By knocking on Robinson's door and announcing themselves as the Milwaukee Police Department, an announcement which in fact was invited by Robinson's question of "Who is it?", the officers were conducting themselves in an utterly appropriate and lawful manner. See United States v. Collins, 510 F.3d 697, 700 (7th Cir. 2007) ("[T]here is no legal requirement of obtaining a warrant to knock on someone's door."). Simply because Robinson chose to respond to the officers' lawful conduct by running from the door, thereby leading the officers to believe that he would destroy evidence, does not mean that we ought to overlook the exigent circumstances.

In Judge Crocker's view, Rietzler's failed effort to get Etchin's consent to search "let the cat out of the bag" (we paraphrase slightly), which required officers to enter or else risk that evidence would be destroyed. The government has endorsed the position that exigent circumstances supported the officers' entry, relying on our decision in United States v. Collins, 510 F.3d 697 (7th Cir. 2007). In Collins, we acknowledged that police are free to approach a home and knock on a door, and we stressed that doing so may sometimes give rise to an emergency that justifies a warrantless entry into the home.

This argument has previously been rejected as "unbelievably frivolous." United States v. Collins, 510 F.3d 697, 698 (7th Cir. 2007). See also Holt v. Bush, 321 Fed. App'x 5, 5 (D.C. Cir. 2009) ("[A]ppellant's challenge to § 3231 is frivolous, as two circuit courts and numerous district courts have held.");Buczek v. Constructive Statutory Trust Depository Trust, No. 10-CV-382, 2011 WL 4549206 at *4- 5 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2011) (rejecting similar claim as "wholly without merit"); Ozsusamlar v. United States, No. 10 Civ. 3455(PKL), 2010 WL 3528888 at * 2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 2, 2010) (rejecting similar claim as meritless); Robinson v. United States, No. 0 9 Civ. 2178(SAS), 03 CR. 1501(SAS), 2010 WL 1789931 at *7 (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 2010) ("All courts that have considered this claim have rejected it.").

In fact, the Seventh Circuit ordered an attorney to show cause why he should not be sanctioned for professional misconduct for relying on this claim on appeal, sending a copy of its opinion to the appropriate disciplinary authorities. United States v. Collins, 510 F.3d 697, 698 (7th Cir. 2007). The appellate court labeled counsel's "quixotic crusade" a "profound disservice to his clients" and expressly left open the possibility of post-conviction relief based on ineffective assistance of counsel.

18 U.S.C. section 3231. The Seventh Circuit recently considered an argument similar to Johnson's in United States v. Collins, 510 F.3d 697 (7th Cir. 2007). Judge Posner, writing for the Court, states this:

[¶ 17] Here, the court did not directly address temporal proximity, intervening circumstances, or the purpose and flagrancy of the misconduct, finding in the threshold inquiry that Bailey's consent to the search of his apartment was not voluntary. The court concluded that Bailey's consent “manifested a submission to authority created by the prior illegality.” [¶ 18] Consent is not voluntary “if the consent was induced by deceit, trickery or misrepresentation of the officials making the search,” State v. Barlow, 320 A.2d 895, 900 (Me.1974), or if the defendant is essentially given no choice due to the initial police conduct, see United States v. Collins, 510 F.3d 697, 701 (7th Cir.2007). In Collins, the police illegally entered an apartment using a battering ram, and then, once one of the defendants was handcuffed, asked for his consent to search the apartment.

Artic "consented to the choice at time when he had no real choice, and he had no real choice because of police misconduct." United States v. Collins, 510 F.3d 697, 701 (7th Cir. 2007). II

In that brief, Moore argues that the district court should have granted his motion to dismiss because 18 U.S.C. § 876(c) is not a valid law—only prima facie evidence of law—and that Congress exceeded its constitutional authority in enacting Title 18 of the United States Code. These arguments are meritless. See U.S. Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers AFL-CIO, 413 U.S. 548, 550 n.1 (1973) (noting that Title 18 has been enacted into positive law); United States v. Collins, 510 F.3d 697, 698 (7th Cir. 2007) (describing argument that Title 18 of the United States Code is unconstitutional as "unbelievably frivolous" and ordering attorney who made the argument to show cause why he should not be sanctioned for professional misconduct). We therefore affirm the district court's judgment.

United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 40 (2003) ("[T]he exigent need of law enforcement trumps a resident's interest in avoiding all property damage."). Courts determine exigency by conducting a totality of the circumstances analysis based on the facts that the police knew at the time of the search. Id. at 39-41; see generally United States v. Collins, 510 F.3d 697 (7th Cir. 2007). Police must wait a reasonable amount of time before forcibly entering a home.

We have rejected this argument the two previous times that Moleski has raised it, and do so again now. See Moleski, 578 F. App'x at 88 (quoting statement from United States v. Collins, 510 F.3d 697, 698 (7th Cir. 2007), that this argument is "unbelievably frivolous"). Also frivolous is Moleski's argument that the District Judge lacks the required credentials to serve.