Summary
noting that the "Supreme Court has held that the Attorney General through the Bureau of Prisons, as opposed to the district courts, is authorized to determine whether a defendant should receive credit for time spent in custody"
Summary of this case from Thornton v. United StatesOpinion
CRIMINAL ACTION 98-00146-KD-M.
February 12, 2009
ORDER
This matter is before the court on defendant's motion for review/release wherein he asks this court to review or cause to be reviewed the status of his present confinement by the appropriate government agency and determine that when given all credits to which he is entitled, he should be forthwith released from incarceration and reinstated to terms of supervised release (doc. 38). At the time of filing this motion, defendant was incarcerated at the Escambia County Detention Center, 316 Court St., Brewton, Alabama 36426. The inmate locator service provided by the Federal Bureau of Prisons indicates that defendant has commenced serving his federal sentence and is now incarcerated at FCI Jesup, Federal Correctional Institution, 2680 301 South, Jesup, Georgia 31599.
Because defendant is incarcerated in a federal correctional institution, the Attorney General, acting through the Bureau of Prisons, and not this Court, is responsible for computing any sentencing credits available to defendant. See United States v. Williams, 425 F.3d 987, 990 (11th Cir. 2005) ("the Supreme Court has held that the Attorney General through the Bureau of Prisons, as opposed to the district courts, is authorized to compute sentence credit awards after sentencing"). The Supreme Court has also held that the Bureau of Prisons has the authority to determine whether a defendant should receive credit for time spent in custody before the federal sentence commences. See United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 112 S.Ct. 1351 (1992). Therefore, defendant should first exhaust the administrative procedures provided by the Bureau of Prisons for requesting sentence credits before seeking review in this court. See, e.g.,United States v. Flanagan, 868 F.2d 1544, 1546 (11th Cir. 1989) ("a federal prisoner dissatisfied with the computation of his sentence must pursue the administrative remedy available through the federal prison system before seeking judicial review of his sentence").
The record before the court does not indicate that defendant has pursued or exhausted his administrative remedies. Because "[e]xhaustion of administrative remedies is jurisdictional"Williams, 425 F.3d at 990 (citation omitted), this court lacks jurisdiction over defendant's motion. Accordingly, defendant's motion for review/release is denied for lack of jurisdiction.