United States v. Brooks

41 Citing cases

  1. United States v. Hern

    926 F.2d 764 (8th Cir. 1991)   Cited 18 times
    In U.S. v. Hem, 926 F.2d 764 (8th Cir. 1991), the Eighth Circuit, citing Brooks, observed: "[a]lthough the use of a `middleman' may be common practice at gun shows, ยง 922(b) `is violated by a sham sale made to a resident when the transaction is really with a nonresident.'"

    We disagree. Although the use of a "middleman" may be common practice at gun shows, ยง 922(b) "is violated by a sham sale made to a resident when the transaction is really with a nonresident, and it is for the jury to decide, on all the relevant evidence . . . whether such a charade occurred or whether there was a bona fide sale to a resident." United States v. Brooks, 611 F.2d 614, 619 (5th Cir. 1980) (subsequent history omitted); see also United States v. Lawrence, 680 F.2d 1126, 1128 (6th Cir. 1982) (toleration of sham sales would in effect be "tantamount" to repeal of gun control legislation). We agree with the government that there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could find that Hern knew the transactions were sham.

  2. United States v. Garrett

    716 F.2d 257 (5th Cir. 1983)   Cited 34 times
    In Garrett, the defendants also had been active participants in the criminal activity; one defendant "originated the idea" of calling a Houston city councilman for the purpose of setting up a bribe, and both defendants had taken part in meetings and discussions to carry out a bribery scheme.

    One basis for this approach seems to be that inconsistent defenses will tend to "confuse" the jury, see Sears, supra, 343 F.2d at 143, due to the "inherent inconsistency" in saying at the same time that "I didn't do it," and "the government tricked or seduced me into doing it." United States v. Brooks, 611 F.2d 614, 618 (5th Cir. 1980). However, the now "fundamental rule that a defendant may not alternatively rely on inconsistent defenses of entrapment and denial of the commission of the crime has come under increasing attack," United States v. Hill, 626 F.2d 1301, 1303 n. 2 (5th Cir. 1980).

  3. United States v. Henry

    727 F.2d 1373 (5th Cir. 1984)   Cited 10 times
    Abandoning Greenfield rule altogether and returning to old requirement that defendant admit all the elements of the crime

    Similar instances abound. In United States v. Brooks, 611 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1980), Brooks did not deny selling guns illegally: only that he intended to violate the law. 611 F.2d at 616-17.

  4. Adventure Outdoors v. Bloomberg

    552 F.3d 1290 (11th Cir. 2008)   Cited 365 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that a claim under state law did not necessarily raise a federal issue when its elements did not implicate federal law

    Here, the defendants correctly concede that federal law prohibits participation by both buyers and sellers in straw purchases of firearms. See United States v. Ortiz, 318 F.3d 1030, 1038-39 (11th Cir. 2003) (upholding conviction of individual acting as straw purchaser); United States v. Nelson, 221 F.3d 1206, 1209-11 (11th Cir. 2000) (upholding conviction of "actual buyer" in straw purchase transaction); United States v. Brooks, 611 F.2d 614, 616 (5th Cir. 1980) (upholding conviction of seller in straw purchase transaction). However, the defendants argue that it is unclear whether federal law prohibits sales to straw purchasers in the context of this case, focusing specifically on whether participation in a simulated straw purchase is illegal.

  5. U.S. v. Bacon

    276 F. App'x 697 (9th Cir. 2008)

    Even assuming that ยง 925(a)'s exemption extends to "sell[ing]" firearms, 18 U.S.C. ยง 922(a)(5), this Court has held specifically that it does not apply to sales to undercover government agents. See Perri, 637 F.2d at 1337 (citing United States v. Brooks, 611 F.2d 614, 617-18 (5th Cir. 1980) (stating that ยง 925(a) "does not exempt any sale or delivery of firearms[,] [but] . . . expressly covers only the `transportation, shipment, receipt, or importation' of firearms `for the use of the United States'"), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Henry, 749 F.2d 203, 206 n. 2 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc)). The fact that Perri. involved a license revocation proceeding and not a criminal prosecution does not undermine this interpretation, particularly as Perri relied on Brooks, a criminal case, for its conclusion.

  6. United States v. Moore

    109 F.3d 1456 (9th Cir. 1997)   Cited 40 times
    Finding Gun Control Act was not unconstitutionally vague where "[t]he record show[ed] that both [defendants] understood their respective legal obligations"

    The Fifth Circuit rejected an analogous argument that section 922(a)(6) was constitutionally vague as applied to a straw transaction in United States v. Brooks, 611 F.2d 614, 617 (5th Cir. 1980), overruled on other grounds, United States v. Henry, 749 F.2d 203 (5th Cir. 1984). In Brooks, a gun dealer was convicted for an illegal straw sale to a nonresident.

