3 times

    Finally, if those two factors warrant, the court may then inquire whether the Government would have been substantially prejudiced by the delay in going to trial.United States v. Cray, 47 F.3d 1203, 1207 (D.C. Cir. 1995). A defendant cannot satisfy the need to show legal innocence by a mere general denial, but "he must affirmatively advance an objectively reasonable argument that he is innocent." Id.

  4. U.S. v. Jones

    642 F.3d 1151 (D.C. Cir. 2011)   Cited 8 times

    We will therefore re-order the factors and consider them in the order of their importance. See United States v. Robinson, 587 F.3d 1122, 1127 (D.C. Cir. 2009); United States v. Cray, 47 F.3d 1203, 1208 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 1. The gravamen of Jones' claim of taint is that he thought he was merely pleading guilty to a single sale of 10 ziplocks of heroin to an undercover officer, and that he did not understand that he was actually pleading guilty to a conspiracy involving 100 or more grams of the drug. It is hard to see how this could have been so.

  5. U.S. v. Robinson

    587 F.3d 1122 (D.C. Cir. 2009)   Cited 27 times
    Holding that district court accepted defendants' guilty pleas even though it refrained from accepting or rejecting defendants' plea agreements at plea hearing and used terms "plea" and "plea agreement" interchangeably because court specifically asked each defendant how he pleaded and then acknowledged its acceptance of each guilty plea

    The third factor is the "most important," Ford, 993 F.2d at 251, so we address it first. See United States v. Cray, 47 F.3d 1203, 1208 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 1. Taint

  6. U.S. v. Thomas

    541 F. Supp. 2d 18 (D.D.C. 2008)   Cited 13 times
    Concluding that an evidentiary hearing was unnecessary because defendant's claim was insufficient to render a plea invalid even when defendant argued that prior counsel failed to investigate fully

    " Id. A defendant who does not "`show some error under Rule 11 has to shoulder an extremely heavy burden if he is to ultimately prevail' in his effort to withdraw his plea." United States v. Berkeley, 515 F. Supp. 2d 159, 161 (D.D.C. 2007) (quoting United States v. Cray, 47 F.3d 1203, 1208 (D.C. Cir. 1995)). The defendant's representations at the plea hearing regarding "adequacy of counsel and the knowing and voluntary nature of his plea . . . may `constitute a formidable barrier' to . . . later refutations."

  7. U.S. v. Tolson

    372 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2005)   Cited 27 times
    Holding that "active pursuit of a plea agreement including a cooperation provision . . . seems to give rise to the . . . inference . . . that [the attorney] is quite unlikely to have been acting to advance [the coconspirator's]interests by pushing [the defendant] to enter into a plea agreement and cooperate with the Government"

    While the Court of Appeals has "often considered the three . . . factors as if they were all simply to be balanced against one another in each case . . . none of our cases would have been decided differently if the only inquiry undertaken were whether the defendant's guilty plea was taken in compliance with Rule 11." United States v. Cray, 47 F.3d 1203, 1207 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (citations omitted). Specifically, "prejudice to the government has never been a determinative factor" for the D.C. Circuit in evaluating a district court's decision to grant or deny a withdrawal motion.

  8. U.S. v. West

    392 F.3d 450 (D.C. Cir. 2004)   Cited 45 times
    Holding that exception to appellate waiver for sentence exceeding "statutory maximum" did not allow for Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 or Blakely challenge where parties did not intend the term to have such meaning

    "[A] defendant who fails to show some error under Rule 11 has to shoulder an extremely heavy burden if he is ultimately to prevail." United States v. Cray, 47 F.3d 1203, 1208 (D.C. Cir. 1995). We review refusals of motions to withdraw for abuse of discretion.

  9. United States v. Coleman

    704 F. Supp. 3d 7 (D.D.C. 2023)

    "[A] defendant who fails to show some error under Rule 11 has to shoulder an extremely heavy burden if he is ultimately to prevail." United States v. Cray, 47 F.3d 1203, 1208 (D.C. Cir. 1995). So heavy, in fact, that the D.C. Circuit remarked some years ago that whether a defendant's plea was tainted had been "the determinative factor in all of [its plea withdrawal] decisions to date." Id.

  10. United States v. Magruder

    Criminal Action No. 19-203 (CKK) (D.D.C. Jul. 20, 2020)   Cited 2 times

    Therefore, this analysis focuses on the first and third factors, beginning with the third factor as it is the most influential. See United States v. Cray, 47 F.3d 1203, 1208 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (adopting "more structured inquiry-focusing first on the most important, indeed determinative factor"). Defendant Magruder argues that these factors are not applicable because they are "considered by the Appellate Court to determine if the court abused its discretion in not permitting a defendant to withdraw his guilty plea."