Opinion
Criminal No. 00-158 (JRT/ESS)
June 2, 2003
Lisa A. Biersay, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Minneapolis, MN., for plaintiff.
Daniel M. Scott, FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for defendant.
ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR AMENDMENT OF JUDGMENT AND COMMITMENT ORDER
Defendant James L. Chapman ("Chapman") has moved to withdraw the Court's recommendation in its Judgment and Commitment Order ("JC") that Chapman be eligible for a 500-hour drug treatment plan during his sentence. By the time Chapman was sentenced in this case and arrived at his designated facility, he had completed so much of his sentence that he was no longer eligible for the 500-hour program. Chapman asserts that because he has not completed this treatment program per the Court's recommendation, the prison will not allow him to be released to a halfway house prior to the completion of his sentence. Chapman is thus caught in a catch-22; he is not eligible for the treatment program because he has nearly completed his sentence, but he is being prevented from early release to a halfway house because he has not participated in the treatment program. Chapman believes that the BOP will permit him to access the halfway house if the Court withdraws its earlier recommendation regarding drug treatment. The Court is inclined to grant Chapman's request, but the government argues that the Court lost jurisdiction to make this change once Chapman appealed his sentence.
The government is correct that filing a notice of appeal divests the district court of its control over those aspects of the case involved in the appeal. Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58 (1982); Liddell v. Board of Ed. of City of St. Louis, 73 F.3d 819, 822 (8th Cir. 1996). The government also correctly notes that the exceptions found in Rules 35 and 36 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not apply here. The Court does not agree, however, that it is without the power to change its recommendation. Although an appeal divests the Court of jurisdiction to make legally binding decisions over aspects of a case on appeal, in this case the Court is not asked to make any legally binding ruling. The Court's recommendation as to whether Chapman should participate in a drug treatment program is just that — a recommendation. The Court may suggest that Chapman participate in such a program, but the ultimate decision rests in the sole discretion of the BOP. United States v. Creed, 897 F.2d 963, 964 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding that court's recommendation to place defendant in drug treatment program was not binding and was without legal significance); United States v. A.J., 190 F.3d 873, 876 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding that the BOP has discretion to make placement decisions); United States v. Williams, 65 F.3d 301, 307 (2d Cir. 1995) ("A sentencing court has no authority to order that a convicted defendant be confined in a particular facility, much less placed in a particular treatment program; those decisions are within the sole discretion of the Bureau of Prisons."); Egan v. Hawk, 983 F. Supp. 858, 864-65 (D. Minn. 1997). See 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b) (providing that BOP has power to designate prisoners and need only consider the sentencing court's recommendation). Thus, because the Court's recommendation has no legal significance, it does not matter that Chapman's case is currently being considered by the court of appeals.
Furthermore, amending the Court's previous JC does not implicate the purposes of the rule divesting the district court of jurisdiction. This doctrine is designed to promote judicial economy by sparing the trial court from ruling on matters that will be mooted by the court of appeals. United States v. Ledbetter, 882 F.2d 1345, 1347 (8th Cir. 1989). The doctrine also promotes fairness to parties, "who might otherwise have to fight a confusing `two front war' for no good reason . . . avoiding possible duplication and confusion by allocating control between forums." Id. (citation omitted). Chapman's request here implicates neither of these important interests. For this reason, and because the Court's recommendation to the BOP is not legally binding, the Court finds that it has the power to amend its JC. The Court therefore denies the government's motion to dismiss, and grants defendant's motion to amend the Judgment and Commitment Order.
ORDER
Based on the foregoing, all the records, files, and proceedings herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. Defendant's Motion for Amendment of Judgment and Commitment Order [Docket No. 282] is GRANTED.
2. Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss Defendant's Motion for Lack of Jurisdiction [Docket No. 283] is DENIED.