These findings were subsequently adopted by other courts as well. See United States v. Coye, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14979, at *3-*4 (E.D.N.Y. 2004); United States v. Kunen, 323 F.Supp.2d 390, 393 (E.D.N.Y. 2004); United States v. Bailey, 272 F.Supp.2d 822, 827-30 (D.Neb. 2003). Among other things, Binney asserted in his affidavit that he had joined Candyman by sending an e-mail message to the group's moderator, a step he asserted was required of all new subscribers.

It is common sense that an individual who joins such a site would more than likely download and possess such material. See id. (finding it to be "common sense" that one who "voluntarily joins" a child-pornography group and "remains a member of the group . . . without cancelling his subscription . . . would download such pornography from the website and have it in his possession"); Bailey, 272 F.Supp.2d at 824-25 ("[K]nowingly becoming a computer subscriber to a specialized internet site that frequently, obviously, unquestionably and sometimes automatically distributes electronic images of child pornography to other computer subscribers alone establishes probable cause for a search of the target subscriber's computer."); see also United States v. Coye, No. 02-CR-732, 2004 WL 1743945, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2004). And this conclusion is supported by the majority of courts that have found that corrected Candyman affidavits set forth probable cause.

The Farrell court apparently was not aware of the then-recent decision in Iron Workers. See Farrell, 1996 WL 19223, at *5 (stating that "[t]he Second Circuit has not addressed th[e] issue" of "whether . . . the statute applies to contributions paid after filing of the suit but prior to judgment"). The Court is sympathetic to Plaintiff's argument that disallowing the recovery of statutory liquidated damages for delinquent contributions paid prior to filing of suit is contrary to ERISA's purpose of encouraging employers to pay promised contributions in a timely manner (Pl.'s Mem. Supp. Summ. J. 8-10), but the Court is bound by the statute and must carefully consider the Second Circuit's dicta interpreting it, see United States v. Coye, No. 02-CR-732, 2004 WL 1743945, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2004) ("Although considered dictum of a higher court is not binding, it `must be given considerable weight.'" (quoting United States v. Bell, 524 F.2d 202, 206 (2d Cir. 1975))).