  7. U.S. v. Straach

    987 F.2d 232 (5th Cir. 1993)   Cited 52 times
    Holding that although the jury improperly discussed penalties that might be imposed against the defendant, the verdict must stand where there is no evidence that they learned of these matters from an outside source

    The jury was entitled to assess the credibility of the witnesses and to disbelieve Straach's feigned innocence of the illegality of strawman transactions. The facts of this case are similar to those of United States v. Brooks, 611 F.2d 614, 616 (5th Cir. 1980), in which this court upheld a conviction under 18 U.S.C. ยง 922(b)(3) for the sale of firearms by a licensed Florida dealer to a nonresident. In Brooks, a nonresident attempted to buy a gun, but was told that to do so he would have to return with someone who was a Florida resident.

  8. United States v. Smith

    757 F.2d 1161 (11th Cir. 1985)   Cited 33 times
    In Smith, we held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant's motion for a continuance because the defendant failed to uncover the evidence he sought, despite having time to do so, and because the information he sought "appeared to be quite speculative."

    The consistency of the defenses presented by a defendant depends largely on what part of the prosecution's case he or she admits is true. While this Court has often held that a defendant asserting entrapment must admit all the criminal acts upon which the prosecution builds its case, United States v. Nicoll, 664 F.2d 1308 (5th Cir. Unit B), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1118, 102 S.Ct. 2929, 73 L.Ed.2d 1330 (1982); United States v. Crossman, 663 F.2d 607, 610 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 977, 102 S.Ct. 2243, 72 L.Ed.2d 851 (1982); United States v. Brooks, 611 F.2d 614, 618 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Williamson, 482 F.2d 508, 515 (5th Cir. 1973); Government of the Canal Zone v. Risbrook, 454 F.2d 725 (5th Cir. 1972); McCarty v. United States, 379 F.2d 285 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 929, 88 S.Ct. 291, 19 L.Ed.2d 281 (1967); Beatty v. United States, 377 F.2d 181, 186 (5th Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 389 U.S. 45, 88 S.Ct. 234, 19 L.Ed.2d 48 (1967), there are several recognized exceptions to this rule. The first, not applicable in this case, occurs when the government's case-in-chief injects substantial evidence of entrapment into the case.

  9. United States v. Henry

    749 F.2d 203 (5th Cir. 1984)   Cited 105 times
    Holding that evidence of prescriptions other than those charged in the indictment was admissible under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) because "[t]he extrinsic evidence provides background information concerning [defendant's] practices in dispensing Schedule II drugs to the same individual on a frequent basis in large quantities under at least questionable circumstances as to legitimate medical needs, and, thus, shows substantially identical acts."

    United States v. Garrett, 716 F.2d 257, 269-71 (5th Cir. 1983); United States v. Greenfield, 554 F.2d 179, 181-83 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 860, 99 S.Ct. 178, 58 L.Ed.2d 168 (1978); United States v. McKinley, 493 F.2d 547, 550-51 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Harrell, 436 F.2d 606, 611-12 (5th Cir.) cert. denied, 409 U.S. 846, 93 S.Ct. 49, 34 L.Ed.2d 86 (1972); United States v. Smith, 407 F.2d 202, 203-04 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 949, 90 S.Ct. 972, 25 L.Ed.2d 131 (1970); Sears v. United States, 343 F.2d 139, 142-44 (5th Cir. 1965); United States v. Henderson, 237 F.2d 169, 171-72 (5th Cir. 1956).United States v. Rey, 706 F.2d 145 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 104 S.Ct. 698, 79 L.Ed.2d 164 (1984); United States v. Nicoll, 664 F.2d 1308 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1118, 102 S.Ct. 2929, 73 L.Ed.2d 1330 (1982); United States v. Brooks, 611 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. McCarty, 379 F.2d 285 (5th Cir. 1967). See also United States v. Deutsch, 475 F.2d 55, 57 (5th Cir. 1973).

  10. Perri v. Dept. of Treasury; Bu. of Alcohol

    637 F.2d 1332 (9th Cir. 1981)   Cited 56 times
    Holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in affirming ATF's license revocation without first receiving repetitive evidence through additional testimony

    18 U.S.C. ยง 925(a)(1). This subsection does not exempt a sale of firearms through an undisclosed under-cover agent of the United States. United States v. Brooks, 611 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1980). To excuse a dealer's willful violation of the Act by selling to an unlawful purchaser simply because the government ultimately receives the firearm would circumvent the Act in a way Congress did not intend.