4, 591 (6th Cir. 2015) ("[T]o establish a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel ensuing from government surveillance, a claimant must . . . show . . . that the information gained was used to prejudice the claimant's defense in his criminal trial."); Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 911 (9th Cir. 2014) (contemplating the type of "harm" sufficient to "cause[ ] prejudice" from "an improper intrusion into the attorney-client relationship," and concluding that "tainted evidence . . . used against [the defendant]" would qualify); see also, e.g., United States v. Esformes, 60 F.4th 621, 632-33 (11th Cir. 2023), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 144 S. Ct. 485, 217 L.Ed.2d 255 (2023); United States v. Hari, 67 F.4th 903, 912-13 (8th Cir. 2023), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 144 S. Ct. 436, 217 L.Ed.2d 242 (2023); United States v. Allen, 491 F.3d 178, 192 (4th Cir. 2007); Williams v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 567, 584-85 (9th Cir. 2004); United States v. Danielson, 325 F.3d 1054, 1068-70 (9th Cir. 2003); United States v. Castor, 937 F.2d 293, 297-98 (7th Cir. 1991); United States v. Kelly, 790 F.2d 130, 136-38 (D.C. Cir. 1986); United States v. Ginsberg, 758 F.2d 823, 833 (2d Cir. 1985); United States v. Mastroianni, 749 F.2d 900, 906-08 (1st Cir. 1984); United States v. Steele, 727 F.2d 580, 585-87 (6th Cir. 1984); United States v. Melvin, 650 F.2d 641, 643-44 (5th Cir. 1981). The government culls this caselaw in its supplemental brief, see Suppl. Resp. Br. at 9 n.1, to suggest that any decision from this court rejecting Shillinger's structural-error rule would find good company among our fellow circuits.

Id. However, even if one of these exceptions is presented in a section 2241 petition, federal courts have determined that it is appropriate to require pretrial detainees to first "exhaust all avenues of state relief before seeking the writ." United States v. Castor, 937 F.2d 293, 296-97 (7th Cir. 1991); see also Gonzalez v. O'Connell, 355 F.3d 1010, 1015-16 (7th Cir. 2004) (noting that discretionary, judicially-created common-law exhaustion applies when Congress has not clearly required exhaustion via statute). I find that the bulk of Franscoviak's claims do not fall within the scope of any exception.

Although Olsson raises a speedy trial claim, by his own admission he has not exhausted his state court remedies, nor has he presented any exceptional circumstances to justify enjoining his state criminal proceeding. See United States v. Castor, 937 F.2d 293, 296-97 (7th Cir. 1991). He claims that if he presented a speedy trial claim in state court.

Although they do not phrase it as such, Defendants essentially assert a claim of right or good faith defense to Robbins' allegations that they violated the Hobbs Act. The claim of right defense provides that a person with a lawful claim of right to property cannot be liable for wrongfully acquiring it. United States v. Castor, 937 F.2d 293, 299 (7th Cir. 1991). The Supreme Court first recognized the defense in the context of the Hobbs Act in United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396, 93 S.Ct. 1007, 35 L.Ed.2d 379 (1973).

Section 2241 has no express exhaustion requirement, but courts apply a common-law exhaustion rule. Richmond v. Scibana, 387 F.3d 602, 604 (7th Cir. 2004); See Boettcher v. Doyle, 105 Fed.Appx. 852, 854 (7th Cir. 2004) citing United States v. Castor, 937 F.2d 293, 296-297 (7thCir. 1991) (unlike §2254, §2241 does not itself require exhaustion but federal courts may nevertheless require it as a matter of comity). Thus, a pretrial detainee must “exhaust all avenues of state relief” before seeking a writ of habeas corpus through a section 2241 action.

Crutchfield v. Dennison, 910 F.3d 968, 972 (7th Cir. 2018) (citing Davila v. Davis, 582 U.S. 521, 527 (2017)); see also Curran, 328 Fed.Appx. at 335 (collecting cases); United States v. Castor, 937 F.2d 293, 296-97 (7th Cir. 1991) (stating that while § 2241 applicants are not subject to the statutory requirement of exhaustion of remedies, “federal courts nevertheless may require, as a matter of comity, that such detainees exhaust all avenues of state relief before seeking the writ” (citing Baldwin v. Lewis, 442 F.2d 29, 31-33 (7th Cir. 1971))). 4.1 Ground One - Double Jeopardy Claim

Section 2241 contains no statutory exhaustion requirement, but federal courts require it as a matter of comity. Richmond v. Scibana, 387 F.3d 602, 604 (7th Cir. 2004); United States v. Castor, 937 F.2d 293, 296-97 (7th Cir. 1991).

However, federal courts also require exhaustion of § 2241 claims in the interest of comity. See, e.g., Olsson v. Curran, 328 F. App'x 334, 335 (7th Cir. 2009); United States v. Castor, 937 F.2d 293, 296-97 (7th Cir. 1991); Puchner v. Severson, No. 19-CV-1737, 2019 WL 6895992, at *1 (E.D. Wis. Dec. 18, 2019) (citing Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Ky., 410 U.S. 484, 489-92 (1973); Castor, 937 F.2d at 296-97; Neville v. Cavanagh, 611 F.2d 673, 675 (7th Cir. 1979); Baldwin v. Lewis, 442 F.2d 29, 31-33 (7th Cir. 1971)), report and recommendation adopted by No. 19-CV-1737-PP, 2020 WL 2085277, at *1-2 (E.D. Wis. Apr. 30, 2020). There is no indication that Love challenged the institution's procedures for terminating him from the SOTP or the handling of his complaint via the proper administrative procedures, Wis. Admin. Code § 310, or in any Wisconsin court.

Brown correctly notes that this action started as a habeas filing pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 because he had not been convicted at that point. Walker v. O'Brien, 216 F.3d 626, 633 (7th Cir. 2000) (Section 2254 is the vehicle for prisoners in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court, but not those in state custody for some other reason, such as preconviction custody); United States v. Castor, 937 F.2d 293, 296-97 (7th Cir. 1991); Hirsch v. Smitley, 66 F.Supp.2d 985 (W.D.Wisc. 1999).

Section 2241 allows a pretrial detainee to bring a habeas corpus petition, but this ability is limited by the desire of federal courts not to interfere with pending state criminal prosecutions except in special circumstances. Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484, 489-92 (1973); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); Sweeney v. Bartow, 612 F.3d 571, 573 (7th Cir. 2010); Olsson v. Curran, 328 Fed. App'x 334, 335 (7th Cir. 2009) (nonprecedential decision); United States v. Castro, 937 F.2d 293, 296-97 (7th Cir. 1991); Neville v. Cavanaugh, 611 F.2d 673, 675 (7th Cir. 1979). The general rule is that the detainee must proceed with her claims through the regular state criminal proceedings, and may raise claims through a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 federal habeas corpus petition only after a state conviction.