U.S. v. Boult

14 Citing cases

  1. United States v. Cree

    915 F.2d 352 (8th Cir. 1990)   Cited 16 times
    Reversing the § 3A1.1 adjustment when there was no evidence that the defendant knew of the victim's alcohol-related vulnerability or that defendant attacked the victim because of the vulnerability

    United States v. Creech, 913 F.2d 780 (10th Cir. 1990). See United States v. Boult, 905 F.2d 1137, 1139 n. 3 (8th Cir. 1990); United States v. Moree, 897 F.2d 1329, 1335-36 (5th Cir. 1990); United States v. Salyer, 893 F.2d 113, 116-17 (6th Cir. 1989). For example, this Court held in Boult that an enhancement for victim vulnerability was proper where the defendant chose his victim "because he would be an easy target" to defraud.

  2. U.S. v. Anderson

    349 F.3d 568 (8th Cir. 2003)   Cited 32 times
    Holding the sophisticated-means enhancement was appropriately applied in a ponzi scheme where the defendant tried to conceal his fraud by telling his victims that the shares they bought in the defendant's sham company would be compensated with worthless bonds of another sham company

    We review vulnerable victim determinations for clear error. United States v. Boult, 905 F.2d 1137, 1138-39 (8th Cir. 1990). Anderson's Presentence Report (PSR) recommended that both enhancements be imposed.

  3. U.S. v. Checora

    175 F.3d 782 (10th Cir. 1999)   Cited 56 times
    Holding that physical restraint occurred where defendant "tackled [victim] to the ground to prevent his escape"

    Although the focus of the vulnerable-victim enhancement must be on the particular traits of the victim, "information about a defendant may be relevant in assessing a victim's vulnerability." United States v. Tissnolthtos, 115 F.3d 759, 761-62 (10th Cir. 1997); see also United States v. Coates, 996 F.2d 939, 942 (8th Cir. 1993); United States v. Boult, 905 F.2d 1137, 1139 (8th Cir. 1990). Thus, a court may consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether the victim was particularly susceptible to criminal conduct.

  4. U.S. v. Stover

    93 F.3d 1379 (8th Cir. 1996)   Cited 18 times
    Holding "the district court lacked authority to leave the designation of the payee or payees entirely to the discretion of the probation office" because, "[a]s a general rule, the district courts should designate the recipient or recipients when ordering restitution pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3663"

    We review for clear error the district court's finding that there was a vulnerable victim in the present case. United States v. Cron, 71 F.3d 312, 314 (8th Cir. 1995); United States v. Boult, 905 F.2d 1137, 1138-39 (8th Cir. 1990) (existence of a vulnerable victim is a factual determination reviewable under the clearly erroneous standard). In the present case, we are not dealing with one of the types of victim vulnerability expressly enumerated in Section(s) 3A1.1 (i.e., age, physical or mental condition).

  5. U.S. v. Janis

    71 F.3d 308 (8th Cir. 1995)   Cited 14 times
    Holding that the perpetrator who lived with the victim knew or should have known of her vulnerability given their regular contact and the victim's history of ADHD, FAS, and learning disabilities

    This is a factual determination subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review. United States v. Boult, 905 F.2d 1137, 1139 (8th Cir. 1990). The district court did not improperly double count the victim's age because it relied on a number of factors related to the victim's mental disabilities or susceptibility to criminal conduct.

  6. U.S. v. Coates

    996 F.2d 939 (8th Cir. 1993)   Cited 6 times
    Affirming vulnerable victim enhancement for kidnapping in order to sexually abuse minors based on the age differences and the victims' small physical sizes

    Having determined that the district court did not penalize Coates twice based upon the age of his victim, we now turn to Coates's argument that the district court erroneously awarded him a two-level enhancement based upon the vulnerability of his victim pursuant to section 3A1.1. A sentencing court's finding that there was a vulnerable victim "is a factual determination reviewable under the clearly erroneous standard." United States v. Boult, 905 F.2d 1137, 1139 (8th Cir. 1990); United States v. Callaway, 943 F.2d 29, 31 (8th Cir. 1991). We have held that "[s]ection 3A1.1 is properly applied in cases . . . where the defendant chose the particular victim for his age, his mental condition, [or] his physical stature compared to that of the defendant."

  7. U.S. v. Ravoy

    994 F.2d 1332 (8th Cir. 1993)   Cited 7 times
    Holding that the victims of an equity skimming scheme were not unusually vulnerable based on their financial situations where the evidence did not demonstrate that they were coerced or that the selling prices used by defendant were below the fair market values.

    A vulnerable victim finding is a factual determination reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. United States v. Boult, 905 F.2d 1137, 1139 (8th Cir. 1990). Section 3A1.1 states:

  8. U.S. v. Seligsohn

    981 F.2d 1418 (3d Cir. 1992)   Cited 71 times
    Holding that "mail fraud counts" could not be grouped with "tax evasion" counts under subsection (d) because "the tax evasion . . . differed in nature" from and was "not an essential part of or related to" the false claims

    Melvin Seligsohn contends that the district court erred in granting a two-level enhancement under section 3A1.1 on the basis that he "knew or should have known that a victim of the offense was unusually vulnerable due to age, physical or mental condition, or that a victim was otherwise particularly susceptible to the criminal conduct." See United States v. Boult, 905 F.2d 1137, 1139 (8th Cir. 1990). Whether a victim is particularly vulnerable to certain types of criminal conduct is inherently a factual determination subject to a clearly erroneous standard of review.

  9. U.S. v. Newman

    965 F.2d 206 (7th Cir. 1992)   Cited 48 times
    Holding that a psychologist's testimony was admissible under Rule 803

    A number of fraud cases, some involving factual patterns comparable to that in the present case, have approved vulnerable-victim enhancements without insisting on evidence — besides the victim's own conduct — of a definite mental deficiency or psychiatric illness. United States v. Caterino, 957 F.2d 681, 683-84 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v. Pavao, 948 F.2d 74, 78-79 (1st Cir. 1991); United States v. Astorri, 923 F.2d 1052, 1055 (3d Cir. 1991); United States v. Boult, 905 F.2d 1137, 1139 (8th Cir. 1990); United States v. Altman, 901 F.2d 1161, 1165 (2d Cir. 1990). The upward departure for threats was clearly proper, though Newman argues not. As for departing for both bodily and psychological harm (and raising Newman's offense two levels for each), rather than merging the forms of harm into a single departure for purposes of assessing the appropriate increase in the offense level, such a merger would, we may assume, be required if the bodily harm were incidental to the psychological — for physical illness is a frequent by-product of psychological injury — or vice versa, for physical injury frequently gives rise to psychological illness.

  10. U.S. v. Callaway

    943 F.2d 29 (8th Cir. 1991)   Cited 20 times
    Holding that a defendant must choose his victim "as a `target'" for § 3A1.1 to apply

    We review a sentencing court's finding that there was a vulnerable victim for clear error. United States v. Boult, 905 F.2d 1137, 1139 (8th Cir. 1990). Section 3A1.1 of the Guidelines provides for an enhancement if the defendant knew or should have known that the victim of the offense was unusually vulnerable due to age, or physical or mental condition.